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PRELIMINARY REPORT

FOR

THE SWEDISH-RUSSIAN WORKING GROUP INTO THE FATE OF

RAOUL WALLENBERG

Susan Ellen Mesinai
Director, ARK Project
Independent Consultant

August 4, 1998

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS SUBMISSION INCLUDES 'SECTION ONE' ONLY
Final Draft

PRELIMINARY REPORT. PART ONE

Susan Ellen Mesinai

INTRODUCTION

In the absence of incontrovertible evidence, the key to the resolution of the mystery of Raoul Wallenberg's fate lies in the question of whether the Swedish diplomat died or disappeared in 1947. Arguments for both views arise in every aspect of this work, starting with the debate over the use of the term 'liquidatsia' in the Vishinsky paper to Molotov of May 14, 1947. While there are those who state that this use of the term was a strong hint to execute the man, a number of former Soviet officials maintain that this language refers rather to the 'resolution of the problem'. A number of procedures could be followed for this but the most likely -- and the one that most conforms with the circumstances we have seen -- is to isolate and intimidate the witnesses and "disappear the man."

Our task is not to argue semantics, nor to get lost in the credibility battles evoked by conflicting oral reports from eyewitnesses, whether former prisoners or official. My objective is rather to provide a fully documented context in which to evaluate this problem. This is being done by reviewing the files of a number of related prisoners in order to weigh the 'extreme case scenario' against the realities of the norm. These two poles of norm and extreme provide a grid against which all testimonies can be measured and charted, allowing us to evaluate not only the sketchy details of a single sighting but its place in the bigger picture. A growing understanding of grouping and movements of prisoners, of the apparatus itself, has proven critical to the investigation in process as have questions raised by analogous cases which may or may not prove tangential in the end.

While we are forced to deal with the problems generated by the absence or destruction of documents directly related to Wallenberg or his associate, Vilmos Langfelder, we rely upon the cross-referencing of pertinent details to reconstruct the missing information or, in more classified cases, to point to those registries and administrative files where such data might be found.

A final report on this material cannot be written, however, without more complete data, including the remaining files and follow-up requests. I am therefore using this opportunity not only to define the direction this work has taken as a result of the materials we have seen to date, but to move ahead with requests (most old, but some new) for information needed to complete our data gathering efforts over the next few months.

TIME FRAME

I have focused this particular phase of the investigation on the time frame between Wallenberg and Langfelder's arrests in 1945 and the Soviet replies to their respective governments in 1957 because it was during this period that their fates, one way or another, were sealed. I am attempting as detailed an examination as possible of the information put forth doing this time frame, including internal memoranda as well as formal exchanges, in order to lay a solid foundation upon which to conduct any further research that might become necessary into the medical or labor camp sightings of the later decades.

My Final Report will give these findings up through the Nanna Svartz/Myasnikov controversy of the early Sixties, and include the results not only from the Prisoner Files but Medical files, Phases One and Two, of the Medical Proposal.

AREAS OF INVESTIGATION

Other than the facts, including forensics, which will directly enable us to reconstruct Wallenberg and Langfelder's paper trails, I have divided my data gathering and analysis into the following sub-investigations:

1. Probable Danger Points between 1945 and 1957, starting with but not limited to the official Soviet death date of July 17, 1947;

2. Ways of Concealment or of 'Disappearing a Man' as pertains to this case;

3. The role of the witnesses and to what degree and in what way(s) Wallenberg and Langfelder were or were not separated from them; where and when;

4. Details of arrest, investigation and sentencing, including questions of jurisdiction. which could help us understand and track their fates;

5. The question of 'Important' versus 'Dangerous' and where it leads us (to be developed primarily in the Final Report)

6. Informants before and after the supposed death date and where that leaves us;

7. The question of 'Collective Embarrassment' (a term I have coined to mean the inability to divulge the truth about one case, in whole or in part, because it would reveal information about the fate of another foreign prisoner).

8. Unresolved intelligence links which continue to tie Wallenberg's fate with that of Anglo-American involvement in Hungary (to be left for the Final Report as it requires additional investigative research in Washington).

9. The inability to reveal the truth regarding this case, in whole or in part, because it touches upon Soviet operations or the work of Soviet agents;

10. The collection of pertinent medical data in anticipation of the Medical Investigation or to provide forensics.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PRELIMINARY REPORT

As this is only a Preliminary Report, the gathering of data is at various stages of completion, effecting the analysis and end result. Under no circumstances should this document be construed as conclusive. It is rather an open invitation to the Russian side to respond to my findings, requests and my thinking so that we can cooperate even more closely in this final stage.

I will confine my discussion to the highlights which could help us collectively tackle the basic issues in this case. At the same time, I have defined those documents or files which I think could help answer the questions at hand. Each of these requests relate to specific determinations and offer a means of establishing substantive evidence. It should be remembered that these findings directly reflect the 54 files we have seen to date, and could be altered by the remaining prisoner files as well as the results of our investigative questions or medical research.

Please note that I have limited this report to the first of the above-mentioned Sub-Investigations, with certain aspects of the interwoven. Further, smaller reports can be produced upon request, but this covers the most controversial material and is therefore the most significant.

THE RISK

While there is always a risk in presenting partial findings at a premature stage, I do so out of respect and thankfulness to the Russian side whose generous and well thought out cooperation has brought us to this place. In so doing, I welcome corrections in fact and in emphasis that would greatly improve the end result. It is also my hope that by placing my various follow-up requests in a specific context, the Russian side will be able to see that this is indeed a finite search whose every method is geared toward closure within the next several months. Again this depends upon receiving as much requested data as possible during the forthcoming stage.

It should be noted that while, in this report, I have been very forthright regarding the materials I

have seen, this is written under the strict terms of confidentiality set down before our research began. Particularly in sensitive areas caused by potentially overlapping mysteries, I am being frank about these matters because I do not expect anything set forth here to go beyond the Working Group. The Russian government has already initiated a number of steps to heal the abuses of previous regimes. I am only following in their wake when I raise issues which, resolved, will not only bring us much closer to the truth but honor the spirit generated by the present government's active cooperation.

MY THANKS

I remain thankful to both the Russian and Swedish sides for making this independent investigation possible. Through my on-site work, I can now attest to the invaluable contributions made over the past seven years by members of the Working Group. The documents which have been handed over have indeed provided a foundation for this time-consuming and meticulous effort. I am therefore all the more grateful for the access and insight I have been given. Special thanks go to the archivists who patiently re-created their steps even as they placed far reaching requests for files in order to assure the continuity and completeness of this analysis.

I MOST PROBABLE DANGER POINTS, 1945 - 1957

The Gromyko Memorandum of 1957 establishes Wallenberg's death date as July 17, 1947, based on the attached Smoltsov document. Our investigation would suggest rather three possible danger periods, the first based on the above and current testimonies of former Soviet officials. The latter are prompted by our findings in the Prisoner Files and preliminary analysis of the Vladimir cards copied in 1990 by the independent team

These three periods are:

- 1947, either as 'execution' or the result of 'acute measures' in an effort to recruit, as well as a possible heart attack .
- 1952, if indeed execution; otherwise 1953-55 for reasons of health;
- 1955-56 for reasons of 'collective embarrassment' and/or unresolved intelligence issues related to Anglo-American interests in Hungary and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.

1947 - MOSCOW

1. While recent oral testimony from various KGB officials have suggested other causes of death than the heart attack mentioned in the Smoltsov document, they all adhere to the July 1947 death date. The difficulty here is that there is no legitimate, witnessed document to substantiate this claim. Furthermore, if one views Wallenberg, not as a 'super-hero' but as one of a special group of war prisoners charged with being Fascists or of collaborating with the Nazi regime against the Soviet Union and her Allies – this death date comes too soon. With the exception of the 'Polish convicted' leaders of the Polish 'Government' in exile, tried and sentenced in early 1945 — the investigation process for those with whom Wallenberg sat between 1945-47 was just warming up. Prisoners who had wall tapping contact with Wallenberg in Lefortovo only began to be sentenced in 1948, while those with whom he had more substantial association were sentenced primarily in 1952, with a few small groups of closely associated prisoners going out in 1950 and 1951.

Furthermore, truly important prisoners like the Polish or Baltic leaders remained numbered until their sentencing. Wallenberg, we know from the file of Kitschmann, Page 99, was known by his own name — at least while under the jurisdiction of Kartashov of the 4th Department of the Third Main Directorate which continued at least until August 1946. If this situation changed, it did so only in early 1947 where Wallenberg's transfer to Lubyanka may also mark his coming under the jurisdiction of the Investigative Unit for Especially Important or Grave Matters. If Wallenberg suddenly became a significantly important prisoner whose fate hung in the balance even in 1947, some real ground for this must be established.

Given that Willi Roedl, Wallenberg's long-term cellmate, was still under the jurisdiction of the 4th Department of the Third Main Directorate when he died, did Roedl stay under that jurisdiction between February 1947 and October 1947, while being held at Internal Prison?

In order to evaluate the question of international 'embarassment' versus Soviet conviction of Wallenberg's guilt as the primary motivation in determining his fate, it will be necessary to reconstruct the testimonies against him through increased access to the investigative files, in those cases that might contain something of relevance.

In order to give weight to the Soviet argument that Wallenberg died in July 1947, it is very important that we be allowed to review the prisoner and Ministry of Health files of those who did die that year —namely Bethlen, Marek, and Roedl from our original list, and Esau Oggins. It is also important to examine the medical file of Garet Van der Waals who died in August 1948. Like Wallenberg and Langfelder, also said to have died in 1948, van der Waals was in his prime while Bethlen, Marek and Roedl were much older. It is also relevant that van der Waals -- like Schandl, Clement and Wallenberg -- was directly under Abakumov's watch.

2. In this context, we would like to inquire as to the fate of British Warrant Officer, Reginald H. Barratt, also known as Stanley Godden, who worked with Van der Waals, Clement and Schandl in Budapest, had connections with the Swedish Legation and — like Wallenberg — had been advised to seek the protection of the Soviet authorities when he approached them and disappeared. The British Government has established that Barratt also was taken into the Soviet Gulag. It should be noted that the Soviet Government denied detention/possession of Wallenberg, van der Waals and Barratt — all three.

If correlations could be shown between such denials and death, this would lend weight not only to the death claim but give a clearer context to the role of Vishinsky, inasmuch as he issued the denials to the foreign powers in question.. If the Russian side could offer examples of others whose presence in the Soviet Union was denied, with information as to whether they died or disappeared, this would give us more information from which to draw our conclusions.

3. At the Moscow Conference of October 1943, which established the Tripartite Allies' commitment to 'unconditional surrender,' the format for Allied victory and deception plans for Scandinavia and the Balkans; Molotov reported to the American side that Stalin was 'violently opposed' to all forms of Eastern European federation, confederacy or any form of economic union — including what was called the 'Scandinavian/Danubian conspiracy.' Along these lines also, Stalin kept a sharp eye out for separate peace deals and/or any under-the-table negotiations with the Western Allies that could effect the Eastern Front or the planned 'spheres of influence.' This would include ransoming Jews or others in exchange for critical materials to be used by the Germans exclusively on the Eastern Front. This 'violent opposition' may account for possible acute measures against Raoul Wallenberg in 1947.

The question of Eastern European confederacy, resistance and its links to both Scandinavia and the Anglo-American Allies can only be addressed by reviewing the investigative files of Bethlen, Jankowski, Chatlosh, Hatz, Marek, van der Waals, Field, Rado, Mayer and Feller, Beckerle, Roedl, Volkov and Gfrorener from our original list and others arrested because of their resistance or intelligence work in Hungary, such as Victor BONDOR, Zoltan MIKO and Elemer BENCZES (also known as GEIGER) whose father helped shape Wallenberg's mission in Stockholm. In most of the cases noted, there is mounting proof of a direct connection with Wallenberg.

4. Nikonov, Gordievsky and Kondrashev (among others) have all indicated that Wallenberg did not die of a heart attack but was shot. Had this occurred before May 26, 1947, it might have proven more probable and easier to trace. However, rasstrel was canceled on that date and not reintroduced until January 12, 1950. If there are exceptions, we do not know of them.

If the Russian side could name instances of foreign prisoners shot during the period that rasstrel was no longer in effect, and would allow us to review some of these files, this would support such an argument. However, in such a case, we would need to know by whose order, for what reasons and how an execution which ran contrary to order was documented and put into effect. Who really did the 'dirty work' and where were these executions carried out?

5. Mr. Kondrashev has identified the documents that were being reviewed in the interrogation of late March/April 1947 in which he served as translator as those found in Wallenberg's possession upon his arrest. In subsequent conversations he has stated that if the document proved Wallenberg had a direct connection with American intelligence, this would be reason enough to execute him. I have on several occasions brought up to Mr. Vinogradov the importance of those documents to the Americans, as expressed by recently declassified CIA documents. For example, in a September 1945 top secret cable from Dean Acheson to Washington reports that the Swedes knew Wallenberg's papers had been seized and that he had been taken into the Gulag, and feared that he might never come home. The Nansen Plan, which was among those papers, would hardly seem grounds for execution.

In response to this I have now initiated, in my capacity as Director of the ARK Project, a concentrated effort to determine the nature of these documents through declassification of important American documents. I am asking that a concentrated effort be made by the Russian side to retrieve these documents, as a way of establishing a possible motive for execution and/for isolating the man for information purposes or for an eventual exchange..

6B. Related to this, we noted in the file of Jan Spishiak, the Slovak diplomat arrested and interrogated by Smersh in Budapest at the same time as Wallenberg, that Spishiak's documents stayed with him for a time and would seem to have been finally removed in Internal Prison in December 1946. (Alternatively they had already been removed and were being brought forth in anticipation of his return to Czechlosovakia). These are clearly unidentified papers in foreign languages, notepad with notes, and various photographs. All items were placed in one parcel with 'seal Number 14.' Received by the Officer on Duty, MGB, 18 December 1946. The backside of this document reads: handed over to Department. Registered in book for various departments. Received, Major Weindorf, Room 671. 18 XII 46. According to the archivist, when Spishiak was repatriated to stand trial in Czechlosovakia, these documents were forwarded under separate cover as evidence.

Please locate the registry which records Spishiak's documents as 'seal Number 14' in December of 1946. As this seems to be an exceptional procedure, we would be interested in a complete list of those whose documents (not currency or possessions) were so parceled and sealed in the years 1945, 1946 and 1947.

Please scan the general registry of search for seizure of documents of all diplomats on our list and provide a list of the name of the diplomat, date of seizure and receipt numbers. How many of these documents were actually returned to their owners? For example, when Mayer and Feller were repatriated, did their documents go with them? If not, where did they go? (The fate of the documents of the following would be especially relevant: Beckerle, Feller, Chatlosh, Roedl, Bethlen, Hatz, Marek, Gerstenberg, Rensinghoff, Nakamura, Okulicki, Jankowski, Wallenberg, Munters, Merkis, Urbshis as well as any other numbered prisoners who were diplomats.)

Given that Spishiak, Chatlosh and Turanets occupied cells in Internal Prison just before Kitschmann and Schlitter were sent back to occupy them, after which Kitschmann and Hatz were transferred to Lefortovo to take over Wallenberg and Roedl's cell 203: would we be correct in assuming that independent of their respective fates all of these men were in the approximately same stage of development, i.e. that they were 'special contingents?'?

Is it possible that Wallenberg's documents were intended for eventual use as potential evidence for Nurnberg or for eventual show trials in Eastern Europe? Is there any indication of this from other sources? What would be the most likely use of these documents in the Spring of 1947?

6. As the issue of Wallenberg being an 'American spy' has been cited as the probable cause of his extreme fate, whether death by execution or long term detention, more attention should be paid to the investigative efforts of the American Departments of the various directorates. Because Wallenberg's cellmates were Fascists, and because the charge against Wallenberg was, at least initially, collaboration with the Nazis against the Soviet Union and its Allies — investigation to date has focused on the German Department. Given that being a British or American spy may, in itself, constitute a 'grave matter' that could result in death or numbered disappearance, this may reflect an omission on all our parts.

Under what unit, department and directorates were the American department(s) and who constituted its heads? Who were its most expert interrogators? In general, what were its strategic goals?

In this context, kindly provide us with a fuller understanding of the identity and/or nature of the case against Vladimir Prisoner Number One, whose card describes him as a Hungarian accused of being an 'American spy.'

Thirdly, would the transfer of Wallenberg from the 4th Department of the Third Main Directorate to the Investigative Unit of Especially Important/Grave Matters/Cases have been coincidental with investigating questions of his having been an Anglo-American spy?

7B. Also, the only file of those on our original list where we can be certain of an American connection is that of Noel Field, formerly of the U.S. State Department, OSS, and Unitarian Service Committee which provided helpful intelligence information to the War Refugee Board in its early stages. Field defected to the Soviet side and was later the subject of a show trial in Budapest where he was accused of pro-Zionist, pro-Titoist leanings and of being an American spy because of his close association with Allen Dulles.

Outside research would suggest that Field's case is analogous to Wallenberg's not only in their mutual interest in rescue, but through overlapping contacts in Budapest during the War, including Rajk. There exists also indications that not only Field, but Wallenberg may have had a working connection with Allen Dulles and his associates while carrying out his mission in Hungary.

For this and other reasons, we repeat our request to review Field's personal file and address questions to the investigative file. This is particularly vital in order to better understand the American Budapest connection, how it functioned and in what specific ways it threatened Soviet security concerns.

7. Questions have arisen around the Smoltsov document — lately through the files of Okulicki and those turned over to us from Vladimir. Smoltsov's distinctive signature is easy to read. It appears in the cases of Patadaridze, Shulgin, Jankowski and Okulicki only for the most routine form of processing. In the Doctor's Report introduced as a forensic sample of Smoltsov's signature, Okulicki is being evaluated in June of 1945 for his fitness to work in a labor camp. When it comes to critical medical concerns like the hunger striking which precipitated Okulicki's death -- it is not Smoltsov who is called in to observe or oversee the emergency operation but Dr. Tsitronblat from the Central Polyclinic of the Medical Department of the MGB.

Tsitronblat's personal records and medical reports should be examined, as well as those of that unit not only to determine what might have transpired in the case of Wallenberg, but the chain of command for reporting in general.

Smoltsov's relationship to Abakumov should be compared to that of the Medical Department of the MGB. Smoltsov's correspondence from 1945 through 1951 should be studied to determine the nature and content of his reporting and to whom? How often did he report to Abakumov? How often did he deal with a special or critical situation? Does he figure in the death of any other important prisoners?

8. In terms of the text of the Smoltsov document itself, we ask the Russian side to define through parallel cases or use of language the following terms: 'Because of your

instruction personally to watch ( ) Walenberg....' We further need to understand why such a 'watch' would be necessary unless he was already ill, in which case he should not have been in his cell but in Butyrka (See below).

Please comment also on the phrase 'presumably as a result of infarct of the myocardium. As 'presumably' does not do justice to the meticulous reporting in the various final stage medical histories and autopsies we have seen, is this a hint as to how to write out a pseudo-medical report? May we infer from this that Smoltsov would be responsible for the actual cause of death? Does this explain the absence of three witnesses to legalize this handwritten note to file?

9. The prisoner files would show that all medical situations, from severe malnutrition to attempted suicide, were referred to Butyrka Medical Service rather than being treated in-house.

Given the active role of the Butyrka Medical Service, the function of the Sanitorium Service of any Moscow prison, but particularly Lubyanka, should be clearly defined.

Butyrka Medical registries should be examined for Wallenberg as an incoming patient (or for an autopsy). This is also important because of the text of Supplement Number 3 to the Written Report by Molotov and Serov of April 28, 1956 which states that Wallenberg died in the prison hospital. To facilitate this, it is very important to identify Wallenberg's registration number at Internal Prison since, it has been noted, the sick retain their identification number from the prison where they are officially being detained — to distinguish them from those sent directly as prisoners of Butyrka.

Wallenberg and Langfelder's registration numbers can be determined from the Internal Prison registry for January - February, 1945. Such numbers do not change even after a substantial absence so once these numbers have been determined, the Butyrka Medical Service registries could be scanned for years — not only the 1947 time period.

10. Autopsy reports for the prisoners we have considered were consistently performed by the team of Moscow Medical Forensic specialist, Semenovsky, and Lt. Colonel of Butyrka Medical Service, Finayev, with a third doctor sometimes as an added witness. This can be seen in the cases of Van der Waals, Okulicki, Marek and Roedl whose autopsies and death certificates we have been able to review.

As Dr. Semenovsky is well versed in 'signing off on' extremely sensitive deaths — including documents related to the Katyn Forest Massacre — why was a Smoltsov document even necessary?

Again, we must inquire as to the legal consequences of the absence of three witnesses on a

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death report or autopsy, as in the case of the Smoltsov document, and on the failure to report a death, as in the case of Jankowski and Prisoner Number Eleven, listed in the 1952-54 Section of this Report. Do these omissions create a situation where, from a legal perspective, the death did not really happen?

11. In the deaths of the individuals who died while under the jurisdiction of Moscow prisons, responsibility for ordering an autopsy and cremation at Lubyanka rested with Mironov, as Head of Internal Prison. Mironov's jurisdiction reached so far that he oversaw the resolution of all matters attending the death of Roedl who died on a transport to Camp 27, Krasnogorsk. Both Mironov and Ionov of Lefortovo were very thorough in their responsibilities. They took accountability seriously and had no compunctions about demanding that Abakumov and/or the Especially Important Matters Unit take responsibility for those in their custody. Therefore, the initiative which Smoltsov implied he could take in the case of the death of the 'prisoner Walenberg' not to perform an autopsy and to order his cremation does not fit with the procedures used in comparable cases.

If however there exist other instances where Smoltsov took such steps, we would re-consider this reading of the situation.

12. Okulicki, Page 128A. Handwritten pencil note. "Corpse of prisoner Okulicki could be cremated in the crematorium on general grounds as usual. Agreed with Comrade Likashov.' [Alternatively: Lukashov]. Short note says that first page is missing, signed Ivan Nikolayevich. Telephone 296-1405."

Please define the procedures involved in 'on general grounds as usual.'

Why 'could' instead of 'should'? What are the other options or concerns in weighing this decision? If not here, where else would the body be placed for disposal?

Where are the actual documents ordering and witnessing this cremation? Do records actually exist to show where and when the cremation took place and where the ashes were placed, as has been described in comparable cases such as that of Istavan Bethlen?

Assuming Comrade Likashov to be the same who interrogated Okulicki on December 4, 1946 after the Polish head of the Home Army began his final hunger strike on December 2, why was he consulted in the process to dispose the body. What was agreed? How accountable would Likashov be for the death of Okulicki and why? (I raise this point particularly because 'interrogations' have also been described by the prisoners as 'negotiations.' In this instance where obviously no accord could be reached, self-induced death was a certainty. Okulicki had made this clear.)

Do classified documents or notes still exist from the files of Mironov, Leonov, Likashov and 'Ivan Nikolayevich' related to the disposal of Okulicki's body?

As a point of discussion, if we take the case of Okulicki as a possible parallel: if Wallenberg's death was the result of his refusal to be turned, who would be the most likely persons to consult regarding the disposition of his body? Can one infer that whoever was consulted may have had a direct hand in acute measures leading to this tragic event?

13. Related to the Vishinsky request of May 14, 1947 to resolve the controversy generated by Wallenberg's detention, we refer to Schandl Pages 8 - 15, October 1948 to December 1949 as a possible parallel. Chief of Lefortovo, Ionov, notifies Major Borashnikov, as Chief of Section A; Leonov as Chief of the Investigative Unit for Especially Important Prisoners; and Pitovranov as Chief of the Second Main Directorate that Schandl is still being held without interrogation for years. Ionov requests explanation and to take all measures to 'move the question ahead.' While the language is not identical, it should be procedurally compared with the steps involved in Vishinsky's complaint 'Insofar as the Wallenberg case remains unresolved until the present moment,'(i.e. without moving, no one cares to resolve it), 'I ask you to order Abakumov to present information on the subject of this affair and suggestion about its liquidatsia.'

In terms of evaluating the implied tendency to extremes of the parties in question, it should be noted that Schandl was not liquidated. Rather a reply came from Deputy Chief of Section A, instructing Ionov not to give a report (spravka) for the arrest of the arrested....Schandl and Clement.' On February 10, 1950 and on June 13, 1950 Pitovronov made the decision that Schandl was guilty of being an agent of British intelligence and should be placed in a special prison under strict isolation. Schandl was sent to Vladimir as Prisoner Number 26 without ever having gone through the normal procedures of investigation and sentencing. This is indicated by the fact that later, when Schandl applied to Voroshilov for a pardon, the chairman of the Presidium [committee?] noted that Schandl's request could not be considered because 'the decision of the Special Tribunal was not in the personal file.'

How does the Russian side view the differences between these two cases, Schandl and Wallenberg, where in both cases there is dissension between Soviet authorities as to the procedures in question. Can they offer concrete information to establish why one man was supposedly executed while the other was not?

Why did the answer come from Section A? Were they the appointed liaison with the prison authorities?

Has a thorough examination been conducted for comparable questions being raised by any of

the heads of Moscow prisons where the response 'not to report on the arrest of the arrested' would apply to Wallenberg or Langfelder?

Since General Pitovranov is still alive, perhaps he would be willing to comment directly on the processing of more problematic cases such as Schandl, Clement and Pap — not only procedurally but to enable us to understand why they, and van der Waals while alive, were so valuable to the investigation. This is necessary to understand more specifically the Soviet strategic concerns of the time, that would justify the detention and possible death of a number of seemingly peripheral cases from the Budapest area.

14. While the form of Wallenberg's death in 1947 is grounds for debate, there seems to be no question among the Russian authorities that Wallenberg refused to be recruited. This leaves the question of who was attempting to recruit him, for what operation and when? (Not only Stolyarov, but Pitovranov have testified that Utekin of Komitet Informatsia knew a lot about Wallenberg due to an active interest in his potential usefulness as an 'agent of influence.') Sinitsyn has stated in his memoires that he took part in an effort to recruit Wallenberg. The name of Sinitsyn has also appeared as an interrogator for Walter Schlitter/Schlutter, an informant who sat with a number of Wallenberg/Langfelder witnesses. This interrogation took place in May 10, 1945 from 22:40 until 0:20. Wallenberg was still in Internal Prison at that time, but had been transferred from Cells 121-123 which he shared for six weeks with Schlitter in February - March 1945.

Assuming this to be the same Sinitsyn whose name, like that of Abakumov, appears rarely as an interrogator; it is important to clarify under whose jurisdiction and with what goal his interrogations were being conducted.

Are there any instances in which Fitin carried on interrogations during the 1945 - 1949 period? Please study them for Raoul Wallenberg or anyone who might be him, including Numbered Prisoners. Under whose jurisdiction were each of these conducted at the time?.

What was the content of Sinitsyn's interrogation of Schlitter? Who read or signed off on this material?

Given Sinitsyn's admitted role in Stockholm and Helsinki during the last years of the War, his familiarity with the Wallenberg family and their international ties, an effort should be made to itemize the interrogations conducted by Sinitsyn to determine if they all address the same approximate area(s) of concern.

15. July 17, 1947 is given as the official date for Raoul Wallenberg's death, according to the Gromyko Memorandum. Subsequent research by the Russian side has uncovered

the existence of a July 17, 1947 Memorandum, 3044A from Abakumov to Molotov, which is assumed to carry the answer to the fate of Wallenberg. The Abakumov Oggins Memorandum 2773A of May 21, 1947 has been offered as proof that 3044A refers to the execution of the prisoner in question. This invites further analysis.

A number of issues should be raised in connection to these two memorandum. First Oggins was an American prisoner whose presence in the Soviet GULAG was certain. He had been interviewed by representatives of his Embassy in June of 1943 and they had stated their willingness to repatriate him. Oggins had also been sentenced and served his full term; he should have already been released. This made an immediate decision necessary.

Secondly, Abakumov's recommendation for the fate of Oggins is addressed to Stalin and Molotov. Memorandum 3044A regarding Wallenberg is addressed only to Molotov. Abakumov's 'solution' in the case of Oggins -- to execute him and make a false medical history and predate his death certificate so that it would appear he had died of aggravated tuberculosis of the spine a few weeks before his release date --.presumably required Stalin's consent. It is hard to believe that two months later, the execution of a man as internationally valuable as Raoul Wallenberg required only the consent of Molotov or, no consent at all.

It should be remembered that, at that time, it was not known that Wallenberg was held captive in the Soviet Union. Therefore, the denial set forth in the Vishinsky Memorandum of August 18, 1947 may have been sufficient 'solution' to the problem. From this perspective, the rounding up of the witnesses on July 22, 1947 would appear a sensible step to establish how much was known about the presence of prisoners Wallenberg and Langfelder, prior to preparing the Memorandum.

Kindly provide comparable memoranda to the Council of Ministers regarding the fates of Okulicki, Yasukovich, (1946) and Bethlen and Marek (1947). To whom were they addressed -- Stalin, Molotov, others, a combination of the above? What is their date, memorandum number and who signed them? If there were no reports via the Council of Ministers, how were these deaths reported to Stalin and by whom?

Please examine other cases from that time, even from those not on our list, to help us analyze how deeply these officials were involved in such matters, and to define what prisoners were of concern to whom and why.

16. While emphasis had been placed on the July 22,1947 interrogations in the past certain key pieces of information emerged which could be helpful in better understanding Wallenberg's fate. The first is that neither Loyda, who sat with both Wallenberg and Langfelder, or Hille were interrogated in Moscow at that time. Secondly, Schlitter — Raoul's first cellmate with Richter — was interrogated by Kartashov, at the end with

Ernst Huber who later became his long term cellmate. Thirdly, the emphasis on the July 22nd interrogations may have obscured the fact that Gustav Richter was interrogated on July 17 for six hours and fifteen minutes. As this is supposedly Wallenberg's death date, this is an important coincidence.

We would like a complete list of all those interrogated in Moscow prisons on July 22, 1947 to determine who else may have been included in the inquiries conducted by Kartashov in Internal and Kuzmishin in Lefortovo. For example, were comparable interrogations taking place in Butyrka and, if so, with whom? Who conducted these interrogations?

It is further necessary to determine who was placed in isolation immediately after such interrogations and who not. For example, was Schlitter isolated or was he placed in a cell with another significant player, such as Roedl or Langfelder who was brought to Internal Prison the next day? (Regarding the overlapping interrogations of Schlitter and Huber by Kartashov on July 22, 1947: as Schlitter was known to have sat with Wallenberg and Huber to have had a good rapport with Langfelder, could this indicate some form of preparation for the informant Schlitter to sit with Langfelder?)

Fuller attention should be paid to the July 17, 1947 interrogation registry and the days before and after. If Richter was interrogated extensively at that time, there are good reasons to expect that Roedl would also have undergone an interrogation.

MGB transport registries should be examined between the May 14, 1947 until October 14th when Roedl was sent to Krasnogorsk to determine if Wallenberg was sent to another Moscow prison or out of Moscow during that time. Once again, it is critical to have Wallenberg's registration number for Internal Prison.

17. As the Lubyanka Emergency Registry for July and August 1947, provided by the Russian side, has already shown: there is no report of an emergency heart attack in a cell, only of a suicide attempt by Gudenka, S.N., a female prisoner, on July 18, 1947 at 1:40 AM, which was handled by the Director of Transport for the Ministry of State Security. "Comrade Bojarsky was informed.'.

Given the role of the Director of Transport in the suicide attempt of Gudenka, we should determine if her attempt to take her life took place while en route from Lubyanka to another prison or camp? If so, we should make certain that this particular emergency registry records both events inside of Lubyanka and for those en route, but still in the custody of Internal Prison.

Roedl's file is important to understand how a living person who dies en route is documented not only in the prison or special camp but in the transport registries and among the archives of

the Convoy Troops.

NOTE: In a separate report on 'Disappearance' I will be including an itemized request to review archives of specific Convoy Troops at specific times to verify certain camp sightings. In the interim, however, it is important to complete our Vladimir transport research for the years 1947 - 1957. In particular, I have asked for the Vladimir prisoner registration number of P.A. KUTUPOV, who arrived on July 25, 1947 with V. V. Shulgin and Constantin Volkov. As these three Russian nationals traveled in open convoy, I have also asked if there was another closed or enforced convoy to Vladimir prison at that time. It would be of great assistance if the Transport records from Internal Prison to Vladimir Prison for the periods 1947 - 1949 could be reviewed for the name of Wallenberg or for an unidentified prisoner who might be Wallenberg, that is a Numbered Prisoner or one sharing his birth date and probable Article and Sentence of 25 years for espionage or having his Internal Prisoner Registration Number.

I also repeat my request to be allowed to complete my study of the kartotecha of Vladimir Prison which I began with the permission of the Prison Authorities there in March of 1997.

18. A further problem is generated by the fact that there are a number of eyewitness sightings in Moscow prisons, particularly Lefortovo, which come after the alleged July 7, 1947 death date.

We renew our request for the files of Maximillan ANGELIS, Friedrich BAYER, Zoltan RIVO, Helmut SCHNEIDER (Lieutenant Tank Commander at Lefortovo whose early camp record we have seen, but this shows no record of his time in Lefortovo), Andre SHIMKEVITCH (alternatively SIENKEVICH) from our original list.

We also need to request the files of the following additional witnesses: Rudiger ADELMANN; Claudio DI MOHR, Kurt GERUM, Hubert HENGSTENBERG; Erich KAHLER (or KOHLER), Karl KRAEMER; Admiral KRAFFT, Hauptmann KREIDENWEISS, Heinz LINGE; Oscar NIEDERMAYER; Armando ODENIGO; OSTEREICH; QUADE, Senior and Junior (uncle/nephew or father/son); Wilhelm RODDE; Af DE SANDBERG; Adolph SCHMIDT, Gunther SCHMIDT, Walter SCHMIDT, Elizabeth SCHREIBER; Karl SUPPRIAN; Joachim VORWERK; Hans Erich VOSS or FOSS; Helmut WEIDLUNG.

Finally, as has been requested in previous correspondence, we urgently require the opportunity to study the Butyrka Prison Incoming Registry for those prisoners who were transferred from Lefortovo on March 30/31, 1950 — including but not limited to Richter, Kitschman, Hille, Loyda, Hoffstetter, Pelkonen, Gfrorener, Gerstenberg, Bentivegni, Grossheim Krisko. As Grossheim Krisko testified to the Swedish Government in 1954 that he was convinced that Wallenberg was among those in this group of 100-110, it would

greatly accelerate our research to be able to affirm or deny this. As Schlitter, Huber, Beckerle and a number of the other prisoners on our list arrived within the next week (the first week in April 1950) we would like to review the incoming during this time frame (March 30 through April 10, 1950) to define the full contingent of persons who were passed to the jurisdiction of Butyrka and the Second Main Directorate for the pre-sentencing phase of their detention process.

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1952 - 1954

1. The October 13, 1954 letter from Deputy Foreign Minister, Gromyko, to KGB Chairman, Serov, asks the latter to report 'when and under what circumstances Raoul Wallenberg died.' Serov replies on November 3, 1954:'The Committee on State Security doesn't have anything to add to the information by the Minister of State Security of the USSR dated March 3, 1952, Number 2816/i about Wallenberg, R.' Ignatiev's letter to Gromyko of that date simply reiterates the position set forth in the Vishinsky Memorandum of August 18, 1947 that Wallenberg was not to be found on the territory of the Soviet Union.

What prompted Gromyko to raise the question of 'when and under what circumstances' at this time? (The issue of Wallenberg's fate was certainly not new to Gromyko who, as U.N. Ambassador, had been approached repeatedly by dignitaries such as Eleanor Roosevelt to clarify the circumstances surrounding his disappearance.)

Why now ask the question this way? Were mounting Swedish inquiries enough to drive him to try to crack through the silence and ambiguity every query met? Or had rumors actually begun to circulate about Wallenberg's fate that would force him to take command of the situation?

Does Serov's adherence to the Ignatiev reply indicate that, no matter what the real facts, the answer of the Deputy Foreign Minister should only reflect the reply of the August 18, 1947 Vishinsky Memorandum?

2. Most of the prisoners of Wallenberg's importance, including those with whom he had contact in Budapest, were sentenced in 1952, either by OSO (Special Tribunal or Session/MGB) or Military Tribunal. A partial listing of those sentenced at this time include *Franz Rudolph Gfrorener*, alias Dr. Karl Schmidt, an Abwehr military intelligence figure with whom Wallenberg had dealings related to Jewish rescue in Budapest. Gfrorener was a triple agent who had paid connections with American

intelligence as of May 1944. Gfrorener was sentenced to death by rasstrel.[1] His execution was reported to have taken place in April 1952, although the requisite paperwork is absent from his file. *Alfred Gerstenberg*, German Air Command at Ploesti, who had military and economic connections in Rumania, Poland and Hungary, was given a twenty-five year sentence for espionage but warned that had 'rasstrel not been cancelled', it would have been considered in his case. (An inaccuracy because rasstrel had already been re-instated). Gerstenberg's air force position and relation to the oil fields of Rumania could easily put him in contact with the Wallenberg family whose cartel interests included SKF and Rumanian oil concerns. *Heinrich Grossheim-Krisko* who worked with Wallenberg at the Swedish Legation in Budapest and *Gustav Richter*, Police Attache in Rumania and one of Wallenberg's first cellmates. Both were accused of having connections with 'an especially important prisoner' and given a 25 years sentence for espionage. They went to Vladimir as part of the special **H** series (see Numbering). *Otto Hatz*, Hungarian Military Attache, who had connections with Wallenberg in Budapest, but who defected to the Soviet side in November 1944. Hatz, though also a triple agent, was given a fifteen year sentence, taking into account certain favors he had rendered the Soviet government, and sent to Ozerny. *Theodor Krummei*, Gestapo Police Attache in Prague, present also in Budapest where he was involved in the Joel Brand affair as well as financial transactions related to the exchange of Jews; *Bela Kovacs*, leader of the Smallholders Party of Hungary with whom Wallenberg had a large number of political connections. *Franz Bentivegni*, head of Abwehr intelligence sentenced with Gerstenberg and sent to Vladimir. Bentivegni was a one time cell mate of Otto Hatz from whom he claims to have first heard of Raoul Wallenberg.

We wish to study the protocol summaries for those sentenced by OSO and the Military Tribunal, named as well as numbered, for 1952. These should include those sentenced with the prisoners mentioned above as well as the previously numbered Baltic leaders on our list sentenced and sent to Vladimir. It should also include anyone with the **H** *designation for Vladimir to complete the series we have already been studying.*

3. The survival of the above prisoners, all of whom were repatriated with the exception of Gfrorener, does not ensure that Wallenberg lived to pass through the same investigative process. However, an important question is raised by the file of Gfrorener in May of 1946 when his investigation was interrupted 'in order to make further arrests.' The decision to interrupt the primary investigation was based on the need for testimony 'without which it is impossible to conduct or complete the investigation in this case'

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[1] It should be noted that most, if not all of the capital punishment sentences we have seen in files or on prisoner cards were commuted to fifteen years of hard labour.

and 'being guided by the special instruction on the current case.' This raises the question of how important Wallenberg was as a witness to another grave matter and, if so, to whom. Gerstenberg's formal arrest, for example, was based on testimonies from Tillessen, Dietl, Spalke, Schoerner and Richter 'given in preliminary investigation.'

The inter-relation of testimonies leads not only to the question of whether or not a live witness is needed for future phases of an investigation, but also whether or not a prisoner 'connected to an especially important prisoner' need be further detained if an when the primary prisoner in question has died.

In this context, it is imperative to determine the identity of the 'especially important prisoner' to whom Grossheim-Krisko and Richter were each connected. Are these the same person? As we understand that the investigative files studied by the Swedish side do not reveal this information, are there any alternative routes to determine the identities in question?

When a connection or association to an 'especially important prisoner' is established, whether in arrest or sentence charges, does this refer to one still alive or may it refer to a prisoner already dead?

When the text says 'connected' to such a prisoner, is this by virtue of having sat together in a cell or does this not rather refer to previous associations in one's work or mission prior to the detention of the prisoner?

Is it possible to be formally under arrest or sentenced to long terms because of a connection to an 'especially important person' who is still at liberty -- i.e., never captured?

4. The above questions are important to evaluating a possible change in Wallenberg's fate during the 1953 time frame. Grossheim Krisko, after never being informed why he was held or shown his sentence, was released on the 26th of May 1953 because his detention was 'no longer necessary.' If this is the result of his case being screened by the newly formed Committee that included Beria, Malenkov and Molotov, surely connections between Grossheim-Krisko and Wallenberg could not have escaped them. Either it was irrelevant to their criteria for freeing him, or Wallenberg's fate was deemed sufficiently 'resolved' for them to let him go -- or Stalin who died in March had a more direct interest in this case than we knew.

Serious effort should be made to establish upon what grounds Grossheim-Krisko was released in late 1953. Was a real examination of his files involved or simply a cursory one, based upon lower level recommendations? How informed were the heads of the Committee or Commission of the so-called nature of the crimes or connections which caused the prisoners to be detained for so long?

5. Jan Loyda was finally given permission to leave the Soviet Union as of December 1953. Loyda had stated in a personal letter to the head of Vladimir Prison that his detention was connected to the fact that he sat with such especially important prisoners as 'Chatlosh, Roedl and Wallenberg' (in that order). Chatlosh was sent back to Czechlosovakia with Spishak, the Slovak diplomat arrested with Wallenberg, in January 1947 to stand trial for war crimes. Roedl died in October 1947 en route to Krasnogorsk, while Loyda was already in repatriation camp in Odessa, en route home. If Wallenberg had indeed died in July 1947, by Loyda's calculations he should not have been recalled by special order from Deputy Minister Selivonovsky on November 10, 1947 (Document No. 3-78258). . *Please examine Loyda's classified materials to determine why and for what purpose he was recalled on the eve of repatriation.*

Given that Kartashov's October 15, 1947 request to bring Loyda and Hille from Camp 27 to Moscow is coincidental with the order to send Roedl to Krasnogorsk, please check for all possible connections between this summons and Roedl's transfer. Did the same persons and authorities order both transfers? If so, who?

6. A number of prisoners died in 1953, at least at Vladimir where we have had more access to the records. A number of them were older than Wallenberg or Langfelder. . However, it should be noted that as of 1949, the majority of the sightings mention Wallenberg's health. The place may change but the reports speak of Wallenberg hungerstriking at Lefortovo to protest his sentence (1948-49), of Wallenberg being examined by Dr. Menachem Meltzer in Khalmer-Yu, of Wallenberg taken off a transport to Magadan to be treated in the hospital in Khabarovsk (1950), of Wallenberg undergoing surgery in Magnitogorsk (1953), of Wallenberg 'very sick' in Vladimir Corpus II (1952-53 and again later.)

Unfortunately, a number of the essential files for this period have not been handed over by the Russian side. These include the following from the original list: Shun Akikusa (medical) Friedrich Bayer, Boguslav Baj (prisoner); Alfred Fries; Franz Bentivegni (prisoner and medical); Antonas Bogdanos (prisoner and medical); Alfred Gerstenberg (medical); Simyon Gogiberidse (medical); Fritz Hammerschmidt (prisoner and medical); Harold Hield (prisoner and medical); Rudolph Winter von Schwab (prisoner and medical); Rafael Saulson Jacobssen (prisoner and medical); Horst Kitschmann (medical); Fumitaka Konoye (medical); Josef Mayr or Mayer (prisoner and medical); Erno Pelkonen (medical); Emil Brugger (medical); Otto Schoggl (medical); Jan Sanitser (medical) Abram Kalinski (prisoner and medical); Gennadi Kuprvanov (prisoner and medical); Merkis the mother (prisoner and medical); Munters, both Vilhelm and Natalie (prisoner and medical); Jan Stanislaw Jankowski (medical); Pataridze and Shulgin (both medical). Konstantinov Volkov (prisoner and medical) Isaac Markovitch Wolfin; ; Walter Schlitter/Schauer (medical) and Franz Rudolph Gfrorener (medical).

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7. Jan Stanislaw Jankowski, former Deputy Premier of the Polish Government in Exile, died in Vladimir Prison on March 13, 1953. Page 477 of his file states that he was buried in the Vladimir City Cemetery with Prisoner Number Eleven. We know nothing about this Prisoner except that he had a twenty-five year sentence for espionage according to Article 58.4. Jankowski's file also states that his death was not reported to OAGS and, in fact, his prisoner card says quite simply:'He died' without giving the usual detailed cause of death.

We consider it a very high priority that Prisoner Number Eleven be identified as fully as possible — name, nationality, date of birth and of death, date and place of arrest, date and place of sentencing and the responsible organs and units thereof, arrival date for Vladimir, cell history in Vladimir and his medical file.

Were there any other numbered prisoners who died at that time? Who were they and were they buried also in Vladimir City Cemetery? Was OAGS/ZAGS notified? If no one was notified regionally, how were these deaths reported to the authorities in Moscow?. To whom were such reports addressed (give not only name but unit, department, directorate). What official had direct oversight over such special cases or deaths?

We would like permission to study the death registries for Vladimir Prison Hospital to review the deaths of those associated with Wallenberg and also that of the Numbered Prisoners from 1947 on. As in the Vladimir Corpus II study, we will be looking at those who might be Wallenberg under a number or other name.

We also wish to examine the records to the Ministry of Welfare for Mordov ASSR where Jankowski would have been sent to an Internat per their letter C-769 of 14 May 1954, to determine what other prominent prisoners were forwarded to internat there rather than being kept in the Vladimir region, as the precedent of Shulgin and Patardize would suggest.

1955/56

1. With the repatriation of the main eyewitnesses as a result of the Khrushchev-Adenauer Treaty and their subsequent testimonies to the Swedish Government that Raoul Wallenberg had been with them in Moscow prisons, the claims of the Vishinsky Memorandum of 1947 had to be amended. In phrasing the Gromyko Memorandum ten years later, it should be born in mind that there existed by then a regular reporting system throughout all the regions of the USSR for listing Foreign Prisoners and Stateless, Forms 5 and 6, as well as a registry for those living in exiled territories. There had also been periodic updating of records between the offices of the various prisons and the Central Operational Information Card Index of "A" Department, MGB

which the 3rd Department of the Prison Administration consulted before releasing Loyda. (See Loyda, Page 85). there exists records of the Internal Convoy Troops of the MVD or NKVD units throughout the USSR. In other words, a thorough and competent search for Wallenberg could indeed have been effected.

Did the search performed during the 1955-56 period go in an attempt to clarify the fate of Wallenberg include review of each of the records mentioned above?

2. We have no report to suggest that Raoul Wallenberg died in 1955-56. The question is raised only by the fate of Prince Fumitaka Konoye, captured at the conclusion of the brief military conflict between the USSR and Japan in the summer of 1945. In 1951, Konoye was sentenced by OSO to 25 years for 'taking part in circles hostile to the USSR' and for 'contacts with militaristic ruling circles of Japan' -- a probable euphemism for the fact that his father, as Prime Minister of Japan, had tried to negotiate a separate peace with the Western Allies at approximately the time that his son was captured. Konoye's father committed suicide. There is a strong analog with the Wallenberg case in that both young men were of potential value as collateral in a diplomatic or industrial/military game because of close family ties which only complicated their situation. Both personally had strong American connections with the West. *The question is whether Konoye's case is analogous,* tangential to or , *in fact overlaps with that of Wallenberg --with tragic consequences for both.*

To answer this question, we would like to examine the records of any discussion which took place among members of the Central Committee, Council of Ministers or Presidium regarding the possible release of Prince Fumitaka Konoye -- particularly, but not limited to the 1955/56 time period when a reply to the Swedish government on the fate of Wallenberg was being constructed. In this case where Konoye is a living prominent figure, whose detention in the Soviet Union was acknowledged, it would be of great value to see how the issues of his repatriation were weighed against security considerations or possible embarrassments caused by his return and probable reconnection with the West. (See Item 9 below).

3. Like Jankowski, Konoye was considered an 'Especially Dangerous State Criminal,' a designation he appealed to Malenkov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers on the 8 of August 1953 and again on the 7th of April 1954. Another letter went to the Minister of State Security on the 1st of July 1955, contents unknown. According to an order instituted by the MGB, MVD and Military Procurator in 1951, anyone designated as 'Especially Dangerous State Criminals' — i.e. spies, nationalist leaders, terrorists and saboteurs --should be sent into exile or to a special camp rather than being released at the completion of their terms. This was to have happened to Jankowski who was to have been sent to an internat to be watched over by MGB organs since 'he had no family on the territory of the Soviet Union.' Jankowski died two weeks before this

change would have taken place.

It is important to clarify exactly which foreign prisoners were effected by this designation — i.e. not repatriated at the completion of their terms. Where were they sent? Could Wallenberg and Langfelder be among them?

It is also important to review the files of the appeal channels to see if Wallenberg, like Gerstenberg, Pelkonen, Schandl to name but a few was appealing his sentence and/or designation at the same time as the others I have named. By like token, where were appeals addressed to Stalin filed — as for example the letter which Wallenberg is known to have written to him in the Fall of 1946?

Finally, what is meant by an internat where Jankowski is to be watched over by the MGB organs? In cases where this actually took place, how long did this custody last?

4. In Konoye's file there is an undated questionnaire filled out by the Deputy Head of MGB in Irkutsk in preparation for Konoye's transport to Harbin where he was to be turned over to someone, presumably for repatriation. Konoye never reached Harbin. Instead he was detained in or brought back to Irkutsk, then sent to Vladimir in January 1956, arriving with a number of his compatriots. In April of 1956, Konoye was transferred to Ivanovo Camp 48, an area which seemingly functioned as a gathering point for dispersion of the repatriates, although Ivanovo Internal Prison had previously served as a detention place for the numbered Baltic leaders for years prior to their sentencing..

This raises two questions of a general nature which must be answered in resolving the Wallenberg case: Why was everyone related to this case — except for Hatz, Schlitter and Gfrorener — eventually brought to Vladimir? Why were Loyda (1947), Beckerle (1952) and Konoye (1955/56) called back from their respective destinations? Who and what unit or agency initiated the request in each and all cases, and on what basis? It is very important to determine first if there is any correlation between these three actions and whether it impacts on or reflects in any way Wallenberg's presence, death or disappearance in the GULAG..

Specifically, it is necessary to determine who canceled Konoye's transport to Harbin, by what order and why, who ordered him brought back to Vladimir and why, and who ordered him to be sent to Ivanovo Camp 48 and why. As these requests come well after the death of Stalin, and the executions of Beria and Abakumov, it is necessary to trace them to the highest level.

5. At Ivanova Camp 48, Konoye died on October 29, 1956 at 5:00 AM of 'hypertension and acute generalized arterio-sclerosis due to a large area of broken blood vessel in the fourth ventricle of the brain...' He was 41 years old, three years younger than

Wallenberg. While his death has been documented in detail, and his autopsy performed with a Japanese doctor as part of the team, those who did the examination thirty-three hours later made note that the prisoner was not in the hospital when he died.

Where was he when he died? More importantly, what is the significance of this statement in terms of accountability? Does this have a direct bearing on the Smoltsov note which places Wallenberg in his cell when he died of a heart attack, even though the proposed Supplement 3 to the Memorandum of Molotov and Serov that was never turned over to the Swedish side states quite clearly that he was in the prison hospital? Which is the truth?

6. As the file later states, there were no diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Japan when this death occurred. Reclamation of the body was only possible after diplomatic relations were resumed. And yet there occurred meticulous reporting as is to be found in the case of all the Polish, Balkan and other diplomats mentioned previously, in the cases of Oggins and van der Waals, in the cases of German and Austrian officials and military personnel, including Rudolph Weisbrot who prosecuted a number of Communists under the Nazi regime. Such reporting shows a clear awareness of the exigencies of international law.

In this context, it is crucial to address the question of why, since there were diplomatic relations with the Swedish government, the Soviets could or would not produce a legal document attesting to Wallenberg's death as a way of resolving the problem? Are there other comparable cases which would enable us to understand the rationale?

7. In the summer of 1992, when the file of Esau Oggins was released, the case of Konoye was raised as a parallel by certain knowledgeable investigative journalists in Russia. Both were described as prisoners who could not be released because of what they knew. In the case of Konoye, it was rumored that he died because of those with whom he had come in contact. Certainly a testimony by a Princeton-educated Japanese Prince that contradicted Soviet claims could have a devastating effect on international public opinion. I was therefore very surprised to read that Prince Konoye died of tuberculosis and other seemingly natural causes.

Given the ramifications of Abakumov's Memorandum 2773A regarding the faked documentation related to the execution of Oggins and the fact certain Russian media persons openly stated in my presence in 1992 that Konoye was executed, I must ask the real facts in this matter. This is particularly necessary since Ambassador Hallqvist's report on Vladimir sightings states that there was one Japanese who sat with Wallenberg —unnamed. We need a complete prison and cell history for Konoye, with cell mates listed, in order to determine who sat with him and when.

NOTE: Konoye's file shows that he sat with Jan Stanislaw Jankowski, starting July 6, 1947 and with Adolph-Heinz Beckerle, German Ambassador in Sofia, in Butyrka Cell 254 just prior to their sentencing in late 1951. Beckerle was sent to Verchne-Uralsk, then called back 'urgently' to become Prisoner H4 at Vladimir in April of 1952. Konoye was sent to Alexandrovsk in the Irkutsk Region where he sat in Cell 49. What other diplomats did he meet along the way?

8. Walter Schlitter, Wallenberg's first cellmate along with Gustav Richter, emerged from three years of strict isolation at Alexandrovsk to be placed in Cell 49 with Konoye on March 6, 1954. How long they sat together and the operational value of this remains to be seen. What is clear is that Schlitter/Schauer, who was repatriated in 1955, never came forth to testify about Wallenberg, even though he sat with Raoul longer than Gustav Richter. In this regard, Document/Memorandum 157, Application 1 dated May 13, 1956 addressed to Molotov and Serov by the Secretary of the Central Committee should be reconsidered. Translated, the text reads: *'The competent Soviet authorities were asked to analyze and check the documents passed over by the Swedish side...In particular they would like to get more detailed information about Shoyer/Shauer who presumably was in the same cell with Wallenberg, as Gustav Richter mentioned in his testimonies.'* This official response to the Swedish Government's presentation of the eyewitness reports which led to the Gromyko Memorandum is brief. While it requests photographs and other information which seemingly could help the Soviets actually search for Wallenberg in the GULAG, its primary purpose may well have been to inquire whether or not Schlitter/Schauer had also come forth to testify. In other words, **this one testimony could have made a significant difference in the form and content of the Gromyko Memorandum of 1957.**

Our study of the file of Walter Schlitter has revealed that he sat with the following: Chamota, alternatively written Yamota; Richter under the name Shauer, Wallenberg, Kitschmann, Foss, Hatz, Huber and Konoye. Wallenberg, Hatz and Konoye are not stated but calculated from comparison of data from other files. In addition, there is an unconfirmed report that he sat with one Schmidt, first name unclear but who could also be Gfrorener under his alias. This, however does not give us a full accounting of Schlitter's cellmates.

In addition, a calculation of the pagination in Schlitter's file shows traces of two other series of numbers. In spite of the fact that the file was expanded in 1991 to 388 pages, analysis of the three pagination series shows a discrepancy which corresponds to the 1947-48 period when Schlitter made his most frequent jumps from cell to cell.

We need to know with whom Schlitter sat in each of the following cells of Internal Prison: Cell 7 (January 8, 1947); Cell 70 (25 February 1947), Cell 25 (26th February 1947). Cell 70 (March 1, 1947); Cell 80 (July 22, 1947); Cell 74 (18 August 1947); Cell 112 (21 September 1947); Cell 130 (27 September 1947); Cell 107 (16 December 1947); Cell 1B (24 December 1947); Cell 22

(13 January 1948); Cell 97 (15 January 1948), Cell 81 (13 February 1948), Cell 118 (23 February 1948).

As each of the underlined dates correspond to events in the Wallenberg investigation, it is important to check how far and how deeply these correspondences go. Specifically I would like to know if Schlitter sat with Akikusa on February 25, with Roedl on February 26, with Wallenberg on March 1st, and with Langfelder on July 23, 1947. It would be important to know with whom he sat on August 18, 1947 and whether or not he sat with either Loyda or Hille when they arrived in January 1948. How often did he sit with Hatz and Kitschmann? How often did he sit with Richter?

We would like to study the file of Yamota/Chamota who is unknown to us to determine if there is a connection between the different cellmates in the series..

9. The fact that Schlitter emerges from strict isolation to be placed with Konoye repeats a pattern which underlines the question whether Konoye sat with Wallenberg, a man with whom he could have much in common, or with Langfelder and/or Roedl who was returning from Japan at the time of his arrest. A number of questions emerge from these parallels, particularly since Konoye's appeals to the Council of Ministers coincide with the mounting determination on the part of the Central Committee to successfully resolve the Wallenberg case with the Swedes, once and for all.

Please help us reconstruct the complete cell history of Prince Konoye and name those with whom he shared a cell, transport or medical rest.

Independent of the question of whether or not Konoye and Wallenberg sat together, it would be most helpful if the Russian side could look at the security, diplomatic and policy factors which entered into questions of Konoye's repatriation and compare them with Wallenberg's situation in 1947 and following, should he have survived.

10. In April of 1955, Isaac Markovitch Wolfin, 'Swedish spy' -- a former staffperson of the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm under Ambassadress Kollontay who was interrogated just prior to the joint Wallenberg/Langfelder interrogation of July 1946 — was returned from Vladimir to Butyrka Prison. Wolfin had been sentenced in 1948 to fifteen years. While we do not know how many additional years Wolfin was held in Butyrka, there is some indication that his sentence had been cut short for informant services. In the course of his detention at Vladimir, Wolfin sat in at least fifty two different cells with more than seventy different prisoners, the majority foreign. While he did not sit with the primary Wallenberg/Langfelder witnesses such as Richter (with the possible exception of Admiral Krafft), Wolfin did sit with a host of witnesses on our original list -- including Gogiberidse three times in 1952 and once in 1953; Otto Schoggl, Josef Mayer,

Maximillan Angelis, Adolph Heinz Beckerle, Fritz Langer; Gennadi Kupryanov. He also sat with those whose files we are now requesting — Karl Supprian for instance. He also sat with important Baltic leaders -- Urbshis, Munters and Shalna — and Numbered Prisoners such as Boris Menshagin, or Prisoner Number 31, unknown. He also may have overlapped with Adam Behn, the Polish leader usually placed with Jankowski as with Hungarian "American Spy" Prisoner Number One, also unknown. He also sat for approximately four months with Kurt Gerum, Gfrorener cellmate, around the time of Gfrorener's execution in April 1952. Besides sitting with a number of prisoners with the label 'spy,' 'saboteur' or 'terrorist', he also sat with a number of prisoners with the designation "M' on their cards. Wolfin also had the 'M' designation, as did Konoye although he could not have been with Konoye in Vladimir if the Prince's file is correct in stating that he only arrived there in 1956. Wolfin did however sit with a number of Japanese.

Because of the (1)outstanding number of Wallenberg-related witnesses, numbered prisoners and other special cases with whom Wolfin sat; (2) possible prior connection to this case and (3) the fact that Wolfin, a Jewish translator, was fluent in Swedish and therefore may have sat with Wallenberg or Langfelder in Moscow as well as in Vladimir; we are requesting access to Wolfin's prison and medical files and the opportunity to address questions to his investigative file, even though he was known to be a Soviet agent. We regard this exception to the rule as necessary and important to the resolution of this case.

It should be noted that -- while it seems obvious that Wolfin's role was as informant to the competent authorities -- there is some indication that he was also the source of the rumor that Raoul Wallenberg was being held in Vladimir Prison. Maximum access to his records would be of great help in determining the basis or motive for this significant behavior.

11. **Regarding LANGFELDER** Van der Waals file, Page 92, is a document dated March 9, 1956 from Butyrka Prison to Deputy Chief of Prison Section of MVD:'In agreement with your inquiry, the personal file of the prisoner of war Van der Waals...is being sent for further keeping in your archives. Contents. Personal file in 91 pages.

Was this in response to a request related specifically to Van der Waals or part of an overall procedure to turn over files of the deceased, or repatriated, prisoners to the archives? If so, the Deputy Chief of Prison Section, was presumably working from a list.

11B. In relation to this, the directive to Soviet Ambassador in Hungary Uri V. Andropov dated September 17, 1957 regarding he fate of Vilmos Langfelder states: "There is reason to think that all materials regarding Langfelder as well as materials about Wallenberg were

destroyed by the former leadership of State Security of the USSR. But the list of the prisoners in Lubyanka was found and there is the name of Langfelder with a remark:'Died on March 2, 1948.'

Where is this list? If not available, where is the document to account for its absence or destruction? Who is accountable for its removal?

* * * * * * *

SUMMARY REMARKS

In closing, I would like to repeat that I do not regard the findings I have highlighted here as conclusive, but I do think that the facts -- objectively placed side by side — show clear cut discrepancies which must be resolved if we are to arrive at a common and recognizable truth.

The questions I have raised are finite in number and therefore can be addressed in the near future. I feel very strongly that they must and can be answered to give the world satisfactory answers that, until now, have been based in large measure on whispers and hints. Again, I am not only verifying eyewitness sightings but providing a context for dealing with the deeper issues involved in the controversy between the death or disappearance of this great humanitarian.

My work in the files, combined with my review of the documents released by the Russian side in 1991 and following, have convinced me that — independent of the actual Wallenberg file — the information of the type we need does still exist and can be accessed. For this reason, I am glad that initially I limited my requests to the most basic level of information. From my mind at least, it has proven a fertile field from which to draw both the data and instruments to perfect this search.

I also would like to say that — as a result of my work to date — I feel confident in the method which I proposed. It is my hope that the Russian side, through this Preliminary Report, can see how this method works and will take the initiative to improve upon it — both by criticism and through their own efforts. In any case, through the materials they have shared with my team, the results are as much theirs as mine.

Again, my deepest thanks to all for the opportunity to carry out this work on behalf of the Russian-Swedish Working Group. I look forward to receiving the remaining files and registries which will enable me to conclude the data and move on to investigative questions and analysis, leading to the Final Report.

Respectfully submitted,

Susan Ellen Mesinai

Susan Ellen Mesinai
Director, ARK Project

August 4, 1998

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
RIGA

1998-07-29

Amb råd Lage Olson
EI/ESEK
UD

210/003
98-08-05

Bil. till Ms Susan Mesinai, New York, N.Y. med fax, Fax Nr. 0091 212 691 6436
Reg. 98-07-30

Ex till:
Hallqvist, EC 2
Olson, EI-ESEK
Amb Moskva
Reg. 98-07-30

Raoul Wallenberg - utkast till prel. rapport från Susan Mesinai.

Broder,

Jag vore tacksam om du kunde vidarebefordra bifogade rader till Susan Mesinai. Så vitt jag kan se har hennes rapport snarare utvidgats än förkortats jämfört med det första utkastet! Hursomhelst blir det svårt att redigera det alltför hårt. Efter ytterligare en omgång tror jag vi får vidarebefordra texten till ambassaden Moskva. Ambassaden bör då först överlämna den engelska texten och därefter översättningen till ryska när denna är klar. Jag är bekymrad över nya kostnader för översättning.

När ambassaden överlämnar rapporten bör följande framhållas för ryssarna.

1/ Texten är Susan Mesinais. Vi har granskat den och gjort kommentarer samt försökt korta den men ej funnit det möjligt att alltför hårt redigera den. Därför har vi förståelse för om den ryska sidan, liksom vi, konstaterar att en del frågeställningar, även om de inte slutgiltigt besvarats, redan diskuterats under arbetets gång och kanske därför främst lämpar sig att tas upp under en avslutande diskussion. Mesinais text är icke desto mindre av intresse, eftersom den återspeglar hennes strävan efter ett helhetsgrepp på problematiken.

2/ Vi kommer också att ha förståelse för att ryska sidan koncentrerar sig på de mest angelägna frågorna och är beredda diskutera vilka som med hänsyn till arbetsinsats eller såsom varande av mer marginellt

Adress
A Pumpura lela 8

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(64) 161114 svnsk lv

intresse i sammanhanget bör kunna läggas åt sidan, åtminstone tills vidare.

Hans Magnusson

PS. Susan åker i helgen till Arvidsjaur så hon bör få detta senast fredag f. m.

Stockholm July 29, 1998

Dear Ms Mesinai,

I have read your second draft preliminary report, and as usual I am impressed by your energy and thouroughness. What worries me is only the length and detail of the text(even longer than the first draft?) - mostly from the point of view of the amount of additional work we require from the Russian side as well as the time and money to be spent on translation. However, I realize that it is now difficult to revise the text in a more profound way, so I ask you to make only a few amendments before we send the text to our Embassy in Moscow for handing it over to the Russian side. When you return your amended text, please address it to Mr Lage Olson, EI/ESEK in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
By the way, due to some administrative problems I have still not seen your fax<of the 24 July, but I expect to receive it tomorrow.

Page 6. Please delete mid-passage("Have the records...reason?"). We know these records have been gone through.

Page 9, first paragraph: I am slightly hesitant as to the necessity of spending time on this issue(of douments). I consider it to be of secondary importance. Perhaps this could be indicated.

Page 14, paragraph 14, mid-text: Sinitsyn was not present at one interrogation involving Fitin, but he was present once when Fitin discussed RW with Abakumov. So, you could make full stop after "...recruit Wallenberg".

Page 16, paragraph "Research...document": This has already been done, so it could be deleted.

Page 19, paragraph "Given...Vladimir". Could this request be more limited in focus - i e only the prisoners mentioned above+ numbered prisoners?

Page 22, third paragraph. Personally, I think strongly that this could be deleted, at least for the time being.

page 23, second paragraph: This question has already been answered in the working group, so it could be deleted.

Page 27, Paragraph "Finally...prisons": could be deleted.

Page 27-28, last two paragraphs+first two could be deletd, as they to a large extent repeat what has already been said before and are also of a rather vague, general discussion nature, difficult for our Russian friends to answer.

Yours sincerely

Hans Magnusson

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

Aambs Stefan Gullgren

1998-08-06

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P	2	Eu

För: EC (Hallqvist)

Kopia: EI (Olson), rekryfax amb Riga

Re Wallenberg - Vladimirprojektet - kontrakt undertecknat med företaget Prosoft

cc-mail Gullgren-Olson 1998-08-06

1. Ambassaden har idag (6 aug) slutit avtal med företaget Prosoft om utförande av den avslutande fasen i det s k Vladimir-projektet - inmatning och bearbetning av information från drygt 10 000 registerkort i Vladimir-fängelsets arkiv. Det slutliga kontraktet är identiskt med det utkast som insändes 1998-08-06 med vårt ovancit. Kontraktssumman belöper på totalt USD 30 334 (USD 2 x 10 162 registerkort plus USD 10 010,32 i "administrativa" kostnader).

2. Dröjsmålet med kontraktsundertecknandet föranleddes av ett byte på en av nyckelposterna på rysk sida i detta projekt - den som chef för MVD:s informationscenter under vilket även arbetsgruppsmedlemmen Konstantin Nikisjkin förefaller sortera. Den nye chefen har av Nikisjkin karakteriserats som "en försiktig man" som ej utan vidare vore redo att acceptera att ett delvis tyskägt företag - Prosoft - skulle ges möjlighet att hantera sekretessbelagd information, därtill i MVD:s egna lokaler.

I nära samråd med Nikisjkin och på dennes initiativ hänvände sig därför ambassaden i slutet av juli direkt till inrikesminister Stepasjin med en begäran om att denne måtte instruera MVD:s informationscenter att ge Prosoft tillträde. Hänvändelsen

skedde genom ett brev som överlämnades av oss via MID 27 juli (brevet hade i själva verket författats av Nikisjkin själv med några smärre korrigeringar från vår sida).

Sent igår eftermiddag (5 aug) meddelade Nikisjkin att denna hänvändelse resulterat i att klartecken nu meddelats för Prosoft att inleda arbetet i MVD:s lokaler (Detta besked var principiellt viktigt eftersom det enligt kontraktet mellan oss och Prosoft är beställaren, den svenska sidan, som har att säkerställa tillträde för utföraren, Prosoft, till den sekretessbelagda informationen).

3. Vid våra kontakter med Prosoft och Nikisjkin har vi förstått att båda sidor är inställda på att inleda arbetet med bearbetning av informationen från registerkorten tämligen omgående. Enligt Prosofts beräkningar kommer därefter den första delfasen - inmatning av information från registerkorten i databas - att kräva ca 1 månads arbete. När väl detta har skett, och inför den avslutande delfasen som ju omfattar bearbetning av informationen enligt Makinens/Kaplans datamodeller, föreställer vi oss att ett kort Moskva-besök av Makinen och/eller Kaplan kan vara motiverat. Behovet av detta torde dock Makinen själv vara bäst skickad att avgöra. Tacksam besked i så fall.

DAHL

223/08 P 2. Eu'

REGERINGSKANSLIET
Utrikesdepartementet

PROMEMORIA

1998-08-11

Utrikesrådet för politiska frågor
Bitr utrikesrådet Sven-Olof Petersson
Mobiltelefon 070-392234

Delges:
Utrikesministern
Kabs
UrP
C AME
C EC
C PIK
Lars Danielsson, SB
Exp. 980811/BP

Raoul Wallenberg-staty i Buenos Aires

Argentinas ambassadör besökte mig den 11 augusti på egen begäran. Avsikten var att under hand **inbjuda utrikesminister Hjelm-Wallén** att delta vid invigningen den 17 november 1998 av en Raoul Wallenberg-staty i Buenos Aires. Statyn skulle placeras på en prominent plats i Buenos Aires, nämligen torget utanför juridiska fakulteten. Invigningen skulle ske av president Menem med deltagande också av utrikesministern. Ambassadören sade sig därför tidigare ha vidarebefordrat en inbjudan till statsminister Persson. Man kände väl till Jan Eliassons stora kunskap om Wallenberg och skulle därför gärna se att också han, om möjligt, kunde delta.

Från den judiska församligen i Stockholm hade inbjudits dess ordförande. Wallenbergs syster och halvbror var likaså inbjudna.

I samband med invigningen planerades ett särskilt seminarium.

Sven-Olof Petersson

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

TELEFAX

1998-08-10

Sid. 1 (7)

Dnr 396

Aambs A. Wallberg

INK. UTRIKESDEP.
1998 -08- 12
P | 2 | Eu 1

Delges:
Kalen
von Dardel
Carl Persson
Magnusson, Teje
Hellgren, EC
Olsson, EI-ESEK
exp. 98-08-07

Utrikesdepartementet (EC, EI)

EC

Re Raoul Wallenberg

(1 bil.)

Ambassaden har i bifogade brev från MID:s andra europiska avdelning erhållit svar på den hänvändelse som gjordes i maj i år med anledning av Susan Mesinais delundersökningar i Wallenberg-ärendet.

a.a.

Mikael Dahl

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184
93178001

Sveriges ambassad
1998-08-10
Anders Wallberg
Översättning

Ryska federationens utrikesministerium

Ministern vid Sveriges ambassad i Ryska federationen
Mikael Dahl

Bäste herr Dahl,

med anledning av brevet från andre ambassadsekreterare S. Gullgren vid Sveriges ambassad i Ryska federationen daterat den 19 maj 1998 beträffande den oberoende experten S. Mesinais arbete för att klarlägga Raoul Wallenbergs öde vill vi meddela följande.

1. Med tanke på att de handlingar, som hänför sig till personer vilka lider av psykiska sjukdomar, förvaras av Ryska federationens hälsovårdsministeriums myndigheter, måste angiven fråga lösas med detta ministerium. Ryska federationens hälsovårdsministerium har, vilket framfördes av den ryska sidan vid mötet mellan E.M. Primakov och L. Hjelm-Wallén i Nyborg 22 juni 1998, inga invändningar mot att arbetsgruppens experter fortsätter sitt arbete (med deltagande av Statliga vetenskapliga centret för social och rättslig psykiatri uppkallat efter V.P. Serbskij) förutsatt att kraven följs på sekretess och icke-inbladning i medborgarnas privatliv, angivna i Ryska federationens lag "Om psykiatrisk vård och

garantier för medborgarnas rättigheter i samband därmed".

Vad beträffar överlämnandet av medicinska dokument som undertecknats av chefen för hälsovårds-avdelningen Smoltsov vid Lubjankafängelset (det inre) vid NKVD-NKGB-MGB, så kan efterforskningar och överlämnande av sådana dokument genomföras om beslut fattas därom på arbetsgruppens möte. Med tanke på att läkarunderskriftens äkthet har fastställts, bl.a. i rapporten om R. Wallenbergs död, av kriminologer och specialister i Ryssland och Sverige med hjälp av hans manuskript, ser vi ingen anledning av tvivla på resultatet av expertundersökningen av den s.k. "Smoltsov-rapporten". De tänkbara omständigheterna kring skrivningarna i denna har redan diskuterats vid arbetsgruppens möten.

2. Att sammanställa en förteckning över de fångar som kommit från Butyrka-fängelset till Lefortovo ter sig för närvarande omöjligt p.g.a. att efter-forskningsarbetet inte är avslutat. Arbetsgrupps-medlemmen K.S. Nikisjkin (MVD) sysslar med denna fråga.

3. Den ryska sidan (FSB) är beredd att studera den förteckning över fångar i Lefortovo-fängelset, som skall ha haft uppgifter om att R. Wallenberg befann sig där 1945-1950.

Samtidigt vill vi påpeka att de uppgifter om R. Wallenbergs vistelse i Lefortovo-fängelset, som sammanställts med hjälp av registreringsjournaler över fångförflyttningar, har överlämnats till den svenska sidan i skriftlig form.

4. MVD:s personal är under S. Mesinais vistelse i Moskva beredd att på den svenska sidans begäran förete de akter som förvaras i Vladimirfängelset i fastställd ordning.

5. Arbetet för att spåra upp de "trofé-akter", som S. Mesinai är intresserad av, och som förvaras i Centret för förvaring av samlingar av historiska dokument (TCIDK, f.d. Särskilda arkivet), kommer att genomföras av MVD med deltagande av FSB efter det att den svenska sidan preciserat vilka "trofé-akter" som åsyftas.

MVD har från TCIDK rekvirerat personakterna avseende tyska krigsfångar. S. Mesinai har tagit del av dessa i läsesalen vid FSB:s centrala arkiv. Hon kan fortsätta ta del av sådana akter, däribland de som begärts från Vladimir, i MVD:s lokaler på Mjasnitskaja-gatan. S. Mesinai har i förväg underrättats därom.

Samtidigt vill vi fästa uppmärksamheten på det faktum att varken den svenske medordföranden i arbetsgruppen eller S. Mesinai har ställt några frågor till FSB:s representant om material från "särskilda distributionskommittén" i Ungern, om brevväxlingen mellan detta organ och NKVD eller MVD, ej heller om registerkort över krigsfångar som förvaras av TCIDK.

Med vänlig hälsning

Biträdande direktören
Andra europeiska avdelningen

P. Kuznetsov

INK. AMB. MOSKVA
D. 13:B/21
1998 - 08 - 05
AVD. R | GR. 18 | MAL RW

МИНИСТЕРСТВО ИНОСТРАННЫХ ДЕЛ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

121200, г. Москва Г-200,
Смоленская-Сенная площадь, дом 32/34
Телефон 244-16-06

04.08.98 №6571/дсп-нс

На № _____ от _____

СОВЕТНИКУ-ПОСЛАННИКУ
ПОСОЛЬСТВА ШВЕЦИИ В
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

Г-НУ МИКАЭЛЮ ДАЛЮ

SG:
AW:
SH

Уважаемый г-н Даль,

В связи с письмом Второго секретаря Посольства Швеции в Российской Федерации С.Гульгрена от 19.05.98 относительно работы в российских архивах независимого эксперта Российско-шведской группы по выяснению судьбы Рауля Валленберга С.Месинаи хотели бы сообщить следующее.

1. Учитывая, что медицинские документы, относящиеся к лечению лиц, страдающих психическими заболеваниями, хранятся в органах Министерства здравоохранения Российской Федерации, указанный вопрос необходимо решать по линии данного Министерства. Минздрав России, как сообщалось российской стороной на встрече Е.М.Примакова и Л.Ельм-Валлен в Нюборге 22 июня 1998 года, не возражает против продолжения работы экспертов рабочей группы (с участием Государственного научного центра социальной и судебной психиатрии им. В.П.Сербского) при соблюдении требований конфиденциальности и невмешательства в частную жизнь граждан, содержащихся в Законе Российской Федерации "О психиатрической помощи и гарантиях прав граждан при ее оказании".

Что касается предоставления г-же С.Месинаи врачебных документов, подписанных начальником санчасти Лубянской (Внутренней) тюрьмы НКВД-НКГБ-МГБ Смольцовым, то поисковая работа по их выявлению и предоставлению могла бы быть проведена, если на этот счет будет принято решение на заседании группы. Принимая во внимание то обстоятельство, что подлинность подписи доктора, в частности, по рапорту о смерти Р.Валленберга, определялась криминалистами и экспертами России и Швеции по его рукописным текстам, не видим оснований для сомнений в результатах экспертного исследования по так называемому "рапорту Смольцова", возможные обстоятельства написания которого уже обсуждались на заседаниях рабочей группы.

2. Списки заключенных, поступивших из Бутырской тюрьмы в Лефортово в марте-апреле 1950 года, в настоящее время составить не представляется возможным в связи с незавершенностью поисковой работы. Данным вопросом занимается член рабочей группы К.С.Никишкин (МВД России).

3. Российская сторона (ФСБ России) готова рассмотреть список заключенных Лефортовской тюрьмы, которые якобы имели сведения о нахождении в ней Р.Валленберга в 1945-1950 гг.

Одновременно хотели бы отметить, что сведения о нахождении Р.Валленберга в Лефортовской тюрьме, составленные по журналам регистрации перемещений заключенных, шведской стороне передавались в письменном виде.

4. В период нахождения С.Месинаи в г.Москве работники МВД России готовы представить для ознакомления в установленном порядке выявленные по просьбе шведской части рабочей группы дела заключенных, содержавшихся во Владимирской тюрьме.

5. Работа по выявлению "трофейных дел", интересующих С.Месинаи, которые хранятся в Центре хранения историко-документальных коллекций (ЦХИДК, бывший Особый архив), будет проведена МВД России при участии ФСБ России после уточнений шведской стороны, о каких "трофейных делах" узников идет речь.

Личные дела на военнопленных из числа немцев затребовались МВД России в ЦХИДК. С ними г-жа С.Месинаи знакомилась в помещении читального зала Центрального архива ФСБ России. Дальнейшее ознакомление с такого рода делами, в том числе и присланными из Владимира, она может продолжить в помещении МВД России на Мясницкой, о чем г-жа С.Месинаи была заблаговременно уведомлена.

Одновременно хотели бы обратить внимание на то, что о материалах "совместного комитета по распределению" в Венгрии, о переписке этого органа с НКВД и МВД, а также об учетных карточках на военнопленных, хранящихся в ЦХИДК ни шведский сопредседатель рабочей группы, ни эксперт С.Месинаи никаких вопросов представителю ФСБ России в группе не задавали.

С уважением,

ЗАМЕСТИТЕЛЬ ДИРЕКТОРА
ВТОРОГО ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО
ДЕПАРТАМЕНТА

П.КУЗНЕЦОВ

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

1998-08-13

Aambs A. Wallberg

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P.	2	Ell 1

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

För: UD-EC (Hallqvist) (EC)

Kopia: UD-EI (Olson), rekryfax amb Riga

Re Raoul Wallenberg

(1 bil.)

Bifogat översänds brev från Susan Mesinai med anteckningar från det möte Wallberg och Mesinai igår hade med chefen för psykiatriska och neurologiska avdelningen vid Hälsovårdsministeriet. Vid mötet diskuterades formerna för de delundersökningar Mesinai och Susanne Berger avser genomföra i Wallenberg-ärendet i de arkiv som sorterar under detta ministerium.

DAHL

Ek till:
Hans Magnusson
p-t. Norrtälje
exp. 98-08-14

a.a.

August 13, 1998

FACSIMILE TO: Ambassador Hans Magnusson
Ambassador Martin Hallqvist
Lage Olson
SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTRY -STOCKHOLM

FROM: Susan Mesinai

Anders Wallberg and I had, I think, a very successful first meeting at the Ministry of Health with Alexander Sergoyovich KARPO of the Psychiatric and Neurological Division and Pavel V. KONOVALCHOUK, Chief of Protocol for the Department of International Relations. I am certain that Anders will write his own report, but I thought I would give you my perspective as to why it seemed like a particularly good meeting....besides the fact that we were prepared.

Dr. Karpo was aware that there had been previous initiatives, involving the psychiatric facilities, but I don't think he was aware of the depth to which we had plumbed or that there was a great deal of carefully defined method to this otherwise, seemingly hopeless task from their perspective. I brought with me concrete items to help us along --- in addition to the Smoltsov document and the Okulicki forensic example, there were lists in Russian from hospitals where I had already worked -- such as Serbsky, Sychovka and work done by the Independent Psychiatric Association in Leningrad to show them what can be gleaned from registries. In each list of foreign prisoners or the like, I pointed out that there were only a few, sometimes only one, case of interest in that particular registry to make the point that we were not going to be looking at each and every file we could.

I spoke about my work with the FSB and MVD files, also by way of precedent for establishing rules of confidentiality and rights of privacy. And I used the case of Clement as a model for a number of possibilities, even though I made the point that Clement had none of the prominence of Raoul Wallenberg.

I also began, by the way, with discussion of the death versus disappearance issue. I introduced, but did not discuss until the end, the need to further substantiate the Smoltsov Document. And I introduced the Nanna Svartz/Myasnikow debate as the strongest case -- in addition to other scattered sightings -- for the possible presence of Wallenberg in such facilities as part of the 'disappearance' scenario. My first request was for Susanne Berger's research, following up her work in Stockholm. They listened with interest and real consideration and said that a separate letter should be drafted to every institute whose files she wishes to examine, stating what she wants to see, how and why.

(I established as the minimum, I believe, that a real effort should be made by those with oversight to find reports and other documents which discuss this controversy from the Russian side. ... as the Working Group has in the past provided documentation of documents which mention Wallenberg...in addition to Susanne's own directed task.)

From my side, where this sighting is concerned, I expressed my desire to track the evaluation of any prisoner, named or numbered in Vladimir or the Moscow prisons, into psychiatric facilities in the Moscow region -- corresponding to that time. I stated openly that I would need to study certain files as analogs and, of course, registries..

In terms of my own work, I made the request -- apart from the medical files of the prisoners on my list -- where psychiatric files are concerned, for access to the observations of those on the wards, letters, artwork and other personal forms which would enable me to match the patient with the personality profile details already built up about Raoul. I do not think this will be a problem.

In terms of rights of privacy, I believe we have agreed that the solution is for the file to be reviewed in the presence of psychiatrists. In my subtle way, I let them know that I would like to bring in a psychiatrist I know (whom I haven't approached yet, waiting their view) not engaged in any controversy about abuses of past regimes who would work with me as our side and they would have their own person, probably from the Institute itself. I got the impression that in cases where files would be coming from Leningrad, Kazan or elsewhere --they would be personally accompanied by a doctor or technician of that institution. This, of course, has the added advantage of my being able to 'sensitize' that person to what we are looking for. They in turn could initiate their own quiet research in the Institute itself.

In terms of confidentiality and rights of privacy, and their concerns about posible lawsuits from family members, I repeated the agreement I have with the FSB and MVD regarding contents of files. I made it clear that by choice I preferred working closely with the two official governments involved in the most professional manner to avoid both hardship and agitation of family members, as I had witnessed in the past in other cases outside this one and outside the official sphere.

Because of my previous finds in this work -- Hamilton and Demesco -- and the fact that I successfully identified a ciphered prisoner from his journals, I found myself in a good position to raise the issue of numbered and ciphered prisoners. I have requested that we be able to examine these files of appropriate institutes -- not only Serbsky -- for a confined time period , say the late Fifties into the early Seventies. As these prisoners' identities are unknown to the care-giving institutions, but are kept in the files of the Prison Department in Moscow (I was very specific --thank God for my work in the prisoner files) there can be as yet no question of rights of privacy. We don't even have a clue who these people are.....nor can there be any accusation against those who took care of them but did not know who they were. In other words, in these cases -- there should be greater openness because the task is to go from what little is in the file, including medical deficiencies, in an effort to I:D: the unknown.

I also repeated the request for the file of Prisoner Number Eleven from Vladimir.

We then returned to a discussion of the Smoltsov document. I told them my observations from the files -- apart from the fact that the document is not witnessed. I also in the abstract pointed out that I had seen files of equally prominent foreign

persons whose deaths were meticulously documented. I raised the question of Smoltsov's function, the difficulty of dealing with this piece of paper out of context and that it behooves the Russian side to make every effort to substantiate this piece of paper with further information. I also said that if Raoul Wallenberg died at any place or time under any name anywhere, we were read to accept the proper documentation. And repeated that we do not understand why such documentation could not have been made available in his case, compared to others. And that the lack of such documentation only adds strength to the disappearance issue. I also mentioned Tsitrinblat.

This led to a long overdue, first discussion, about the role of the security organs -- i.e. MGB. In their view, if Nanna Svartz heard correctly, there are and were much 'safer' places to put him than in the known facilities. However, we know of many cases where such individuals were kept in special wards of certain hospitals 'under the watch of the MGB organs' for decades in time. This will take more work of course but the fact that they brought it up pleased me no end. Nor did they try to wiggle away from anything. I think they understood, even from my description of the process of following through on Andrey Andreyovitch Crispin, that a decisive 'No' is worth far more than a 'forever May Be.' But, even more than that, it is my hope that behind the scenes, some dialogue might take place between the Health Ministry and the appropriate Security Organs, depending upon the success of our findings with them. In short, there is no way they don't have some overlapping point of knowledge and contact. It may exist now (since the early 80s) but it certainly did not exist then --- And to make the changeover which took place in the early Eighties, there has to be some form of accounting.

The other conversation which Karpo himself initiated, that made me very glad, was the question of internats. I was glad because I have been very troubled about when to raise this issue....and where. He told me that it was correct that it would be impossible for a person to go straight into an internat from prison.....it would require some medical evaluation. However, as we want to conclude this soon, I think it would be a very good idea to begin our conversation with the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (?) sooner rather than later. Then, if we have particular reason to address questions, we can act in the specified time frame.

To conclude, I am very happy because I believe the methods are understood and perhaps even appreciated, the constraints so far were as I anticipated (and hopefully I made it easier for them in the case of prisoner files). And because I believe we are at a point to begin targeting a number of specific scenarios....which will only enable us to move toward some eventual conclusions more quickly and easily.

Scenario Number One: Death. A real death certfiicate and the possibility of DNA forensics if at a later date etc.

Scenario Number Two; Disappearance and Long Term Psychiatric Care or Other Physical Issues, either resulting for isolation or some form of active measures. Long term residency in a psychiatric facility until death. Alternatively: using the

psychiatric facility as a place of confinement, rather than prison, and possible active measures therein. The end result is the same.

Scenario Number Three, Disappearance. Intermittent psychiatric concerns -- enough to qualify for his removal from the MVD system and a possible social service arrangement with care through an out patient clinic (my favoriate) but under an assumed identity and name.

Scenario Number Four, Disappearance and Feebleness from long term imprisonment, poor health conditions, etc. Internat. It is also possible that patients from Scenario Number Two could end up in internats. In the case of RW, this could be a special 'pension' or institute.

Scenario Number Five: removal of the 'diplomati' into specific internats or pensions which can be explored by following through on the track of, say, Jankowski,"

This is it for now. I hope to hear from you soon.

With all best wishes,

Susan Ellen Mesinai

Susan Ellen Mesinai

224/007

P 2 Eu'

REGERINGSKANSLIET
Utrikesdepartementet

Promemoria

1998-08-14

Protokollchefen

Delges:
Sr Pagrotsky
UMK
Kab.sekr.
UrH
UrP
BUrP
Ch MENA

Förste hovmarskalken Ewerlöf
Amb Danielsson, SB

HEMLIG SekrL 2:1

Invigning av Raoul Wallenberg-monument i Buenos Aires

Argentinas ambassadör Juan Carlos Vignaud besökte mig i dag på egen begäran. Han informerade om att ett Raoul Wallenberg-monument skulle uppföras på en prominent plats i Buenos Aires på initiativ av president Menem och invigas av denne den 17 november i år. Ambassadören hade fått i uppdrag att framföra inbjudningar till en representant för kungafamiljen och till statsministern, utrikesministern, högre tjänstemän i UD, medlemmar av Raoul Wallenbergs familj och representanter för den judiska församlingen i Stockholm m.fl. Även presidenten för World Jewish Congress skulle inbjudas. Bland dem som tackat ja var fru Nane Annan, sade ambassadören. Han skulle inom kort sammanträffa med statsrådet Pagrotsky, som han hoppades skulle kunna komma i anslutning till att en SAF-delegation skulle avlägga ett besök i Buenos Aires och hålla ett seminarium där den 20 november. Eventuellt skulle delegationen kunna komma några dagar tidigare och delta i invigningen.

Ambassadör Vignaud önskade nu min hjälp med att få till stånd ett möte med Prinsessan Christina för att framföra en inbjudan. Vidare hoppades han få en preliminär indikation på om stats- eller utrikesministern kunde komma. I så fall skulle invigningen ske i anslutning till ett officiellt besök av någon av dessa. Han sade sig vara medveten om att statsråden inte före

valet ville binda sig för åtaganden senare i höst men framhöll, att det med hänsyn till behovet av förberedelser för ett ev. officiellt besök vore väl sent att vänta med besked till efter valet. Vignaud underströk betydelsen av att Sverige representerades även på hög tjänstemannanivå och nämnde särskilt kabinettssekreteraren, vars anförande om Raoul Wallenberg i riksdagen han hade läst.

Ambassadören hade redan under hand tagit kontakter med såväl statsrådsberedningen som UD angående inbjudningarna. Jag vitsordade vad han själv sagt beträffande den principiella inställningen hos statsråden när det gäller åtaganden för engagemang som äger rum efter valet men lovade påminna övriga tilltänkta deltagare om det argentinska önskemålet om snabbast möjliga besked. Jag lovade också ta kontakt med hovet beträffande en eventuell medverkan av prinsessan Christina eller annan representant för kungafamiljen och framhöll, att hovet och regeringskansliet regelmässigt samråder i dylika frågor.

Carl-Magnus Hyltenius

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
TEL AVIV

1998-08-11 Nr 51 R 18

Handl. Juhlin-Dannfelt

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Delges:
Kabs
von Sydow
Cari Persson
Magnusson, Riga
Hallqvist, EC
Olson, EI-ESEK
Amb Moskva
exp. 98-09-09

Kvi-föreningen
exp. 98-09-14

EC

INK. UTRIKESDEP.
DNR
1998 -03- 17
Avd. P | Gr 2 | Mål EU

Uppgifter om Raoul Wallenberg
(1 bilaga)

Juhlin-Dannfelt och jag tog fredagen 7 augusti 1998 emot Dr. Jean Kloos-Fishman och professor Michael Quastel från Raoul Wallenberg-föreningen i Beersheva. Ärendet gällde uppgifter om Raoul Wallenberg som kommit Dr. Kloos-Fishman tillhanda genom en rysk immigrant till Israel, herr Isaak Miller, som uppgivit att han under vistelser i fängläger i det tidigare Sovjetunionen vid två tillfällen sammanträffat med Raoul Wallenberg.

Vid mötet överlämnade Dr. Kloos-Fishman en nedteckning av de uppgifter om Raoul Wallenberg som Miller vid intervju framfört till henne. Miller gör gällande att han träffat Wallenberg i lägret Pechora hösten 1947 och i lägret Zimmermanovka i augusti 1953, båda s.k. transitläger för politiska och andra fångar i Sovjetunionen. Miller gör gällande att han p. g. a. rädsla för ev. konsekvenser inte tidigare vågat tillkännage informationen.

Av elektronisk korrespondens mellan aambs Hollqvist och ambr Lage Olson, ESEK, har vi förstått att Isaak Miller kan vara samma person som Isak Abromovitz Miller, född 1926, som i kontakter med General-konsulatet Berlin 1980 och ambassaden Moskva 1990 framfört uppgifter om Raoul Wallenberg. Önskemål framfördes om att ambassaden skulle sammanträffa med Miller för inhämtande av förefintlig information.

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Ambassaden har ännu inte sammanträffat direkt med Miller. Dr. Kloos-Fishman och Raoul Wallenberg-föreningen i Beersheva har erbjudit sig ordna ett möte. Innan vi går vidare i ärendet vore det dock av värde att få del av departementets bedömning av de uppgifter som Miller framfört, såsom de nedtecknats av Dr. Kloos-Fishman.

Vi lovade att i slutet av denna månad återkomma till Dr. Kloos-Fishman med reaktion på de uppgifter om Raoul Wallenberg som Miller framfört till henne liksom med besked huruvida vi önskar sammanträffa direkt med Miller. Inför detta tillfälle vore vi tacksamma om departementets reaktion och bedömning kunde meddelas oss i särskild ordning.

John HM Hagard

האגודה למען ראול ולנברג - באר-שבע
THE RAOUL WALLENBERG ASSOCIATION - BEER SHEVA

July 19, 1998

I received a letter from Isaak Miller of Ashdod in March 1998. It was written in Russian and stated that he had met Raoul Wallenberg on 2 occasions; in Pechora in the autumn of 1947 and in Zimmermanovka in 1953. Raoul Wallenberg did not die in 1947 as claimed by the Russians. Miller suggested that I read an article about him which appeared in 'Kaleidoscope' in September 1997.

I telephoned Miller, but the conversation was in broken Yiddish, the only language that we had in common. He said that he only wanted to tell Wallenberg's sister his story. He wanted nothing for himself.

A Russian colleague of mine telephoned him with a list of my questions and Miller insisted that he had met Wallenberg but details of the circumstances were not clear.

It was decided that I would meet Miller in Ashdod together with a Russian speaker. Israel Aliat, a former immigrant from Russia and a supporter of our Raoul Wallenberg association, agreed to come with me. Aliat is a retired physics technician at the Ben Gurion University of the Negev.

I obtained the Russian language supplement 'Kaleidoscope' with translation. It essentially described Miller's own traumatic experiences in the Gulag.

Jean Kloos - Fishman

Dr. Jean Kloos-Fishman

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האגודה למען ראול ולנברג - באר-שבע
THE RAOUL WALLENBERG ASSOCIATION - BEER SHEVA

Interviews with Isaak Miller concerning Raoul Wallenberg
during May and June, 1998 in Ashdod, Israel

Isaak Miller immigrated to Israel in 1993. He was born in Baku (Azerbaijan) in 1926. In 1943, he was conscripted to the army and served in a tank unit eventually reaching the rank of lieutenant. Later, he was transferred to the air force which was his ambition.

In 1946, while serving in the army after the war as instructor, he was arrested after killing in self defense a drunken commissar officer who was attached to his unit, and who had first shot Miller in the arm. Miller was hospitalized for his injury. Following interrogation, he was sent for trial and sentenced to death. Subsequently, his sentence was commuted to 10 years. He was sent from one prison and camp to another. These camps and prisons are listed in the article.

Miller's first meeting with Raoul Wallenberg

This took place in Pechora which is situated in the northern Urals. It was at a transit camp during the autumn - September or October of 1947. The prisoners were mixed and included foreigners and prisoners of war.

Miller still wore army uniform but without officer's stripes. On account of his injured arm, he was assigned to distribute food rations of bread and watery soup to the prisoners from a bench in the big barracks.

Someone asked in broken Russian for the heel of the bread loaf and Miller gave it to him. Then a prisoner with a German accent also demanded the heel aggressively. There was none left and the German wanted to hit him, but was pushed away by the first man. Miller did not know the identity of the latter at the time. He thinks they exchanged first names.

Raoul's appearance: He looked about 20 years older than Miller who was 21 years old at the time. He was tallish - Miller is short.

The prisoners came from all over the country. They were going to different areas, mostly to the north.

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Isaak Miller's second meeting with Raoul Wallenberg

This occurred in Zimmermanovka near Komsomol'sk-na -Amure[1] in August 1953.

Stalin had died on March 5, 1953 and there was an amnesty on March 27, 1953.

Miller was in a labour camp in Komsomol'sk in March 1953 where he worked with the horses. He was granted an amnesty and was later sent to Zimmermanovka[2] central camp to get his discharge documents.

It was in August 1953. A man approached him as though he knew him, though Miller did not remember him. He spoke in 'not very good Russian'. The man said he remembered Miller from the incident over the bread at Pechora. They exchanged names and he said that his name was Raoul Wallenberg. He thought that Miller was a Jewish name. When Miller acknowledged he was Jewish, Wallenberg's face lit up and he told Milller that he was Swedish and had been a diplomat in Budapest. He was arrested with his Driver in Budapest and taken to the Lubianka prison in Moscow. At first he was deprived of food, drink and sleep; he was beaten.

Miller asked the reason for Wallenberg's arrest and Wallenberg replied, "It doesn't matter, because of my good deeds. I didn't hurt anyone, God knows. I'm telling you because you are Jewish and I saved Jews." Wallenberg said he had been interrogated and accused of spying for several agencies. There had not been a trial.

Wallenberg's appearance: He was thin and nearly bald with scanty hair. Miller noted that he had a scar under his right ear and his teeth were very bad. Miller managed to get some garlic which he though might help him.

Wallenberg told Miller that while in Lubianka prison in 1947, he fainted in his cell and the warder saw him through the spy glass. He was taken to hospital in the prison. It was said to have been due to a heart attack. He was later transferred to another prison (Cresty in Leningrad).

Wallenberg told Miller that he had been in many camps; he was in camp 501 after Pechora. Miller said that he had also been in camp 501 but they had not met, Miller states that camp 501 is situated near Salekhard and it was under the control of Commander Barabanov who was especially cruel.

Wallenberg spoke about his family in Sweden and said that he had a mother, sister and 2 brothers. When he heard that Miller had been granted an amnesty he became upset

[1] In far east Siberia
[2] Both a labour and a transit camp

and said that he thought there was no way out for him. He asked Miller to tell his family about him. A few days later, Miller left the camp.

Asked why he did not transmit the information about his meetings with Wallenberg, Miller said that his father warned him not to mention it to anyone as he would be arrested again and that would kill his father.

Miller said he wants more expression of recognition for Wallenberg in Israel.

He spoke with sincerity from the heart.

Jean Kloos-Fishman

Dr. Jean Kloos-Fishman and Mr. Israel Aliat

British Broadcasting Corporation White City 201 Wood Lane London W12 7TS Telephone 0181 752 5252

INK
DHF 225/002
1998 -08- 18

BBC

P 2 Eu'

a.a.1

"Mysteries"
Room 4404
BBC White City
201 Wood Lane
London W12 7TS

Lage Olson
Ud-Ei-Esek
Foreign Ministry
SE-10339
Stockholm
Sweden

13 August 1998

Dear Mr Olson,

I am writing to thank you very much for your help with, and contribution to, our film on Raoul Wallenberg.

We very much appreciate your willingness to give up your Saturday morning and we hope we didn't take up too much of your time. It was also very kind of you to arrange for us to have access to the Foreign Ministry Press Building.

We are very pleased with all the interviews and we shall of course let you know the transmission date.

We all hope that your hard work will soon be realised and that an answer to Raoul Wallenberg's whereabouts will soon be found.

Thank you again.

Best wishes,

Lesley Brandon

LESLEY BRANDON

P 2 Eu'

1998 -08- 1 8

Uppsala, den 17 augusti 1998.

Ambassadråd
Lage Olson
Utrikesdepartementet
Avd. E.I./ESEK
Box 16121
103 23 Stockholm.

a.a.r

Bäste Lage,

Varmt tack för att jag fick vara med vid den trevliga lunchen i fredags för Vera Parnes och Ebba Grönroos!

Tack även för att Du tog kontakt med Per Anger och inbjöd honom till lunchen. Per förvånade oss med sin vitalitet och andliga spänst. Han fyller 85 i december. Att även Kanadas ambassadör William L. Clarke anslöt sig var hedrande och angenämt.

Jag lysssnade uppmärksamt på Per Angers konversation och har nedtecknat vad jag kommer ihåg. Därför kunde jag inte följa så noga vad Du samtalade med Ebba Grönroos om. Det rörde sig säkert om den kommande vitboken och UD:s "blå böcker" på CD-Rom. Det var trevligt att ni äntligen fick träffas.

Snart skall jag låta framkalla fotografierna och sända Dig ett par.

Jag har försökt nå Nina Lagergren och Sonja Sonnenfeld men utan framgång. De kanske semestrar. Vera Parnes ville gärna träffa dem, innan hon återvänder till Montreal den 24 d.s.

Än en gång ett varmt tack!

Med vänlig hälsning,

Din tillgivne
Torsten Hèrnod.

Torsten H è r n o d.

Adress:
Norrlandsgatan 42 B
752 29 Uppsala.

Tel.: 018-471 33 56

Ink. 98-08-27

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
RIGA

1998-07-29

Amb råd Lage Olson
EI/ESEK
UD

Ex till:
Foyer, Moskva
Wallberg, Moskva
Olson, EI-ESEK
Hallqvist, EC-2

DNR 210/0027
1998 -08- 28

P 2 EU' exp. 98-08-27

Raoul Wallenberg - utkast till prel. rapport från Susan Mesinai.

Broder,

Jag vore tacksam om du kunde vidarebefordra bifogade rader till Susan Mesinai. Så vitt jag kan se har hennes rapport snarare utvidgats än förkortats jämfört med det första utkastet! Hursomhelst blir det svårt att redigera det alltför hårt. Efter ytterligare en omgång tror jag vi får vidarebefordra texten till ambassaden Moskva. Ambassaden bör då först överlämna den engelska texten och därefter översättningen till ryska när denna är klar. Jag är bekymrad över nya kostnader för översättning.

När ambassaden överlämnar rapporten bör följande framhållas för ryssarna/eller anges i följebrev

1/ Texten är Susan Mesinais. Vi har granskat den och gjort kommentarer ~~samt försökt korta den~~ men ej funnit det möjligt att alltför hårt redigera den. Därför har vi förståelse för om den ryska sidan, liksom vi, konstaterar att en del frågeställningar, även om de inte slutgiltigt besvarats, redan diskuterats under arbetets gång och kanske därför främst lämpar sig att tas upp under en avslutande diskussion. Mesinais text är icke desto mindre av intresse, eftersom den återspeglar ~~hennes~~ en strävan efter ett helhetsgrepp på problematiken.

2/ ~~Vi kommer~~ också att ha förståelse för att ryska sidan ~~koncentrerar~~ sig på de mest angelägna frågorna och är beredda diskutera ~~vilka~~ som med hänsyn till arbetsinsats eller såsom varande av ~~mer~~ marginellt

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intresse i sammanhanget bör kunna läggas åt sidan, åtminstone tills vidare.

Hans Magnusson

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

1998-08-20

Aambs Stefan Gullgren

MYCKET BRÅDSKANDE

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P.	2	Eu 1

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

För: EC

Re Inför utrikesministerns samtal med Avdejev i Västerås - förslag till talepunkt samt bakgrunds-PM rörande Raoul Wallenberg

cc-mail Foyer-Gullgren 1998-08-11
(2 bil.)

Insänder närslutet förslag till talepunkt samt bakgrunds-PM rörande Raoul Wallenberg inför utrikesministerns samtal med vice utrikesminister Avdejev i Västerås.

LUTHMAN

2

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

TALEPUNKT

1998-08-20

Aambs Stefan Gullgren

Raoul Wallenberg

Arbetet i den svensk-ryska arbetsgruppen för att bringa klarhet i Raoul Wallenberg öde forskrider. Fortfarande återstår dock att fullfölja vissa delprojekt innan arbetsgruppens uppdrag kan anses avslutat.

Vi kan med tillfredsställelse konstatera att projektet rörande registerkorten i Vladimir-fängelset nu har fortskridit så långt att det bör kunna avslutas under hösten. Den oberoende arkiv-forskaren Susan Mesinais undersökningar av ett större antal persondossierer i FSB:s och MVD:s arkiv pågår. Efter det ryska hälsovårdvårdsministeriets klartecken bör de planerade under-sökningarna i vissa psykiatriska klinikers arkiv kunna inledas inom kort.

Det är vår starka förhoppning att samarbetet med berörda ryska myndigheter rörande dessa och andra undersökningar inom ramen för utredningen kommer att fortsätta i samma konstruktiva anda som hittills.

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

PROMEMORIA

1998-08-19

Aambs Stefan Gullgren

Raoul Wallenberg-utredningen - läget från Moskvas horisont i augusti 1998

1. Arbetet inom den svensk-ryska arbetsgruppen för att bringa klarhet i Raoul Wallenbergs öde är nu inne i ett slutskede. Båda sidor är eniga om att dokument som entydigt visar vad som hände Wallenberg ej har kunnat påträffas. Viss skiljaktighet råder dock om vilka slutsatser som kan dras av det material som trots allt föreligger.

Den ryska ståndpunkten torde snarast vara att arbetsgruppen redan i dagsläget får anses ha fullgjort sitt uppdrag, eftersom alla relevanta ryska arkiv nu har genomsökts och alla nyckelpersoner som fortfarande är i livet har intervjuats - utan avgörande resultat. Den ryska tolkningen av utredningsmaterialet är därvid att de sammantagna indicierna tyder på att Wallenberg avrättades i juli 1947.

Från svensk sida har vi dock önskat fullfölja ytterligare några delprojekt inom ramen för utredningen innan arbetsgruppen kan avge sin slutredovisning, bl a med hänvisning till behovet av att säkerställa trovärdigheten hos arbetsrapporterna i brist på avgörande bevis rörande Wallenbergs öde. Den ryska sidan har tidvis uttryckt starka tvivel beträffande det fruktbara i dessa undersökningar men har dock under det senaste året - med början några månader före president Jeltsins statsbesök i Sverige i december 1997 - i stort sett tillmötesgått våra önskemål.

2. De delprojekt som på svenskt begäran sålunda återstår att fullfölja innan arbetsgruppen kan avsluta sitt arbete är i första hand följande tre:

a) Genomgång av ett större antal **persondossierer** (ca 100 st) i den ryska säkerhetstjänstens (FSB) respektive det ryska inrikesministeriets (MVD) arkiv för att undersöka trovärdigheten hos de vittnesuppgifter som föreligger om att Wallenberg skulle ha hållits i sovjetiska fängelser/arbetsläger efter 1947.

Undersökningsarbetet utförs på svenskt uppdrag och med svensk finansiering av den oberoende amerikanska arkivforskaren **Susan Mesinai** och dennes ryska medarbetare. Mesinai har sedan slutet av förra året vistats mer eller mindre permanent i Moskva och har till dags dato givits möjlighet att studera ca hälften av de dossierer som hon har efterfrågat.

På svensk begäran har Mesinai under sommaren sammanställt en delrapport (ca 25 sidor) baserad på det arbete som hon hittills har utfört. Översättning av denna rapport till ryska pågår varefter den kommer att överlämnas till den ryska sidan i arbetsgruppen (förhoppningsvis omkring månadsskiftet augusti/september).

Det är Susan Mesinais förhoppning att hon skall kunna avge slutrapport från arbetet med persondossiererna **i januari 1999**, givetvis under förutsättning att den ryska sidan beviljar henne tillstånd att under hösten studera de dossierer som fortfarande återstår.

b) Genomgång och databearbetning av ett större antal **registerkort** (drygt 10 000) **i Vladimir-fängelsets arkiv** för att undersöka trovärdigheten hos de vittnesuppgifter som föreligger om att Wallenberg skulle ha hållits i Vladimir-fängelset under en viss period efter 1947.

Undersökningsarbetet utförs på svenskt uppdrag och med svensk finansiering av den oberoende amerikanske biologi-professorn **Marvin Makinen** och dennes ryska resp amerikanska medarbetare. I april i år genomfördes efter åtskilliga turer en slutlig genomgång respektive avläsning (medelst scanner) av de aktuella registerkorten i Vladimir-fängelsets arkiv. Den avslutande databearbetningen av informationen från registerkorten har under

senvåren och sommaren fått uppskjutas ett flertal tillfällen t f a diverse oförutsedda komplikationer på rysk sida men kommer nu förhoppningsvis att kunna genomföras under **september/oktober i år.**

c) Undersökningar i olika **psykiatriska klinikers arkiv** för att följa upp vittnesuppgifter om att Wallenberg skulle ha hållits inspärrad på psykiatrisk klinik under vissa perioder efter 1947.

Undersökningsarbetet kommer att utföras på svenskt uppdrag och med svensk finansiering av den oberoende amerikanska arkivforskaren **Susan Mesinai** i samarbete med den oberoende tyska arkivforskaren och frilansjournalisten **Susanne Berger** samt dessas ryska medarbetare. Principiellt klartecken till detta delprojekt inom Wallenberg-utredningen meddelades av det ryska hälsovårdsministeriet i juni i år. Ett första möte på expertnivå mellan Mesinai och företrädare för hälsovårdsministeriet ägde rum 13 augusti i Moskva. Förhoppningen är att undersökningarna skall kunna **inledas i september i år.**

3. Slutresultaten från arbetsgruppens verksamhet kommer enligt planerna att redovisas genom att **vardera sidan avger sin arbetsrapport** (eventuellt med en gemensam svensk-rysk inledning på några sidor). Den svenska sidans rapport är i stort sett färdig och detsamma gäller enligt uppgift även den ryska.

Från svensk sida har vi klargjort att åtminstone de tre ovan nämnda delprojekten måste fullföljas innan arbetsgruppens uppdrag kan betecknas som avslutat (beträffande de psykiatriska klinikerna torde det dock i praktiken bli svårt att fastställa tidpunkten för när delprojektet som helhet kan anses "avslutat"). I nuläget framstår det som **osannolikt att så skulle kunna ske före mitten/slutet av 1999.**

4. Från svensk sida har vi vid upprepade tillfällen klargjort att vi utgår från att oberoende experter/historiker som önskar bedriva efterforskningar rörande Raoul Wallenbergs öde kommer att ges tillstånd härtill även *efter* det att den svensk-ryska arbetsgruppen har avslutat sitt uppdrag. Den ryska sidan har i olika sammanhang uttryckt sin beredskap härtill.

Author: Susan (UD) Mesinai at (Pk)Moskva-amb-1
Date: 1998-08-27 14.30
Priority: Low
TO: Lage (UD) Olson at (Pk)UD-3
Subject: Various Matters

DN 239/001
1998 -08- 27
re Raoul Wallenberg
P 2 Ew 1
P 2 Ch 1
a.a.

August 27, 1998

Dear Lage. I am practising having been set up on e mail through your directory. Wanted you to know that you can communicate with me this way. While I have drawn up a list of tasks to complete my consolidation in Moscow over the next few weeks, should I succeed in finishing them, or even if not....I would very much welcome the chance to meet in Stockholm to talk about the ins and outs of moving forward. I spoke to Guy who heard from Hans Magnusson earlier that morning that there might be a Working Group meeting. I assume that means both sides. Or are we talking about a meeting only on the Swedish side? He also mentioned that Martin may be moving on in terms of his Wallenberg responsibilities. As these times of flux are times when momentum gets diverted, please let me know if the UD, on whatever level is appropriate, would find valuable meeting for a few hours with me, a few of us, if not all. I also had wanted to have some conversations of my own with Hans Magnusson whom I assume will be very busy back in Riga. Please let me know if there is any merit in my trying to come to Stockholm before going home and if so when (I must catch my early morning flight from London on September 17th, unless major development in the Wallenberg case or Russia in general make it advisable to stick it out now.) Should it be decided to meet sooner rather than later, could I go out and be assured of a visa to come back under the umbrella of my present visa which goes until mid October?

Regarding the taxes, and what you have explained to me about the rules. It would seem that should there be no more files for a while, there is a number of advantages to my sitting in New York and working...i.e. no taxes while there, no struggle for space here, and minimum expenses, if any extra. All that would be required is to pouch my files to New York and pouch them back when we continue. This is just a thought into the air. Your document has not yet come, but I think that if it's a matter of where I have spent more than six months of the year, if we count in 1998, I have been away from the States for 117 days to date with 22 more to go (this includes some time in the U.K. coming and going, but it was work time in any case). So this is a factor, but not necessarily the most important consideration. That is without doubt completing the data gathering through the Prisoner Files and the Medical and getting my Report done by January as agreed, if possible by that time.

In terms of accessing the files and renewing the work, while the situation is quite difficult at present...the two Cabinet Ministers whom everyone agrees will stay are Primakov and Stepashin. Given the positive relations that exist from the Swedish side to them, and particularly the latter, is there not hope --given the right reason... that we can move ahead in any case as the majority of the files and information is with the MVD?

As you see, there is much to discuss maybe. I think there is much merit in discussing how far we have gotten in the past nine months, what remains to be done, and how best to implement it, bearing all the factors into consideration....including the present crisis and the current needs of the Swedish Embassy in Moscow.

With good wishes, Susan Ellen Mesinai

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

26 augusti 1998

Nr. 111

Manne Wängborg

UD-EC

Kopia:
EI (Lage Olson)
Ambassadör Magnusson, Riga

INK. UTRIKESDEP.
DNR
1998 -08- 28
Avd. P | Gr 2 | Mål EU1

EC

Kop LG
Kop JCR
Org MH

LO: M

a.a.

Översättning till ryska av del 1 av Susan Mesinais rapport för den svensk-ryska arbetsgruppen om Raoul Wallenberg

1 bilaga

Vi översänder härmed en översättning till ryska av del 1 av Susan Mesinais preliminära rapport för den svensk-ryska arbetsgruppen om Raoul Wallenberg.

Innan texten överlämnas till den ryska sidan bör den granskas.

Ambassadör Hans Magnusson är vidtalad och införstådd. För att vinna tid skickar vi parallellt en kopia till honom via kurir-expeditionen.

Sven Hirdman

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ПРЕДВАРИТЕЛЬНЫЙ ПРОЕКТ ДОКЛАДА ДЛЯ ШВЕДСКО-РОССИЙСКОЙ РАБОЧЕЙ ГРУППЫ ПО ВЫЯСНЕНИЮ СУДЬБЫ

РАУЛЯ ВАЛЛЕНБЕРГА

Сюзан Эллен Месинай
Директор, Проект АРК,
Независимый консультант

Переводчик: А.Аллахвердов

4 августа 1998 г.

К О Н Ф И Д Е Н Ц И А Л Ь Н О

ЭТОТ ДОКУМЕНТ ВКЛЮЧАЕТ ТОЛЬКО ПЕРВУЮ ЧАСТЬ

ПРЕДВАРИТЕЛЬНЫЙ ДОКЛАД. ЧАСТЬ ПЕРВАЯ

Сюзан Эллен Месинай

ВВЕДЕНИЕ

При отсутствии неопровержимых, не противоречащих друг другу доказательств, ключ к решению загадки судьбы Рауля Валленберга заключен в ответе на вопрос - умер ли шведский дипломат или исчез в 1947 году. Аргументы в пользу каждой из этих двух возможностей появляются на каждом этапе этой работы, начиная с дискуссий по поводу термина "ликвидация", употребленного в документе, который послал Вышинский Молотову 14 мая 1947 г. Некоторые настаивает, что в данном случае употребление этого термина - это намек на то, что Валленберг должен был быть казнен. Тем не менее, ряд бывших советских официальных лиц придерживается иной точки зрения: данное выражение скорее содержит смысл "решения проблемы".

Вступать в семантические дискуссии не входит в нашу задачу, равно как не входит в задачу принимать сторону тех или иных очевидцев, как из числа заключенных, так и официальных лиц, показания которых часто противоречат друг другу. Скорее, моя задача заключается в следующем: полностью основываясь на документах, воссоздать контекст, в котором и попытаться дать оценку проблеме. Для этого, изучаются личные дела избранного круга заключенных, имеющих отношение к проблеме, с целью рассмотреть "сценарий экстремальной ситуации" в сравнении с нормальными реалиями. Два полюса - норма и экстремум - создают систему координат, в которой можно оценить и поставить на должное место все свидетельские показания. Это позволяет не только обрисовать детали какого-либо конкретного эпизода, но и определить его место в более широкой картине происходившего. Все более глубокое понимание принципов группирования и движения заключенных, организации и действий аппарата оказалось решающим для текущего исследования. Кроме того, для исследования ценными были вопросы по аналогичным делам, которые, в конечном счете, могут иметь, а могут и не иметь отношения к данному делу.

Поскольку мы вынужденно сталкиваемся с проблемами, вызванными отсутствием документов, напрямую относящихся к Раулю Валленбергу и его товарищу Вильмосу Лангфельдеру, часть из которых была уничтожена, мы полагаемся на перекрестные ссылки на относящиеся к делу детали, чтобы восстановить отсутствующую информацию или, в более засекреченных случаях, чтобы указать на те регистрационные журналы или дела, где соответствующие данные могут быть найдены.

Тем не менее, настоящий доклад не может быть составлен в окончательном виде без более полной информации, включающей оставшиеся дела и ответы на запросы

по ним. Поэтому я пользуюсь данной возможностью не только, чтобы определить направление, в котором теперь, благодаря изученным на настоящий момент материалам, ведется работа, но и для того, чтобы достичь прогресса с запросами информации (в большинстве старыми, хотя есть и новые), необходимой для завершения нашей работы по сбору данных в течение следующих нескольких месяцев.

ВРЕМЕННЫЕ РАМКИ

В данной конкретной фазе исследования я решила сконцентрироваться на временном промежутке от ареста Валленберга и Лангфельдера в 1945 г. до момента, когда в 1957 г. Советский Союз направил ответы их правительству. Ведь именно в этот период их судьба так или иначе была решена. Я стараюсь как можно более детально изучить информацию, относящуюся к этому периоду, включая внутриведомственную служебную, а равно и официальную переписку, чтобы заложить фундаментальную основу для дальнейшего исследования, которое, по мере необходимости, коснется показаний более поздних лет очевидцев из медицинских учреждений и трудовых лагерей.

Заключительный доклад объединит все находки вплоть до полемики между Нанной Шварц и Мясниковым, и будет включать результаты, полученные не только на основе изучения личных дел заключенных, но и тюремных медицинских дел, которые указаны в фазах 1 и 2 Медицинских предложений, утвержденных Министерством здравоохранения.

ОБЛАСТИ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ

Помимо фактов, данных, в том числе о вещественных доказательствах и уликах, которые напрямую позволят восстановить следы документов на Валленберга и Лангфельдера, я решила разбить сбор и анализ данных на следующие подразделы:

1. Возможные "моменты опасности" в период 1945-1957 гг., начиная с официально объявленного Советским Союзом дня смерти Валленберга 17 июля 1947 г., но не ограничиваясь им;

2. Методы, с помощью которых возможно укрывать человека или "заставить его исчезнуть", и которые могут иметь отношение к данному делу;

3. Роль свидетелей; в какой степени и как Валленберг и Лангфельдер изолировались или не изолировались от них, где и когда это происходило;

4. Подробности арестов, следствия, вынесения и исполнения приговоров, включая вопросы юрисдикции, которые помогли бы нам понять и

проследить их судьбу;

5. Разделение на "особо опасных" и "особо важных" и последствия такого разделения, в частности, для данного дела (будет описано лишь в Заключительном докладе);

6. Информаторы, действовавшие как до, так и после официально указанной даты смерти; выяснение их значимости в данном деле;

7. "Снежный ком взаимосвязей" (термин, который придуман мной и имеет следующее значение: невозможно было полностью или частично раскрыть правду по делу одного человека, так как это неизбежно пролило бы свет на судьбу другого заключенного-иностранца);

8. Невыясненные связи по линии разведки, которые продолжают связывать судьбу Валленберга с англо-американской деятельностью в Венгрии (я оставляю это для Заключительного доклада, так как необходимо провести дополнительное расследование в Вашингтоне);

9. Невозможность установить (полностью или частично) истину в этом деле, так как это затрагивает советские операции или работу советских агентов;

10. Сбор касающихся дела медицинских данных в ходе медицинского расследования.

ЦЕЛЬ НАСТОЯЩЕГО ПРЕДВАРИТЕЛЬНОГО ДОКЛАДА

Данный доклад является лишь предварительным, поскольку процесс сбора информации по различным категориям находится на различных стадиях, а от этого, в свою очередь, зависит анализ данных и конечный результат. Ни при каких обстоятельствах данный документ не должен рассматриваться как окончательный. Скорее, это предложение российской стороне откликнуться на мои находки и мысли, ответить на мои запросы с тем, чтобы на заключительной стадии мы могли сотрудничать еще более тесным образом.

Я буду рассматривать только отдельные вопросы, которые помогут нам вместе попытаться разрешить главные проблемы этого дела. Вместе с тем, я отметила те документы и дела, которые, на мой взгляд, сразу могут помочь ответить на текущие вопросы. Каждый из этих вопросов относится к определенному понятию и помогает накопить массив информации. Необходимо помнить, что эти изыскания непосредственно отражают сведения, полученные из 54 дел, изученных нами к сегодняшнему дню. Они могут претерпеть изменения в результате изучения оставшихся дел, равно как и после получения ответа на наши вопросы, связанные с исследованием, и после проведения исследования медицинских данных.

МОЯ БЛАГОДАРНОСТЬ

Я выражаю свою благодарность обеим сторонам - и российской, и шведской - за то, что это независимое исследование стало возможным. Благодаря моей работе на местах, я удостоверилась в том, какой бесценный вклад был сделан за последние семь лет членами Рабочей группы. Предоставленные документы действительно стали основой для этой долгой, скрупулезной работы. Поэтому я более чем благодарна за предоставленный доступ к материалам и возможность их подробного изучения. Особая признательность работникам архивов, которые терпеливо повторяли свой уже пройденный однажды исследовательский путь, особенно, когда они выполняли самые обширные заявки по делам, и таким образом обеспечивали непрерывность исследования и полноту анализа.

I. НАИБОЛЕЕ ВЕРОЯТНЫЕ "МОМЕНТЫ ОПАСНОСТИ", 1945 - 1957 гг.

Меморандум Громыко 1957 года, основываясь на приложенном документе за подписью Смольцова, определяет дату смерти Валленберга как 17 июля 1947 г. Наше исследование предлагает рассматривать три возможных опасных периода. Предположение о первом из них основано на вышеупомянутых документах, а также на нынешних свидетельствах бывших советских официальных лиц. Два других определены на основе наших изысканий в личных делах заключенных и предварительного анализа регистрационных карточек Владимирской тюрьмы, скопированных в 1990 г. группой независимых исследователей.

Три периода таковы:

- 1947 г.: либо "уничтожение", либо результат применения слишком "жестких мер" в попытке перевербовать, либо сердечный приступ, как указано в "документе Смольцова";
- 1952 г., если действительно имела место казнь; в противном случае - 1953-55 гг. из-за состояния здоровья;
- 1955-56 гг.: по соображениям, касающимся "снежного кома взаимосвязей" и/или по невыясненным обстоятельствам, связанным с деятельностью разведки, которая занималась англо-американскими интересами в Венгрии и Венгерской революцией 1956 г.

1947 г. - МОСКВА

1. В недавних устных свидетельствах, высказанных различных официальных лиц КГБ, даются причины смерти, отличные от версии сердечного приступа, указанной в документе за подписью Смольцова. Тем не менее все они придерживаются даты 17 июля 1947 г. как действительного дня смерти. Трудность здесь заключается в том, что нет законного документа, засвидетельствовавшего и подтвердившего бы эту версию. Более того, если рассматривать Валленберга не как "супергероя", а как одного из членов особой группы военнопленных, обвиняемых в принадлежности к фашистам или сотрудничестве с нацистским режимом против СССР и его союзников, то представляется, что этот день смерти наступил слишком рано. За исключением осужденных руководителей польского "правительства" в эмиграции, осужденных и приговоренных в июне 1945 г., следствие по делам тех, с кем сидел Валленберг в 1945-47 гг. только разворачивалось. Процесс вынесения приговоров тем, кто перестукивался с Валленбергом в Лефортовской тюрьме, только начинался в 1948 г.; а большинство тех, с кем у него были более существенные связи были приговорены в 1952 г. Лишь некоторые небольшие группы заключенных, тесно связанные с Валленбергом и Лангфельдером, были осуждены в 1950 и 1951 гг.

Более того, по-настоящему важные заключенные, например, руководители Польши и стран Прибалтики, содержались под номерами до самого вынесения приговора. Валленберг же, как мы знаем из дела Кичмана (стр. 99), был известен под собственным именем - по крайней мере, пока он числился за Карташовым, т.е. за 4-м отделом 3-го Главного управления, что продолжалось, как минимум, до августа 1946 г. Если ситуация и изменилась, то произошло это не раньше начала 1947 г., когда перевод Валленберга на Лубянку мог также означать его перечисление под юрисдикцию Следственного отдела по особо важным делам. Если Валленберг вдруг стал весьма важным заключенным, чья судьба лежала на чаше весов уже в 1947 г., для этого должны быть установлены реальные основания.

Известно, что Вилли Редель, в течение долгого времени сокамерник Валленберга, все еще числился за 4-м отделом 3-го Главного управления в тот момент, когда он умер. Числился ли он за этим же структурным подразделением в период с февраля по октябрь 1947 г., когда он содержался во Внутренней тюрьме?

Для того, чтобы определить, были ли советские руководители убеждены в том, что Валленберг виновен, необходимо восстановить показания против него. А для этого нужен расширенный доступ к тем следственным делам, в которых могут содержаться какие-нибудь сведения, имеющие отношение к этому вопросу.

Для придания большего веса советской аргументации о том, что Валленберг умер в июле 1947 г., важно, чтобы нам было разрешено ознакомиться с личными

делами заключенных и делами, хранящимися в Министерстве здравоохранения, на тех, кто умер в тот год, а именно: на Бетлена, Марека и Ределя из первоначального списка, а также на Исава Оггинса[1]. Также важно изучить медицинское дело Гарета ван дер Ваальса, который умер в августе 1948 г. Так же, как Валленберг и Лангфельдер (который, как сообщается, умер в 1948 г.), ван дер Ваальс был еще молод, тогда как Бетлен, Марек и Редель были гораздо старше. Кроме того, к делу имеет отношение и тот факт, что дело ван дер Ваальса, так же, как Шандля, Клемента и Валленберга, находились под непосредственным контролем Абакумова.

2. В этом контексте мы хотели бы также выяснить судьбу британского уорент-офицера (прапорщика) Реджинальда Х. Барратта (Reginald H. Barratt), также известного под именем Стенли Годден, который работал с ван дер Ваальсом, Клементом и Шандлем в Будапеште, имел связи со Шведской Миссией; которому - как и Валленбергу - советовали искать защиты у советских властей, и который, обратившись к ним, исчез. Британское правительство установило, что Барратт также попал в советский ГУЛАГ. Необходимо отметить, что советское правительство отрицало факт того, что все трое - Валленберг, ван дер Ваальс и Барратт - были задержаны и находились на его территории.

Если станет возможным показать взаимосвязь между такими отрицаниями и гибелью этих людей, это не только придаст больше веса заявлениям о смерти, но и позволит четче обрисовать контекст, в котором действовал Вышинский, поскольку именно он отрицал эти факты в меморандумах, направленных соответственно правительствам Великобритании, Швеции и Нидерландов. Если бы российская сторона могла привести другие примеры того, что присутствие того или иного лица на территории СССР отрицалось, и сообщить, умерли ли эти люди или исчезли, это дало бы нам больше информации, на основании который мы могли бы делать выводы.

3. На Московской конференции в октябре 1943 г., где три союзные державы закрепили свою решимость добиваться "безоговорочной капитуляции", определили схему наступления союзников, в том числе обманный для Германии план, охватывавший Скандинавию и Балканы. На этой конференции Молотов сообщил американской стороне о том, что Сталин "резко возражает"[2] против любых форм восточно-европейской федерации, конфедерации или иной формы экономического союза, включая то, что было названо "скандинавско-дунайским заговором". Проводя эту линию, Сталин зорко следил за тем, чтобы не заключались сепаратные мирные сделки и/или чтобы Германия не вела с союзниками тайных деловых

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[1] Нам встречались два варианта написания по-русски имени Оггинса (Esau): Исав или, как дает в своей книге П.Судоплатов, Исаак.

[2] Термин "violently opposed" встречается в записках на английском бывшего Посла США в СССР Гарримана. Мы не знаем, какие в точности слова произнес Молотов.

переговоров, которые могли бы повлиять на успех СССР на Восточном фронте или на планы, касающиеся раздела "сфер влияния". Под этим подразумевалась и выдача Германией евреев в обмен на стратегические материалы, которые должны были применяться немцами исключительно на Восточном фронте. Такие "резкие возражения" могли стать причиной жестких мер, принятых против Рауля Валленберга в 1947 г.

Вопрос о восточно-европейской конфедерации, сопротивлении и связях со Скандинавией и англо-американскими союзниками может быть рассмотрен только при обращении к делам Бетлена, Янковского, Чатлоша, Хатца, ван дер Ваальса, Филда, Радо, Майера и Феллера, Беккерле, Ределя, Волкова и Гфорнера из нашего первоначального списка, а также дел других арестованных, по причине того, что они участвовали в сопротивлении или разведдеятельности в Венгрии, таких, как Виктор БОНДОР, Золтан МИКО и Элемер БЕНЧЕШ, также известный как ГАЙГЕР (ГЕЙГЕР) и чей отец помогал формированию миссии Валленберга в Стокгольме. В большинстве указанных случаев появляется все больше доказательств непосредственных связей с Валленбергом.

4. Никонов, Гордиевский и Кондрашов (в числе прочих) в один голос утверждали, что Валленберг умер не от сердечного приступа, а был застрелен. Случись это до 26 мая 1947 г., это могло быть более вероятным, и было бы легче это проследить и установить. Однако в этот день расстрелы были отменены и вновь введены в практику лишь 12 января 1950 г. Если исключения и были, мы о них ничего не знаем.

Если бы российская сторона могла назвать случаи, когда иностранные заключенные были убиты в период, когда расстрел не применялся, а также позволила бы нам ознакомиться с некоторыми из таких дел, это дало бы нам соответствующие аргументы. Однако, в этом случае нам необходимо знать, по чьему приказу, по какой причине и каким образом казнь, которая противоречила закону, была задокументирована и приведена в исполнение. Кто реально выполнял эту "грязную работу" и где такие казни происходили?

5. Г-н Кондрашов описал документы, которые были просмотрены во время допроса в марте-апреле 1947 г. - он был на нем переводчиком - как те самые, что были найдены у Валленберга во время ареста. В последующих беседах он сказал, что если бы бумаги Валленберга подтверждали его непосредственную связь с американской разведкой, это было бы достаточным основанием для его казни. Несколько раз я поднимала перед г-ном Виноградовым вопрос о важности этих документов для американцев, Это подтверждается в рассекреченных документах ЦРУ. Так, например, в совершенно секретной телеграмме, посланной Дином Ачесоном в Вашингтон в сентябре 1945 г., говорится, что шведам известно о том, что бумаги Валленберга захвачены, а сам он отправлен в ГУЛАГ, и есть опасение, что он никогда не вернется оттуда. "Нансеновский план"

Валленберга по восстановлению еврейской общины в Будапеште, который был среди его бумаг, вряд ли мог быть основанием для его казни.

В ответ на это, я, как директор Проекта АРК, начала интенсивную работу по выяснению из важных рассекреченных американских документов происхождения этих бумаг. Я обращаюсь к российской стороне с просьбой предпринять шаги для реконструкции этих документов. Таким образом могут быть установлены возможные мотивы для уничтожения Валленберга и/или его изоляции с целью получения информации или для того, чтобы со временем его обменять.

6. В связи с этим, из дела Яна Спишьяка, словацкого дипломата, арестованного и допрашивавшегося "Смерш" в Будапеште в то же время, что и Валленберг, мы отметили, что документы Спишьяка оставались при нем в течение некоторого времени и, как представляется, были в конце концов изъяты во Внутренней тюрьме в 1946 г. (Возможно, что к тому времени они уже были изъяты и были представлены вновь в связи с подготовкой к его возвращению в Чехословакию.) Это были неустановленные бумаги на иностранных языках, блокнот с записями и различные фотографии. Все документы были помещены в пакет и опечатаны "печатью № 14". Приняты дежурным офицером МГБ 18 декабря 1946 г. На обороте написано: "Передано в отдел. Зарегистрировано в книге для различных отделов. Принял майор Вайндорф, ком. 671. 18/XII 1946 г".[3] По сведениям архивных работников, когда Спишьяк был репатриирован для суда в Чехословакию, эти документы были пересланы туда отдельным пакетом как доказательства.

Пожалуйста, укажите регистрационный журнал или разносную книгу за декабрь 1946г., где зарегистрированы документы Спишьяка и отмечено, что они опечатаны "печатью № 14". Использовалась ли эта процедура опечатывания только для документов, которые отсылаются в суд? Бывала ли случаи, когда обмененному дипломату, такому, как, например, Феллер, возвращали его документы при отправке? Кому принадлежала печать № 14? Что это за печать и какое значение имеет № 14? Опишите, пожалуйста, процедуру регистрации документов. Существуют ли иные процедуры хранения документов дипломатов, которые все еще находятся под следствием, или тех, кто умер, но чьи документы представляют оперативную или юридическую ценность? Как эти документы регистрировались и обрабатывались? Пожалуйста, определите регистрационные журналы, по которым можно установить судьбу документов следующих дипломатов: Беккерле, Феллера, Чатлоша, Ределя, Бетлена, Хатца, Марека, Герстенберга, Окулицкого, Янковского, Валленберга, Мунтерса, Меркиса, Урбшиса, равно как и любых других номерных заключенных, которые были дипломатами.

[3] Обратный перевод с английского. См. дело Спишьяка стр.28.

Возможно ли, что документы Валленберга рассматривались как потенциальные доказательства, которые со временем предполагалось использовать в Нюрнбергском процессе или в показательных процессах в Восточной Европе? Есть ли какие-либо указания на это в других источниках? Для чего скорее всего могли быть использованы эти документы весной 1947 г.?

7. Из-за того, что сокамерники Валленберга были фашистами и из-за того, что Валленберг обвинялся - по крайней мере в начале - в сотрудничестве с нацистами против СССР и Союзников, исследование до сих пор концентрировалось вокруг отдела, занимавшегося Германией. Поскольку обвинение Валленберга в том, что он являлся "американским шпионом" указывалось как наиболее вероятная причина его тяжелой участи, будь то гибель в результате казни или длительное заключение, необходимо уделить больше внимания разведдеятельности американских отделов различных управлений. Иначе это может создать пробел в нашем исследовании, поскольку быть британским или американским шпионом само по себе могло являться "особо важным" обстоятельством, что могло кончиться смертью человека или его исчезновением,.

В составе каких отделений, отделов, управлений работали подразделения, занимающиеся американскими делами? Кто их возглавлял? Кто был наиболее опытным работником в части допросов? С широкой точки зрения, каковы были стратегические цели этих подразделений?

В этом контексте, укажите, пожалуйста, личность и/или разъясните полностью природу дела на заключенного № 1 во Владимирской тюрьме, в чьей карточке он указан как венгр, обвиняемый в том, что он "американский шпион".

В-третьих, являлось ли перечисление Валленберга из 4-го отдела 3-го Главного управления в Следственный отдел по особо важным делам простым совпадением с расследованием вопроса о том, был ли он англо-американский шпион?

8. Кроме того, единственным человеком из нашего первоначального списка, о котором мы с уверенностью можем говорить, что он имел связи с американцами, был Ноэл Филд, бывший сотрудник Госдепартамента США, Отдела стратегических служб (OSS) и Unitarian Service Committee, который снабжал ценной разведывательной информацией Отдел по делам военных беженцев (War Refugee Board) на ранней стадии его работы. Филд перешел на советскую сторону и впоследствии против него был устроен показательный процесс в Будапеште, на котором он обвинялся в просионистском и про-титовском уклоне, а также в том, что он был американским шпионом по причине его тесных связей с Алленом Даллесом.

Мое исследование, проведенное на Западе, наводит на мысль, что дело Филда аналогично делу Валленберга, не только из-за их взаимного интереса в спасении людей, но и из-за их переплетающихся контактов в Будапеште во время войны, включая Райка. Кроме того, есть указания на то, что не только Филд, но и Валленберг мог иметь рабочие связи с Алленом Даллесом и его коллегами, когда он выполнял свою миссию в Будапеште.

По этой и другим причинам мы вновь просим предоставить для ознакомления личное дело Филда и дать возможность задать вопросы по его следственному делу. Это чрезвычайно важно для того, чтобы лучше понять американские связи в Будапеште, как они функционировали и чем конкретно они угрожали безопасности Советского Союза.

9. Возникли вопросы по и поводу документа, подписанного Смольцовым - в связи с изученным недавно делом Окулицкого, а также в связи с делами переданными из Владимира. Четкая подпись Смольцова легко читается. Она появляется в делах Патаридзе, Шульгина, Янковского и Окулицкого, но только на самых простых, рутинных документах. Во врачебном заключении, представленном как судебный образец подписи Смольцова, сказано, что Окулицкий прошел осмотр в июне 1945 г. на предмет годности к работе в трудовом лагере. Когда дело доходит до серьезных медицинских случаев, как, например голодовка, которая явилась причиной смерти Окулицкого, для наблюдения и экстренной операции вызывают отнюдь не Смольцова, а д-ра Цитронблата из Центральной поликлиники Медицинского управления МГБ.

Необходимо изучить личный архив и медицинские заключения Цитронблата, а также медицинские документы этого отделения, не только для того, чтобы определить, что могло произойти в случае с Валленбергом, но и просто для того, чтобы понять субординацию - кто кому докладывал.

Необходимо сравнить взаимоотношения Смольцова и Абакумова с взаимоотношениями последнего и Медицинского управления МГБ. Необходимо изучить переписку Смольцова с 1945 вплоть до 1951 г., чтобы определить природу и содержание его сообщений, а также, кому они были адресованы. Как часто он докладывал Абакумову? Как часто он имел дело с особыми и критическими ситуациями? Фигурирует ли его имя в связи со смертью какого-либо другого важного заключенного?

В правом верхнем углу "документа Смольцова" есть цифра(ы), которая представляется номером страницы. Из какого и чьего дела взят этот документ?

10. Говоря о самом тексте документа, написанного Смольцовым, мы просим российскую сторону проанализировать, в сравнении с аналогичными случаями, язык записки и употребление таких оборотов: "в связи с

имеющимся от Вас распоряжением о личном наблюдении за Валленбергом..." . Мы должны понять, зачем было нужно такое "наблюдение", если только он не был болен, но в этом случае он должен был находиться не в своей камере, а в Бутырках (см. ниже).

Пожалуйста, прокомментируйте также фразу "предположительно в результате инфаркта миокарда". Поскольку слово "предположительно" не вяжется со скрупулезными заключениями на завершающей стадии истории болезни и протоколами патолого-анатомических вскрытий, которые мы видели, является ли это намеком на то, что должно было быть написано в последующих псевдомедицинских заключениях?

11. Из дел заключенных видно, что в большинстве медицинских случаев - от истощения на почве недоедания до попыток самоубийства - больных лечили в медицинской части Бутырской тюрьмы, а не на месте.

Говоря об активной роли, которую играла медчасть Бутырок, необходимо четко определить функции санчасти любой московской тюрьмы, в особенности же - Лубянской.

Необходимо изучить регистрационные записи медчасти Бутырской тюрьмы на предмет записей о Валленберге, как о поступившем пациенте (или протокола его патолого-анатомического вскрытия). Это особенно важно, учитывая существование Приложения 3 к Письменному Докладу Молотова и Серова от 28 апреля 1956 г., в котором заявляется, что Валленберг умер в тюремном госпитале. ***Чтобы облегчить эту задачу, важно установить регистрационный номер Валленберга во Внутренней тюрьме, поскольку больные в госпитале сохраняли тот же личный номер, что и в той тюрьме, где они официально содержались - чтобы отличать их от тех, кто был направлен в госпиталь (медчасть) непосредственно из Бутырской тюрьмы.***

Регистрационные номера Валленберга и Лангфельдера могут быть установлены по регистрационным книгам Внутренней тюрьмы за январь-февраль 1945 г. Эти номера не менялись даже после длительного отсутствия, так что, установив эти номера, можно обследовать регистрационные записи медчасти Бутырок за многие годы, не только за 1947 г.

12. Обследованные нами протоколы патолого-анатомического вскрытия постоянно составлялись группой московских судебно-медицинских экспертов: Семеновским и подполковником м/с Финаевым из медчасти Бутырской тюрьмы. Иногда в качестве свидетеля участвовал третий медик. Это происходило в случаях смерти ван дер Ваальса, Окулицкого, Марека и Ределя, чьи протоколы вскрытия, акты и свидетельства о смерти нам удалось изучить.

Учитывая то, что д-р Семеновский был очень опытным врачом и подписывал документы о смерти даже в очень деликатных случаях - включая документы, относящиеся к массовому расстрелу в Катыни, - зачем вообще был нужен документ, написанный Смольцовым?

Кроме того, необходимо знать, каковы были юридические последствия того, что на документах о смерти и о вскрытии отсутствовали подписи трех свидетелей, как в случае с документом Смольцова, а также последствия отсутствия документов о смерти, как в случае с Янковским и заключенным № 11, которые упоминаются в разделе "1952-54 гг." настоящего доклада. Означают ли эти пробелы ситуацию, когда с юридической точки зрения смерть не имела места?

13. В тех случаях, когда смерть человека наступала на Лубянке в Москве, приказы о вскрытии и кремации были в компетенции Миронова как начальника Внутренней тюрьмы. Юрисдикция Миронова достигала таких широких пределов, что он даже контролировал решение проблем, связанных со смертью Ределя, который скончался на этапе, по дороге в Красногорск, в лагерь № 27. И Миронов, и Ионов в Лефортовской тюрьме очень ответственно относились к своим обязанностям. Поэтому ответственность, которую взял на себя Смольцов в случае смерти "заключенного Валенберга" - не проводить вскрытия и кремировать его тело - не соответствует процедурам, проводившимся в подобных случаях.

Если существуют другие примеры того, что Смольцов предпринимал подобные шаги, мы готовы пересмотреть наше видение ситуации.

14. Дело Окулицкого, стр. 128-а. Записка, написанная от руки карандашом. "Тело заключенного Окулицкого может быть кремировано в крематории на общих основаниях, как обычно. Согласовано с тов. Лихачевым"[4]. Краткая пометка говорит, что отсутствует первая страница, подписано: Иван Николаевич, тел. 296 14 05.

Пожалуйста, разъясните, какие процедуры включают действия "на общих основаниях, как обычно".

Какие были варианты или другие соображения при принятии этого решения? Если бы тело не было кремировано, куда еще оно могло быть отправлено?

Где находятся документы, в которых отдан приказ и засвидетельствована эта кремация? Делаются ли обычно записи, указывающие где и когда состоялась кремация и куда был помещен прах, как это зафиксировано в некоторых аналогичных случаях, например с Иштаваном Бетленом?

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[4] Обратный перевод с английского. См. документ.

Учитывая, что тов. Лихачев - тот же самый человек, который допрашивал Окулицкого 4 декабря 1946 г., после того как командующий польской Армией Крайовой 2 декабря начал голодовку, почему с ним согласовывали процедуру уничтожения тела? Что конкретно был согласовано? Насколько подотчетен был Лихачев в том, что касалось смерти Окулицкого и почему? (Я поднимаю этот вопрос в особенности потому, что "допросы" описывались заключенными также и как "переговоры". В этом случае, когда очевидно, что не было достигнуто никакого соглашения, заключенный сам шел на смерть. Окулицкий четко дал это понять.)

Существуют ли в личных архивах Миронова, Леонова, Лихачева и "Ивана Николаевича", какие-либо документы по поводу уничтожения тела Окулицкого?

В качестве темы для обсуждения. Если провести возможную параллель с делом Окулицкого: если смерть Валленберга была результатом его отказа быть перевербованным, с кем бы скорее всего согласовывался вопрос об уничтожении его тела? Можно ли предположить, что с кем бы этот вопрос ни согласовывался, это лицо имело непосредственное отношение к жестким мерам, повлекшим это трагическое событие?

15. Относительно меморандума Вышинского от 14 мая 1947 г. о решении проблемы, вызванного содержанием Валленберга под стражей, мы обращаемся к делу Шандля (стр. 8 - 15, относящиеся к октябрю 1948 - декабрю 1949 г.) как к возможной аналогии. Начальник Лефортовской тюрьмы Ионов уведомляет майора Бурашникова как начальника отдела "А", Леонова как начальника следотдела по особо важным делам и Питовранова как начальника 2-го Главного управления о том, что Шандль содержится под стражей в течение нескольких лет и не допрашивается. Ионов запрашивает разъяснения, и просит принять меры, которые позволили бы "продвинуть решение этого вопроса".[5]

С процессуальной точки зрения документ может быть сопоставлен с жалобой Вышинского Молотову, хотя язык и отличается: "До сих пор проблема Валленберга остается неразрешенной" (то есть не двигается с места, никто не заботится о том, чтобы ее решить). "Я отдать распоряжение Абакумову предоставить информацию по этому вопросу и предложения по его ликвидации."[6]

Оценивая предполагаемую склонность лиц, вовлеченных в это дело, к крайним мерам, следует отметить, что Шандль не был ликвидирован. Вместо этого, пришел ответ от зам. начальника отдела "А" с инструкцией не предоставлять справку об аресте заключенных Шандля и Клемента.

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[5] Обратный перевод с английского. См. документ.
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10 февраля и 13 июня 1950 г. Питовранов принял решение, что Шандль виновен в том, что он был агентом британской разведки, и должен быть помещен в специальную тюрьму в строгой изоляции. Шандль был отправлен во Владимирскую тюрьму как заключенный № 26, так и не пройдя обычных процедур допроса и вынесения приговора. На это указывает тот факт, что, когда Шандль впоследствии обратился к Ворошилову с прошением о помиловании, председатель Президиума Верховного Совета отметил, что просьба Шандля рассмотрена быть не может, так как в его личном деле отсутствует решение органа, вынесшего ему приговор.

Возможно ли, что дело Валленберга было "продвинуто" тем же самым способом, что и дело Шандля, которому быстро вынесли приговор, не проводя полностью обычной процедуры расследования, а потом отправили отбывать срок как номерного заключенного? Если невозможно, почему?

Если мы будем рассматривать термин "ликвидация" через призму принципа "нет человека - нет проблемы", возникает вопрос, существовали ли подобные запросы и/или просьбы "продвинуть дело" в связи с делом Оггинса - от начальника мест заключения, где он отбывал наказание, или из МИДа, или из обоих мест? Эта информация позволит глубже проанализировать возможные параллели. Нас очень интересовали бы язык и терминология, употреблявшаяся в этих случаях.

Поскольку генерал Питовранов все еще жив, может быть он сможет непосредственно прокомментировать подобные исключительные случаи, особенно если заключенные были арестованы в Венгрии. Почему Валленберг, ван дер Ваальс и Клемент содержались "под крылом" Абакумова? Кто еще входил в эту группу "подопечных"?

16. Несмотря на то, что сама форма смерти Валленберга в 1947 является предметом дискуссий, у российских официальных лиц, похоже, нет сомнения в том, что Валленберг отказался быть перевербованным. В связи с этим остается открытым вопрос, кто пытался перевербовать его, для какой операции и когда. (Не только Столяров, но и Питовранов показывали, что о Валленберге много знал Утехин из Комитета информации, из-за его потенциальной ценности как "влиятельного агента".) Синицин в своих мемуарах отмечал, что он тоже принял участие в попытках перевербовать Валленберга. Синицин также появляется в качестве лица, допрашивавшего Вальтера Шлиттера/Шлютера, информатора, который сидел вместе с рядом свидетелей по делу Валленберга-Лангфельдера. Допрос проходил 10 мая 1945 г. с 22.40 до 0.20.

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Валленберг в то время все еще находился во Внутренней тюрьме, но был уже переведен из камер 121-123, которую он делил со Шлиттером в течение шести недель в феврале-марте 1945 г.

Исходя из предположения, что это один и тот же Синицин, чье имя так же редко фигурирует в качестве допрашивающего, как и имя Абакумова, необходимо выяснить под чьей юрисдикцией и с какой целью проводились его допросы?

Каково было содержание допросов Шлиттера Синициным? Кто прочитывал эти материалы и ставил на них свою подпись?

Учитывая признанную роль, которую играл Синицин в Стокгольме и Хельсинки в последние годы, его знакомство с семьей Валленбергов, их международные связи, необходимо точно определить темы допросов, проводившихся Синициным, и определить, касались ли все они примерно сходной области(ей) интересов.

17. 17 июля 1947 г., согласно Меморандуму Громыко, официально указывается как дата смерти Рауля Валленберга. Последующее исследование, проведенное российской стороной обнаружило существование документа № 3044-а от 17 июля 1947 г., написанного Абакумовым Молотову, который, как считается, дает ответ на вопрос о судьбе Валленберга. Меморандум, составленный Абакумовым по поводу Оггинса за № 2773-а от 21 мая 1947 г. предлагается рассматривать как доказательство того, что в № 3044-а имеется в виду казнь указанного заключенного. Это требует дальнейшего анализа.

В связи с этим документом необходимо выяснить несколько вопросов. Во-первых, Оггинс был американским заключенным, чье нахождение в советском ГУЛАГе не вызывает сомнений. С ним разговаривали представители Посольства США в июне 1943 г., которые выразили готовность вернуть его на родину. Оггинс также был приговорен, отбыл весь срок и к тому времени уже должен был выйти на свободу. В этих условиях решение необходимо было принимать немедленно.

Во вторых, рекомендации Абакумова по поводу судьбы Оггинса адресованы Сталину и Молотову. Документ же за № 3044-а адресован только Молотову. "Решение" Абакумова по делу Оггинса - уничтожить его, фальсифицировать историю болезни и подделать свидетельство о смерти, чтобы выглядело так, что он умер от обострения туберкулеза спинного мозга за несколько дней до выхода на свободу - вероятно требовало одобрения Сталиным. Трудно поверить, что спустя два месяца уничтожение человека, имевшего такой международный вес, как Рауль Валленберг, потребовало всего лишь одобрения Молотова, а то и вовсе не требовало ничьего согласия.

Следует помнить, что время было неизвестно, что Валленберг содержится под стражей в Советском Союзе. Поэтому отрицания этого факта в Меморандуме

Вышинского от 18 августа 1947 г. могло быть вполне достаточно для "решения" проблемы. В этих обстоятельствах сбор свидетелей вместе 22 июля 1947 г. имеет смысл с той точки зрения, что, прежде, чем готовить меморандум, надо было выяснить, много ли известно о пребывании заключенных Валленберга и Лангфельдера.

Пожалуйста, предоставьте подобные меморандумы, направленные Совету министров, касательно судьбы Окулицкого, Ясюковича (1946 г.), Бетлена и Марека (1947 г.). Кому они были адресованы - Сталину, Молотову, кому-либо другому или кому-то из них вместе? Сообщите, пожалуйста, даты меморандумов, их номера и кем они подписаны. Если не было документов, направленных через Совет министров, то каким образом и кем было сообщено Сталину об их смерти?

Пожалуйста, изучите другие дела, относящиеся к тому времени, даже не входящие в наш список, чтобы помочь нам проанализировать, насколько упомянутые официальные лица были вовлечены в решение этих вопросов, и чтобы определить, какие заключенные считались важными, кем и почему.

Пожалуйста, предоставьте нам для изучения дело Оггинса, а также оригинал (или точную копию) меморандума № 2773-а от 21 мая 1947 г. по его делу.

18. В то время, как акцент делается на 22 июля 1947 г., в ходе допросов, проводившихся и до этого, выявлялись сведения, которые могут помочь понять судьбу Валленберга. Во-первых, ни Лойда, который сидел и с Валенбергом, и с Лангфельдером, ни Хилле не допрашивались в Москве в это время. Во-вторых, Шлиттер - первый сокамерник Валленберга и Рихтера - допрашивался Карташовым, причем в конце - вместе с Эрнстом Хубером, который впоследствии стал его сокамерником на долгий срок. В-третьих, акцент на допросах 22 июля возможно вывел из поля зрения тот факт, что Густав Рихтер 17 июля допрашивался в течение 6 часов 15 минут. Поскольку этот день объявлен днем смерти Валленберга, это важное совпадение.

Мы хотели бы получить полный список тех, кто был допрошен в московских тюрьмах 22 июля 1947 г., чтобы выяснить, кого еще могли вызывать на допрос Карташов во Внутренней тюрьме и Кузьмишин в Лефортове. Для сравнения, проводились ли подобные допросы в Бутырской тюрьме? Если да, то кто на них вызывался? Кто их проводил?

Кроме того, необходимо выяснить, кто был изолирован сразу после этих допросов, и кто нет. К примеру, был ли Шлиттер изолирован, или он был посажен в камеру с другим важным действующим лицом, таким, как Редель или Лангфельдер, который был переведен во Внутреннюю тюрьму на следующий день? (Поскольку допросы Шлиттера и Хубера Карташовым 22 июля 1947 г.

пересекаются, важно следующее: раз известно, что Шлиттер сидел с Валленбергом и Хубером, у которых были добрые отношения с Лангфельдером, может ли это указывать на подготовку к тому, что информатор Шлиттер будет сидеть вместе с Лангфельдером?)

Более пристальное внимание должно быть уделено записям в журнале допросов за 17 июля 1947 г. и несколько дней до и после этой даты. Если Рихтер интенсивно допрашивался в это время, есть все основания предполагать, что и Редель тогда тоже подвергался допросам.

Должны быть изучены записи в регистрационных журналах движения заключенных МГБ за период 14 мая - 14 октября 1947 г., когда Редель был отправлен в Красногорск, чтобы выяснить, был ли Валленберг в это время переведен в другую московскую тюрьму или отправлен за пределы города. Еще раз подчеркиваю: необходимо иметь регистрационный номер Валленберга во Внутренней тюрьме.

19. Как уже показал журнал записи экстренных случаев на Лубянке за июль и август 1947 г., в нем нет записи о каком-либо случае сердечного приступа, только запись от 18 июля 1947 г. о попытке самоубийства заключенной С.Н.Губенко в 1.40 ночи, числящейся за начальником транспортного управления МГБ. "Сообщалось начальнику тюремного отдела тов. Боярскому".

Поскольку в эту экстренную ситуацию были вовлечены Внутренняя тюрьма (Миронов), транспортное и тюремное управления МГБ, объясните, пожалуйста, как распределялись между ними ответственность и компетенция в таких случаях? Следует ли из того факта, что Губенко числилась за транспортным управлением, что экстренная ситуация произошла с ней в пути, при следовании с Лубянки, аналогично тому, как это произошло с Ределем в октябре 1947 г.? Если да, каков был пункт назначения Губенко? Пожалуйста, просмотрите соответствующие регистрационные журналы, где отмечались экстренные случаи за октябрь 1947 г., чтобы определить, была ли там отмечена смерть Ределя, и, если да, то как? Мы также хотели бы ознакомиться с записями в регистрационных журналах транспортного отдела МГБ за июль 1947 г., чтобы выяснить нет, ли записей, касающихся Валленберга и Лангфельдера.

ПРИМЕЧАНИЕ: В специальный раздел "Исчезновение" я включу детальный запрос по изучению архивов конвойных войск за определенные периоды, чтобы проверить некоторые показания о нахождении Валленберга в различных лагерях. Тем временем, важно завершить наше исследование этапов, прибывавших во Владимирскую тюрьму в период 1947 - 1957 гг. В связи с тем, что существуют конкретные показания свидетелей о том, что Шульгин и Валленберг прибыли во Владимирскую тюрьму примерно в одно время, я пытаюсь восстановить журнал регистрации прибывших за 1947 г. В частности, я запрашивала регистрационный

номер заключенного Владимирской тюрьмы П.А.Кутепова, который прибыл туда 25 июля 1947 г. вместе с В.В.Шульгиным и Константином Волковым. Поскольку эти трое, русские по национальности, были этапированы во Владимир вместе, я спрашивала также, не прибывал ли в этот день еще какой-нибудь этап из Внутренней тюрьмы и не был ли доставлен оттуда особый заключенный - тем же этапом, но изолированно от других?

Нам бы очень помогло если бы были изучены записи об этапах из Внутренней тюрьмы во Владимирскую в поисках имени Валленберг или какого-либо неизвестного заключенного, который мог быть Валленбергом, то есть номерной заключенный или тот, у которого совпадала бы дата рождения или, возможно, статья - 25 лет за шпионаж, - или тот, у которого был бы номер, под которым Валленберг был зарегистрирован во Внутренней тюрьме. Я также повторяю свою просьбу разрешить мне закончить изучение картотеки Владимирской тюрьмы, которое я начала с разрешения тюремного начальства в марте 1997 г.

20. Еще одна проблема заключается в том, что существуют показания очевидцев из московских тюрем, в частности, Лефортова, которые утверждают, что они сидели с Валленбергом. Эти показания относятся к периоду после официально принятой даты смерти - 17 июля 1947 г.

Мы повторяем нашу просьбу предоставить дела Максимилиана АНГЕЛИСА, Фридриха БАЙЕРА, Золтана РИВО (личное дело заключенного, где была бы информация о его пребывании в московских тюрьмах), Хельмута ШНАЙДЕРА (лейтенанта, командира танка, содержавшегося в Лефортове, чьи ранние лагерные документы мы видели, но среди них нет документов, относящихся к его пребыванию в Лефортовской тюрьме), Андре ШИМКЕВИЧА (или СИЕНКЕВИЧА, или ШИЕНКЕВИЧА) из нашего первоначального списка.

Мы также хотели бы попросить предоставить нам дела следующих дополнительных свидетелей (далее имена в именительном падеже): Рудигер АДЕЛЬМАНН (Rudiger ADELMANN); Йозеф БЁМ (Joseph BÖHM или BOEHM); Хельмут ВАЙДЛЮНГ или ВЕЙДЛИНГ (Helmut WEIDLUNG); Пауль ВИТТЕРН (Paul WITTERN); Курт ГЕРУМ (Kurt GERUM); Ханс Оскар ГЛАУНИНГ (Hans Oscar GLAUNING); Клаудио ДИ МОР или ДЕ МОР (Claudio DI MOHR или DE MOHR); Аф ДЕ САНДБЕРГ (Af DE SANDBERG); Эрих КАЛЕР или КОЛЕР (Erich KAHLER или KOHLER); адмирал Эрнст КРАФФТ (Ernst KRAFFT); гауптман КРАЙДЕНВАЙС (KREIDENWEISS); Карл КРЕМЕР (Karl KRÄMER или KRAEMER); Эрих КУЕЙД и Фердинанд Бодо-Хорст КУЕЙД (дядя и племянник) (Erich + Ferdinand Bodo-Horst QUADE); Хайнц ЛИНГЕ (Heinz LINGE); капитан Юрий НАРБУТ; Оскар НИДЕРМАЙЕР (Oscar NIEDERMAYER); Армандо ОДЕНИГО (Armando ODENIGO); Курт фон ОСТЕРРАЙХ(ЕР) или ЭСТЕРРАЙХ(ЕР) (Kurt von ÖSTERREICH(ER)); Рудольф ПАЛЬ(Т)ЦЕР (Rudolf PALTZER); Хайнц ПАН(Н)ВИЦ (Heinz PANNWITZ); Вильгельм РОДДЕ или РЁДДЕ (Wilhelm RODDE или RÖDDE); Карл СУП(П)РИАН или СУП(П)РИЯН (Karl SUPPRIAN); Йоахим ФОРВЕРК

(Joachim VORWERK); Ханс Эрих ФОСС (Hans Erich VOSS или FOSS); Герберт ХЕНГСТЕНБЕРГ (Herbert HENGSTENBERG); Адольф ШМИДТ, Вальтер ШМИДТ, Герхард ШМИДТ, Ханс ШМИДТ(Adolph + Walter + Gerhard + Hans SCHMIDT); Элизабет ШРАЙБЕР (Elizabeth SCHREIBER); Хельмут ШТИЛЕР или ШТЮЛЕР (Helmut STYHLER); Эрнст Э(Э)ГЕМУНД (Ernst EEGEMUND).
Эти дела мы запрашиваем потому, что существует сведения, полученные из шведского СЕПО, а также для того, чтобы найти подтверждение нашим находкам из уже изученных дел. Данный список - исправленный.

Нам также необходимо просмотреть регистрационные карточки Лефортовской тюрьмы на заключенных, чьи дела мы уже изучили, но по которым у нас нет полной информации, касающейся их размещения и движениях по камерам. Это следующие заключенные: Роланд Готтлиб, Золтан Риво, Хайнц Янчи, Герман Генрих Гроссгейм-Крысько (он же Томсен), Могенс Карлсон и Франц Гфрорнер.

Наконец, как мы писали ранее, мы просим срочно предоставить нам возможность изучить регистрационный журнал прибытия Бутырской тюрьмы на предмет поиска заключенных, переведенных из Лефортовской тюрьмы 30-31 марта 1950 г., включая Рихтера, Кичмана, Хилле, Лойду, Хофштеттера, Пелконена, Гфрорнера, Герстенберга, Бентивеньи, Гроссгейма-Крысько, но не ограничиваясь ими. Поскольку Гроссгейм-Крысько в своих показаниях правительству Швеции в 1954 г. высказал убежденность, что Валленберг был в числе этой группы из 100-110 заключенных, такая возможность очень помогла бы нам ускорить наше исследование, чтобы или подтвердить, или опровергнуть это. Поскольку Шлиттер, Хубер, Беккерле и ряд других заключенных из нашего списка прибыли в течение последующей недели (первой недели апреля 1950 г.), мы хотели бы изучить журнал прибытия в этих временных рамках (с 30 марта по 10 апреля 1950 г.), чтобы полностью определить контингент лиц, которые были перечислены под юрисдикцию Бутырской тюрьмы и 2-го Главного управления на стадии, предшествующей вынесению приговора.

1952 - 1954 гг.

1. 13 октября 1954 г. заместитель министра иностранных дел Громыко в письме председателю КГБ Серову просит его сообщить "когда и при каких обстоятельствах умер Рауль Валленберг".[7] Серов отвечает 3 ноября 1954 г.: "Комитет государственной безопасности не имеет ничего добавить к информации министра государственной безопасности СССР от 3 марта 1952 г, № 2816/и о Валленберге Р." Письмо Игнатьева Громыко просто повторяет позицию, высказанную в Меморандуме Вышинского от 18 августа 1947 г., о том, что Валленберг не находился на территории Советского Союза.

[7] Обратный перевод с английского. См. документы.

Что в то время побудило Громыко вновь поднять вопрос "когда и при каких обстоятельствах"? (Проблема судьбы Валленберга безусловно не была нова для Громыко, к которому не раз обращались как к Послу в ООН высокопоставленные люди, например Элеанор Рузвельт, с просьбой прояснить обстоятельства вокруг его исчезновения).

Зачем в то время надо было ставить вопрос в такой форме? Могли ли все новые и новые запросы из Швеции заставить его попытаться прорвать завесу молчания и неопределенности, на которую натыкался каждый вопрос? Или слухи о судьбе Валленберга, которые стали тогда циркулировать, заставили его попробовать овладеть ситуацией?

То, что Серов придерживался ответа Игнатьева, означало ли это, что вне зависимости от реальных фактов, ответ зам. министра иностранных дел должен повторить Меморандум Вышинского от 18 августа 1947 г.?

2. Большинство заключенных, такого же масштаба, как и Валленберг, включая и тех, с кем он контактировал в Будапеште были осуждены в 1952 г. либо Особым Совещанием при министре госбезопасности, либо Военным Трибуналом. Частичный список осужденных в то время включает *Франца Рудольфа Гфрорнера*, он же д-р Карл Шмидт, работник военной разведки Абвер, с которым Валленберг имел дело в связи со спасением евреев в Будапеште. Гфрорнер был тройным агентом, который имел оплачиваемые контакты с американской разведкой с мая 1944 г. Гфрорнер был приговорен к расстрелу.[8] Указывалось, что приговор был приведен в исполнение в апреле 1952 г., хотя необходимые документы, сопровождающие эту меру, в деле отсутствуют. *Альфред Герстенберг*, командный чин ВВС Германии в Плоэшти, который имел военные и экономические связи в Румынии, Польше и Венгрии, получил 25 лет за шпионаж. Ему было заявлено, что если бы расстрел не был отменен, в его случае он мог рассматриваться как возможное наказание. (Неточность: к тому времени расстрел уже был восстановлен.) Положение Герстенберга в ВВС и его связь с добычей нефти в Румынии вполне могли свести его с семьей Валленбергов, чей картель включал SKF и румынские нефтяные концерны. *Генрих Гроссгейм-Крысько*, который работал с Валленбергом в Шведской Миссии в Будапеште, и *Густав Рихтер*, полицейский атташе в Румынии и один из первых сокамерников Валленберга. Оба были обвинены в связях с "особо важным заключенным" и получили по 25 лет за шпионаж. Они были отправлены во Владимир в числе особой группы заключенных под литерой "Н". *Отто Хатц*, венгерский военный атташе, который имел контакты с Валленбергом в Будапеште. Перешел на советскую сторону в

[8] Следует отметить, что в большинстве, если не во всех других случаях, которые мы встречали в делах или карточках заключенных, смертный приговор заменялся 15 годами исправительно-трудовых работ.

ноябре 1944 г. Хатц, хотя и был также тройным агентом, был приговорен к 15 годам, учитывая некоторые услуги, которые он оказал советскому правительству, и был отправлен в Озерный лагерь. *Теодор Круммай*, полицейский атташе гестапо в Праге, был также и в Будапеште, где был вовлечен в дело Джоэля Бранда, а также в финансовые операции, относившиеся к обмену евреев. *Бела Ковач*, лидер Партии мелких собственников Венгрии, с которым у Валленберга было множество политических контактов. *Франц Бентивеньи*, один из высших чинов Абвера, осужденный вместе с Герстенбергом и отправленный во Владимир. Одно время был сокамерником Отто Хатца, от которого, по его словам, и услышал впервые о Рауле Валленберге.

Мы хотели бы изучить сжатое изложение протоколов допросов тех, кто был осужден Особым Совещанием или Военным Трибуналом, как под именем, так и под номерами, в 1952 г. В это число входят и те, кто был осужден вместе с заключенными, указанными выше, а также руководители стран Прибалтики, которым предварительно были даны номера и которые были окончательно осуждены и отправлены - под своими именами или номерами - во Владимирскую тюрьму. В это число также любой заключенный отправленный во Владимир по категории "Н". Это нужно, чтобы завершить работу над той серией, которую мы сейчас изучаем.

3. Тот факт, что все упомянутые заключенные, кроме Гфрорнера, выжили и были репатриированы, отнюдь не дает уверенности в том, что Валленберг прошел тот же самый процесс следствия. Тем не менее, важный вопрос возникает в связи с указанием в деле Гфрорнера на то, что в мае 1946 г. следствие по его делу было приостановлено "для производства новых арестов"[9]. Решение приостановить предварительное следствие было принято для того, чтобы получить новые показания, "без которых невозможно вести или закончить следствие по этому делу", а также "руководствуясь специальными инструкциями по делу". В связи с этим возникает вопрос, насколько значимым свидетелем по другому важному делу был Валленберг, и, если так, то по чьему делу. Скажем, формальный арест Герстенберга базировался на показаниях Тиллессена, Дитля, Шпальке, Шернера и Рихтера, "полученных в ходе предварительного следствия".

Взаимосвязь показаний вызывает не только вопрос о том, был ли нужен живой свидетель для дальнейших стадий расследования или нет, но и о том, надо ли продолжать содержать под стражей заключенного, "связанного с особо важным заключенным", если или когда тот умирает.

В этой связи, крайне важно установить личность "особо важного заключенного", с которым были связаны Гроссгейм-Крысько и Рихтер. Идет ли речь об одном и

[9] Обратный перевод с английского. См. документ.

том же человеке? Поскольку, как мы понимаем, следственные дела, изученные шведской стороной, не дают такой информации, существуют ли другие пути, чтобы установить личность упомянутого заключенного (или заключенных)?

Когда обнаруживается связь с "особо важным заключенным" либо во время ареста, либо, когда выносится приговор, имеется ли в виду под этим понятием живой человек, или это может относится к уже умершему заключенному?

Когда говорится "связан" с таким заключенным, имеется ли в виду, что они были сокамерниками, или это относится к прошлым связям по работе или миссии, то есть до задержания заключенного?

Возможно ли находиться формально под арестом или быть приговоренным к длительному сроку из-за связи с "особо важным" лицом, которое еще находится на свободе, то есть вообще не пойман?

4. Ответы на приведенные выше вопросы необходимы для того, чтобы проанализировать возможные изменения в судьбе Валленберга в течение 1953 г. Гроссгейм-Крысько, которому так и не сообщили, за что он сидит и не показали приговора, был выпущен 26 мая 1953 г., так как в его содержании под стражей "больше не было необходимости".[10] Если такое решение было принято после пересмотра его дела вновь созданным комитетом, в состав которого входили Берия, Маленков и Молотов, то конечно они не могли упустить из вида связи Гроссгейма-Крысько и Валленберга. В таком случае, либо они не имели отношения к тем критериям, по которым было решено освободить Гроссгейма-Крысько, либо судьба Валленберга казалась достаточно "решенной", чтобы позволить ему выйти на свободу, либо же Валленберг не являлся тем "особо важным заключенным", с которым был связан Гроссгейм-Крысько.

Необходимо серьезнейшим образом изучить этот вопрос и установить, по какой причине Гроссгейм-Крысько был освобожден в 1953 г. Насколько информированы были руководители комиссии или комитета о природе тех преступлений или связей, которые повлекли столь долгое заключение?

5. Ян Лойда в конце концов получил разрешение покинуть СССР в декабре 1953 г. В своем письме начальнику Владимирской тюрьмы Лойда отмечал, что его заключение было связано с тем, что он сидел с особо важными заключенными - "Чатлошем, Ределем и Валленбергом" (в таком порядке). Чатлош был передан Чехословакии вместе со Спишьяком, словацким дипломатом, арестованном с Валленбергом в январе 1947 г., и должен был там предстать перед судом за военные преступления. Редель умер по дороге в Красногорск в октябре 1947 г., в то время как Лойда уже находился в лагере для репатриируемых в Одессе, то есть на пути на

[10] Обратный перевод с английского. См. документ.

родину. Если бы Валленберг действительно умер в июле 1947 г. (если Лойда был прав относительно причин своего заключения), он не был отозван специальным приказом зам. министра Селивановского от 10 ноября 1947 г. (за № 3-78258).

Пожалуйста, изучите секретные материалы на Лойду чтобы определить, по какой причине и с какой целью он был отозван накануне своей репатриации.

Поскольку просьба Карташова от 15 октября 1947 г. о вызове Лойды и Хилле из лагеря № 27 в Москву совпадает по времени с приказом об отправке Ределя в Красногорск, пожалуйста проверьте все возможные связи, которые существуют между этим вызовом и отправкой Ределя. Были ли оба указания отданы одним и тем же начальством? Если да, то кем?

6. Ряд заключенных умер в 1953 г., по крайней мере известно о таковых во Владимирской тюрьме, где мы имели доступ к картотеке. Часть из них была старше Валленберга и Лангфельдера. Тем не менее, необходимо отметить, что в большинстве показаний, относящихся к периоду с 1949 г. упоминается состояние здоровья Валленберга. Несмотря на то, что при этом называются различные места, вопрос состояния здоровья Валленберга является главной темой: говорится о голодовке Валленберга в Лефортове в знак протеста против приговора (1948-49); об обследовании Валленберга д-ром Менахемом Мельтцером в Хальмер-Ю; о том, что Валленберг снят с этапа в
Магадан и отправлен на лечение в госпиталь в Хабаровск (1950); о том, что Валленберга оперировали в Магнитогорске (1953); о том, что Валленберг "тяжело болен", находясь во Владимирской тюрьме, корп. II (1952-53 и еще раз позднее).

К сожалению, ряд исключительно важных дел за этот период не был передан нам российской стороной. К ним относятся следующие дела из первоначального списка: Шун Акикуса (медицинское дело); Фридрих Байер, Богуслав Бай (личное дело заключенного), Альфред Фриз (Фрис), Франц Бентивеньи (личное и медицинское), Антонас Богданос (личное и медицинское), Альфред Герстенберг (медицинское), Семен Гогоберидзе (медицинское), Фриц Гаммершмидт (личное и медицинское), Харольд Хьельд (личное и медицинское), Рудольф Винтер фон Шваб (личное и медицинское), Рафаэль Саульсон Якобссен (личное и медицинское), Хорст Кичман (медицинское), Фумитака Коноэ (медицинское), Йозеф Мейер или Майер (личное и медицинское), Эрно Пелконен (медицинское), Эмиль Бруггер (медицинское), Отто Шоггль (медицинское), Ян Санитцер (медицинское), Абрам Калинский (личное и медицинское), Геннадий Куприянов (личное и медицинское), Меркис (мать) (личное и медицинское), Мунтерсы - оба, Вильгельм и Натали (личное и медицинское), Ян Станислав Янковский (медицинское), Патаридзе и Шульгин (медицинские), Константин Волков (личное и медицинское), Исаак

Маркович Вольфин (личное и медицинское), Вальтер Шлиттер-Шауэр (медицинское) и Франц Рудольф Гфрорнер (медицинское).

7. Ян Станислав Янковский бывший заместитель Премьера Польского правительства в эмиграции, умер во Владимирской тюрьме 13 марта 1953 г. На стр. 477 его дела говорится, что он был похоронен на городском кладбище Владимира вместе с заключенным № 11. Мы ничего не знаем об этом заключенном, кроме того, что он был приговорен к 25 годам за шпионаж по статье 58-4. В деле Янковского также говорится, что о его смерти не сообщалось в ОАГС, а в учетной карточке заключенного говорится просто - он умер - и не указывается причина смерти, как это обычно делается.

Мы считаем исключительно важным установить настолько полно, насколько это возможно, личность заключенного № 11: его имя, национальность, дату рождения и смерти; дату и место ареста; где, когда и каким органом был вынесен приговор; дату прибытия во Владимир; историю пребывания во Владимирской тюрьме и движение по камерам; его медицинское дело.

Умирали ли в это время какие-либо еще номерные заключенные? Кто это был, и были ли они также похоронены на городском кладбище Владимира? Уведомлялся ли ОАГС/ЗАГС? Если никто не уведомлялся на местном уровне, как об этих смертях сообщалось в Москву? Кому адресовались такие уведомления (пожалуйста, сообщите не только имя, но и подразделение, отдел, управление)? Какое официальное лицо непосредственно курировало эти особые случаи и случаи смерти?

Мы хотели бы получить разрешение обследовать журналы владимирского тюремного госпиталя, где регистрируется смерть, в поисках записей о смерти Валленберга, Лангфельдера, тех, кто был с ними связан, а также номерных заключенных, начиная с 1947 г. Как и в случае исследования в корпусе II Владимирской тюрьмы, мы будем искать того, кто мог быть Валленбергом, но быть скрытым под другим именем или под номером.

Мы также хотели бы обследовать архивные документы Министерства социального обеспечения Мордовии (Мордовской АССР), куда по их письму за № С-769 от 14 мая 1954 г. должен был быть направлен в интернат Янковский. Мы хотим выяснить, какие еще известные заключенные-иностранцы были направлены в интернат в Мордовии, вместо того, чтобы содержаться во Владимирской области, как это было с Шульгиным и Патаридзе.

1955-56

1. После того, как основные свидетели были репатриированы в результате подписания договора Хрущева-Аденауэра, и впоследствии дали показания Шведскому Правительству о том, что Рауль Валленберг был с ними в московских тюрьмах, в позицию, выраженную в Меморандуме Вышинского 1947 года должны были быть внесены поправки. При составлении Меморандума Громыко десять лет спустя необходимо было учитывать, что к тому времени существовала система обязательных и регулярных рапортов изо всех регионов СССР, с помощью которой составлялись списки заключенных - иностранных граждан и лиц без гражданства - формы 5 и 6, - а также списки ссыльных, проживавших на специальных территориях. Архивные материалы периодически уточнялись, так как информация посылалась из различных тюрем в Специальную оперативно-информационную картотеку отдела "А" МГБ[11], с которой сверялся 3-й отдел Тюремного управления перед тем, как выпустить Лойду (см. дело Лойды, стр. 85). Кроме того существовали архивные записи подразделений конвойных и внутренних войск МВД или НКВД по всей территории СССР. Иными словами, имелась возможность провести серьезные и компетентные поиски Валленберга.

Изучались ли вышеупомянутые источники, когда в период 1955-56 гг. проводились поиски с целью выяснить судьбу Рауля Валленберга?

2. Мы не можем представить никаких свидетельских показаний о том, что Рауль Валленберг умер в 1955-56 гг. Вопрос возник лишь в связи с судьбой принца Фумитаки Коноэ, захваченного в конце короткого военного конфликта между СССР и Японией летом 1945 г. В 1951 г. Коноэ был приговорен Особым Совещанием к 25 годам за "участие в кругах, враждебных СССР" и "связь с милитаристскими правящими кругами Японии" - эвфемизм, под которым, вероятно, подразумевалось, что его отец как премьер-министр Японии пытался вести переговоры о сепаратном мире с западными Союзниками примерно в то время, когда был схвачен его сын. (Отец Коноэ покончил с собой.) Его дело в значительной степени аналогично делу Валленберга в том смысле, что оба молодых человека представляли потенциальную ценность как возможные заложники дипломатической или военно-промышленной игры из-за своих семейных связей, что и отягчило их участь. Оба получили образование в Америке и имели сильные связи с Западом.

Вопрос в том, является ли дело Коноэ аналогичным делу Валленберга, как-то касается его, или тесно с ним переплетается - с трагическими последствиями для обоих?

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[11] Название картотеки может быть неточным, так как это также обратный перевод с английского.

Чтобы ответить на этот вопрос, нам необходимо изучить записи любых обсуждений, которые имели место между членами ЦК, Совета Министров или Президиума ВС, по поводу возможного освобождения принца Фумитаки Коноэ, особенно относящихся к периоду 1955-56 гг. (но не ограничиваясь им), когда создавался ответ Шведскому Правительству по поводу судьбы Рауля Валленберга. В этом случае, поскольку Коноэ являлся известной фигурой, был жив, и его заключение признавалось Советским Союзом, было бы очень ценным проследить, как оценивались возможности его репатриации в связи с вопросами безопасности, а также в связи с замешательством, которое могло вызвать его возвращение, и восстановление его связей с Западом. (см. ниже п. 9).

3. Как и Янковский, Коноэ считался "особо опасным государственным преступником", и апеллировал к Председателю Совета Министров Маленкову с просьбой о пресмотре этого статуса 8 августа 1953 г. и еще раз - 7 апреля 1954 г. Еще одно письмо было отправлено министру госбезопасности 1 июля 1955 г., его содержание неизвестно. Как я понимаю, в соответствии с совместным постановлением МГБ, МВД и Военной прокуратуры 1951 г., все, кто был квалифицирован как "особо опасные государственные преступники" - т.е. шпионы, лидеры националистических движений, террористы, саботажники - по отбытия наказания должны были не освобождаться, а отправляться в ссылку или спецлагерь. Это должно было произойти с Янковским, который должен был быть отправлен в интернат под наблюдением органов МГБ, поскольку "он не имел семьи на территории Советского Союза".[12] Янковский умер за две недели до того, как в его жизни должна была случиться эта перемена.

Необходимо прояснить какие из заключенных-иностранцев подпадали под действие этого постановления, т.е. не репатриировались по окончании срока. Куда их отправляли? Могли ли среди них быть Валленберг и Лангфельдер?

Также важно изучить записи, касающиеся апелляций, чтобы выяснить не обращался ли Валленберг (как и Герстенберг, Пелконен, Шандль и почти все остальные) с апелляциями по поводу своего приговора и/или пересмотра своего статуса в то же время, что и вышеупомянутые заключенные. Кроме того - где хранятся апелляции, адресованные Сталину, например, письмо, которое Валленберг - это известно - написал ему осенью 1946 г.?

Что подразумевается под "интернатом", где Янковский должен был быть под наблюдением органов КГБ? Был ли это обычный интернат, куда работники КГБ наведывались время от времени, или специальное учреждение, целиком и полностью под контролем КГБ? В тех случаях, когда это реально происходило, как долго длилось такое пребывание?

4. В деле Коноэ есть документ без даты - анкета, которую заполнил зам.

[12] Обратный перевод с английского.

начальника иркутского управления МГБ при подготовке к отправке Коноэ в Харбин, где он должен был быть кому-то передан, предположительно для репатриации. Коноэ так и не добрался до Харбина. Вместо этого он или был задержан в Иркутске, или возвращен туда, а затем отправлен во Владимир в январе 1956 г., куда он прибыл с группой своих сотечественников. В апреле 1956 г. Коноэ был переведен в Иваново, в лагерь № 48. Это место, как представляется, было сборным и распределительным пунктом для репатриирумых, хотя в прошлом Внутренняя тюрьма Иванова являлась местом заключения руководителей прибалтийских стран, которые проводили там годы в качестве номерных заключенных в ожидании приговора.

В связи с этим возникают вопросы общего характера, ответ на которые должен быть найден для выяснения дела Валленберга. Почему все, кто имеет отношение к данному делу - кроме Хатца, Шлиттера и Гфорнера, - были со временем переведены во Владимир? Почему Лойда (1947), Беккерле (1952) и Коноэ (1955-56) отозваны, не достигнув пунктов своего назначения? По чьей инициативе и каким отделом это делалось в каждом из трех случаев? На каком основании?Очень важно определить вначале, есть ли какая-либо взаимосвязь между этими тремя мерами и влияли ли они или имели какое бы то ни было отношение к пребыванию, смерти или исчезновению Валленберга в ГУЛАГе.

Более конкретно, необходимо определить, кто отменил отправку Коноэ в Харбин, по какому приказу и почему. Кто приказал перевести его во Владимир и почему? Кто приказал отправить его в лагерь № 48 в Иванове и почему? Поскольку многие из этих приказов приходятся на период после смерти Сталина и казни Берии и Абакумова, необходимо проследить цепочку до самого выского уровня.

5. Коноэ умер 29 октября 1956 г. в 5.00 утра в лагере № 48 в Иванове от "повышенного кровяного давления и острого общего артерио-склероза вследствие обширного разрушения кровеносных сосудов в четвертом желудочке головного мозга".[13] Ему был 41 год, он был на три года моложе Валленберга. В то время, как его смерть детально задокументирована, а протокол вскрытия подписан, в числе прочих, японским врачом, те, кто делал обследование 33-мя часми позже отметили, что заключенный в момент смерти не находился в госпитале.

Где он находился в момент смерти? Еще важнее выяснить, какое значение имело такое замечание с точки зрения отчетности. Имеет ли это прямое отношение к записке Смольцова, в которой отмечается, что Валленберг в момент смерти находился в камере, тогда как в Дополнении 3 к Меморандуму Молотова и Серова, предложенном, но так и не переданном шведской стороне, говорится о том, что он находился в тюремном госпитале? Какие из этих сведений - правда?

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[13] Обратный перевод с английского. См. документ.

6. Как далее отмечается в деле Коноэ, в то время, когда произошла эта смерть, у СССР не было дипломатических отношений с Японией. Просьба о передаче тела была возможной только тогда, когда дипломатические отношения были бы восстановлены. Тем не менее были составлены скрупулезнейшие отчеты, и то же было сделано в случае смерти польских, балканских и других дипломатов, о которых говорилось выше, а также в случае с Оггинсом и ван дер Ваальсом, с немецкими и австрийскими официальными лицами и военными, включая Рудольфа Вайсброта, который приговорил к смерти ряд коммунистов при нацистском режиме. Такие сообщения показывают твердое знание требований международного права.

В этих условиях, принципиально важно задать вопрос, почему, в то время, как дипломатические отношения со Шведским Правительством существовали, советские руководители не могли или не хотели представть законный документ, подтверждающий смерть Валленберга, в качестве возможного решения этой проблемы? Существуют ли другие подобные случаи, которые помогли бы нам понять их логику?

7. Летом 1992 г. дело Коноэ было поднято российскими журналистами как параллель недавно раскрытого дела Оггинса. Оба этих человека описывались как заключенные, которых не могли выпустить на свободу из-за того, *что* они знали. О Коноэ говорили, что он погиб из-за тех, с кем он вступил в контакт, нахоясь в заключении. Очевидно, что показания японского прица с принстонским образованием произвели бы эффект разорвавшейся бомбы в мировом общественном мнении. Поэтому я была очень удивлена, прочтя, что принц Коноэ умер от туберкулеза и других причин, кажущихся естественными.

Исходя из деталей Меморандума Абакумова № 2773-а о подлоге документации, касающейся казни Оггинса, и учитывая тот факт, что некоторые российские журналисты открыто заявляли в моем присутствии, что Коноэ был казнен, я должна попросить предоставить реальные факты по этому делу. Это тем более важно, что в докладе посла Халльквиста о показаниях, касающихся Владимира, говорится о том, что существовал японец - имя не названо, - который сидел вместе с Валленбергом. Нам нужна полная история пребывания Коноэ в тюрьмах, с указанием номеров камер и имен сокамерников, чтобы определить кто и когда с ним сидел.

ПРИМЕЧАНИЕ: В деле Коноэ указывается, что он сидел вместе с Яном Станиславом Янковским, начиная с 6 июля 1947 г., и с Адольфом-Хайнцем Беккерле, бывшим Послом Германии в Софии, в Бутырской тюрьме, в камере 254, как раз перед вынесением им приговоров в конце 1951 г. Беккерле был отправлен в Верхне-Уральск, затем "срочно" отзван назад и стал заключенным Н4 во Владимирской тюрьме в апреле 1952 г. Коноэ отправили в Александровск Иркутской области, где он сидел в камере 49. С какими еще дипломатами

пересекались пути Коноэ в этза все время заключения?

8. Вальтер Шлиттер, первый сокамерник Валленберга, в то время, когда тот сидел с Густавом Рихтером, был переведен из строгой изоляции в Александровске и помещен в камеру 49 с Коноэ 6 марта 1954 г. Как долго они сидели вместе и какое оперативное значение это имело, предстоит еще выяснить. Что абсолютно ясно, это то, что Шлиттер-Шауэр, репатриированный в 1955 г., никогда не давал показаний о Валленберге, несмотря на то, что он сидел с Раулем дольше, чем Густав Рихтер. В связи с этим документ № 157, приложение 1, от 13 мая 1956 г., направленный Молотову и Серову Секретарем ЦК должен быть пересмотрен. В переводе тест выглядит так: "*компетентным советским органам было предложено проанализировать и проверить документы, переданные шведской стороной... В частности, они хотели бы иметь более детальную информацию о Шойере-Шауэере, который предположительно находился в одной камере с Валленбергом, как указывает Густав Рихтер в своих показаниях.*"[14] Этот официальный ответ на представленные Шведским Правительством показания очевидца, который привел к появлению Меморандума Громыко, короток. Вместе с запросом фотографий и информации, которая, казалось, могла помочь советским компетентным ведомствам в действительных поисках Валленберга в ГУЛАГе, его первоначальная причина могла заключаться в том, чтобы выяснить, давал ли Шлиттер/Шауэр также показания или нет. Иными словами, **это одно признание могло существенно изменить и форму, и содержание Меморандума Громыко 1957 г.**

В результате изучения нами дела Вальтера Шлиттера выяснилось, что он сидел со следующими лицами (даются в именительном падеже): Чамота (другое написание - Ямота), Рихтер, Валленберг, Кичман, Фосс, Хатц, Хубер и Коноэ. Указаний на Валленберга, Хатца и Коноэ нет, однако это можно определить сопоставлением информации из других дел. Кроме того, есть неподтвержденная информация, что он сидел вместе со Шмидтом, имя которого неясно, но который мог быть также Гфорнером, сидящим под другим своим именем Карл Шмидт. Тем не менее все это не дает полной информации обо всех сокамерниках Шлиттера.

Кроме того, анализ пагинации дела Шлиттера указывает на следы двух других пагинаций, отличных от генеральной. Несмотря на то, что дело было расширено до 388 страниц в 1991, анализ трех разных пагинаций указывает на пробел, который относится к 1947-48 г., периоду, когда Шлиттер особенно часто переходил из камеры в камеру.

Нам необходимо знать, с кем сидел Шлиттер в каждой из следующих камер во Внутренней тюрьме: кам. 7 (с 8 января 1947 г.), кам. 70 (25 февраля 1947 г.),

[14] Обратный перевод с английского. См. документ.

кам. 25 (с 26 февраля 1947г.), кам. 70 (с 1 марта 1947 г.), кам. 80 (с 22 июля 1947 г.), кам. 74 (с 18 августа 1947 г.), кам. 112 (с 21 сентября 1947 г.), кам. 130 (с 27 сентября 1947 г.), кам. 107 (с 16 декабря 1947 г.), кам. 1В (24 декабря1947 г.), кам. 22 (с 13 января 1948 г.), кам. 97 (с 15 января 1948 г.), кам. 81 (с 13 февраля 1948 г.), кам. 118 (с 23 февраля 1948 г.)

Каждая из подчеркнутых дат совпадает с важными событиями в судьбе Валленберга, поэтому важно проверить насколько далеко заходят эти совпадения. Я в особенности хотела бы знать, сидел ли Шлиттер с Акикусой 25 февраля, с Ределем 26 февраля, с Валленбергом 1 марта и с Лангфельдером 23 июля 1947 г. Было бы важным узнать, с кем он сидел 18 августа 1947 г., и сидел ли он вместе с Лойдой или Хилле, когда они прибыли в январе 1948 г. Как часто он сидел вместе с Хатцем и Кичманом? Как часто он сидел с Рихтером?

Мы хотели бы изучить дело Чамоты (Ямоты), личность которого нам неизвестна, чтобы определить есть ли взаимосвязь между ним и различными сокамерниками в этой группе.

9. Факт перевода Шлиттера из изоляции и его помещение вместе с Коноэ идет в русле той практики, на основе которой возникают вопросы: сидел ли Коноэ вместе с Валленбергом, человеком, с которым у него было много общего, или с Лангфельдером и/или Ределем, который возвращался из Японии в тот момент, когда его арестовали. Из анализа этих параллелей возникает много вопросов, особенно если учесть, что апелляции Коноэ к Совету Министров совпадает с растущим намерением ЦК успешно решить проблему Валленберга со шведами раз и навсегда.

Независимо от того, были ли сокамерниками Коноэ и Валленберг, очень бы помогло, если бы российская сторона смогла проанализировать дипломатический, политический факторы и фактор безопасности, которые играли рольв ввопросе репатриации Коноэ и сравнить их с ситуацией с Валленбергом в 1947 г и в дальнейшем, если он оставался в живых.

10. В апреле 1955 г. Исаак Маркович Вольфин, "шведский шпион", бывший сотрудник Советского Посольства в Стокгольме, в бытность Коллонтай Послом, которого допрашивали прямо перед допросами Валленберга-Лангфельдера в июле 1946 г., был возвращен из Владимира в Бутырки. Вольфин был приговорен к 15 годам в 1948 г. Мы не знаем, сколько еще лет Вольфин провел в Бутырской тюрьме, а кроме того, есть указания, что его срок был сокращен в обмен на то, что он был информатором и провокатором. Во время своего пребывания во Владимире, Вольфин сидел по меньшей мере в 52 разных камерах с более, чем 70 различными заключенными, по большей части иностранцами. Несмотря на то, что он не сидел в одной камере ни с кем из непосредственных свидетелей в деле

Валленберга-Лангфельдера, таких, как, например, Рихтер (единственным исключением, возможно, является адмирал Краффт), Вольфин сидел с целой группой свидетелей из нашего первоначального списка, включая Гогоберидзе - три раза в 1952 г. и один раз в 1953 г.; Отто Шогглем, Йозефом Майером, Максимиллианом Ангелисом, Адольфом Хайнцем Беккерле, Францем Лангером; Геннадием Куприяновым. Он также сидел с теми, чьи дела мы запрашиваем сейчас - например, с Карлом Супприаном. Он так же был сокамерником важных руководителей прибалтийских стран - Мунтерса, Урбшиса, Шальны - и номерных заключенных, таких, как Борис Менщагин, или заключенный № 31, личность которого не установлена. Он также мог пересекаться с Адамом Бенем, польским руководителем, которого обычно помещали вместе с Янковским, а также с венгром - "американским шпионом" - заключенным № 1, личность которого также не установлена. Он также просидел почти 4 месяца с Куртом Герумом, сокамерником Гфрорнера, примерно в тот период, когда Гфрорнер был казнен - в апреле 1952 г. Помимо того, что его сокамерниками были заключенные со статусом "шпиона", "саботажника" и "террориста", он также сидел с рядом заключенных, на карточках которых стоит литера "М". У Вольфина также была категория "М", так же, как и у Коноэ, хотя он и не мог быть вместе с принцем Коноэ во Владимире, если в деле последнего правильно указано, что он прибыл туда только в 1956 г. Тем не менее Вольфин сидел с рядом японцев.

Учитывая 1) экстраординарное количество свидетелей по делу Валленберга, номерных заключенных и заключенных других особых категорий, с которыми сидел Вольфин во Владимире; 2) возможную связь с данным делом и на более раннем этапе, как работника Советского Посольства в Швеции, и 3) тот факт, что Вольфин, переводчик, еврей по национальности, хорошо говорил по-шведски, и поэтому вполне мог сидеть с Валленбергом и Лангфельдером как в Москве, так и во Владимире; мы просим возможности получить доступ к личному и медицинскому делу Вольфина, а также задать вопросы по его следственному делу, даже несмотря на то, что он был известен как советский агент. Мы рассматриваем это исключение из правил как очень важное и нужное для выяснения данного дела.

Следует отметить также, что - помимо того, что очевидна роль Вольфина как осведомителя компетентных органов - есть указания о том, что он также мог являться источником слуха о том, что Валленберг содержится во Владимирской тюрьме. Максимальный доступ к архивным документам, касающимся Вольфина оказал бы огромную помощь в определении мотивов или основания для такого его поведения.

11. **Относительно ЛАНГФЕЛЬДЕРА.** В деле ван дер Ваальса на стр. 92 есть документ, датированный 9 марта 1956 г. посланный из Бутырской тюрьмы заместителю начальника Тюремного управления МВД: "В соответствии с

вашим запросом, личное дело военнопленного ван дер Ваальса... пересылается для дальнейшего хранения в ваш архив. Приложение: личное дело на 91 стр."[15]

Было ли это ответом на запрос, касающийся лично ван дер Ваальса или частью общей процедуры передачи дел умерших или репатриированных заключенных в архив? Если так, то, вероятно, заместитель начальника Тюремного управления работал в соответствии со списком, к которому мы хотели бы получить доступ?

12. В связи с этим: в директиве Советскому Послу в Венгрии Юрию В. Андропову от 17 сентября 1957 г. относительно судьбы Вильмоса Лангфельдера говорится: "Есть основания полагать, что материалы, касающиеся Лангфельдера, а также материалы о Валленберге были уничтожены прежним руководством Госбезопасности СССР. Однако был найден список заключенных Лубянской тюрьмы, в котором значится имя Лангфельдера с пометкой: "умер 2 марта 1948 г."."[16]

Где находится этот список? Если он недоступен, где находится документ о его отсутствии или уничтожении? Кто был ответственным за его изъятие?

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ИТОГОВЫЕ ЗАМЕЧАНИЯ

В заключение, я хочу еще раз обратить внимание на то, что я не считаю результаты поисков, которые я вкратце привела здесь, окончательными, однако я думаю, что факты - если сопоставлять их объективно - четко указывают на явные пробелы, которые должны быть восстановлены, если мы желаем придти к правдивому ответу, который мог быть признан всеми.

Вопросы, которые я задала, не бесконечны, и поэтому могут быть рассмотрены в ближайшем будущем. Я убеждена, что на эти вопросы можно и должно ответить, для того чтобы в свою очередь дать миру удовлетворительные ответы, тогда как до сих пор, они в большой мере основывались на слухах, намеках и догадках. Кроме того, я не только проверяю достоверность показаний свидетелей, но воссоздаю контекст событий, для того, чтобы раскрыть более глубокие аспекты, связанные с решением проблемы, умер ли этот великий гуманист или исчез.

В ходе моей работы с делами, а также с моим исследованием документов опубликованных российской стороной в 1991 г. и позже, я убедилась в том, что - в независимости от наличия дела самого Валленберга - информация того плана, что нам нужна, до сих пор существует и может быть доступной. Поэтому я рада, что с

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[15] Обратный перевод с английского. См. документ.
[16] Обратный перевод с английского. См. документ.

сначала я ограничила круг моих запросов, сведя его к базовому уровню информации. Это оказалось, по крайне мере с моей точки зрения, благодатным полем для нас, и мы вынесли из нашей работы не только данные, но и способы того, как сделать наше исследование более эффективным.

Кроме того, я хотела бы сказать, что в результате моей работы до сегодняшнего дня, я чувствую правильность предложенного мной метода. Я надеюсь, что российская сторона увидит из этого Предварительного доклада, как работает этот метод, и в свою очередь сделает предложения по его улучшению - как через критические замечания, так и своей собственной работой. В любом случае, благодаря тем материалам, которые они предоставили моей команде, эти результаты - заслуга российской стороны в равной степени, как и наши.

Я еще раз выражаю глубокую признательность всем за предоставленную возможность делать эту работу от имени Российско-Шведской Рабочей Группы. Я с надеждой ожидаю, что нам будет дан доступ к оставшимся делам и регистрационным книгам, что даст возможность закончить сбор информации и перейти к исследовательским вопросам и анализу, и завершить работу Заключительным докладом.

С уважением,

Susan Ellen Mesinai

Сюзан Эллен Месинай
Директор,
Проект АРК

4 августа 1998 г.

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

TELEFAX

Sid. 1 (3)

1998-08-31

Dnr 425

Aambs A. Wallberg

Delges:
von Dardel
Carl Persson
Hallqvist EC
Olson, EI-ESEK
Gullgren, EC4
Skp. 98-09-09

INK. UTRIKESDEP.
DNR
1998 -09- 01
Avd. P | Gr 2 | MAI EU

EC
EI

UD-EC (Hallqvist)
UD-EI (Olson) rekryfax amb Riga

Re Raoul Wallenberg

(1 bil.)

Bifogat översänds svar på ambassadens hänvändelse till Statliga arkivet om undersökningar i arkiv som hänför sig till krigstribunalen i Nürnberg i syfte att bringa klarhet i Raoul Wallenbergs öde.

HIRDMAN

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Ulitsa Mosfilmovskaja 60
119 590 MOSKVA

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Ulitsa Mosfilmovskaja 60

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64-413 410

Sveriges ambassad
1998-08-31
Översättning

Ryska federationens statliga arkiv
5/8 1998

Sveriges ambassad i Ryska federationen
Befullmäktigade ministern M. Dahl

Bäste herr Dahl,

Ryska federationens statliga arkiv har inga invändningar mot att representanter för den rysk-svenska arbetsgruppen som arbetar med att klarlägga den svenska diplomaten Raoul Wallenbergs öde vid den tidpunkt som passar dem tar del av handlingar som förvaras i akten "Underlag inför Internationella krigsförbrytartribunalens sammanträde i Nürnberg" (f.R-7445, op. 2 d. 404), eller om behov föreligger även annat material i fond R-7445.

Arkivchef

S.V. Mironenko

Avs Ry federationens statliga arkiv
Re Wallenberg

Государственная архивная
служба России

ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ АРХИВ
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ
(ГА РФ)
119817, Москва, ГСП,
ул. Б. Пироговская, 17
тел. 245-81-41

05.08.98 № 5/2-т

На № Нот. 105

→ AW : fi : fj : d

Fax 425 31/8 AD

Посольство Швеции в
Российской Федерации

Полномочному министру
Даль М.

119590, Москва,
Мосфильмовская ул., 60

INK. AMB. MOSKVA
D. 14-385
1998-08-25
AVD. R | GR. 18 | MÄL RW

Уважаемый господин Даль!

Государственный архив Российской Федерации не возражает против ознакомления представителей российско-шведской рабочей группы по выяснению судьбы шведского дипломата Рауля Валленберга в удобное для них время с документами, содержащимися в деле «Материалы подготовки заседаний Международного военного трибунала в г.Нюрнберге» (ф.Р-7445, оп.2, д.404), а также, в случае необходимости, и другими материалами фонда Р-7445.

Директор архива С.В.Мироненко

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

TELEFAX

Sid. 1 (3)

1998-08-31

Dnr 426

Aambs A. Wallberg

Delges:
Kabsahn
von Dardel
Carl Persson
Hallqvist, EC
Olson, EI-EEK
Gullgren, EC 4
exp. 98-09-09

Allard, ERS

EC

INK. UTRIKESDEP.
DNR
1998 -09- 01
Avd. P | Gr 2 | MAJ EU 1

För: UD-EC (Hallqvist)
Kopia: UD-EI (Olson), rekryfax amb Riga

Re Raoul Wallenberg

(1 bil.)

I bifogade brev från MID meddelas att Vjatjeslav Tujtnin utsetts till ny rysk medordförande i arbetsgrupperna avseende Raoul Wallenberg och försvunna svenska fartyg.

a.a.

HIRDMAN

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Sveriges ambassad
Arbetsöversättning

Ryska federationens utrikesministerium
19 augusti 1998

Till Konungariket Sveriges ambassads
chargé d'affaires

Herr Mikael Dahl

Bäste herr Dahl,

med anledning av att att medordföranden i de rysk-svenska arbetsgrupperna om ärendet Raoul Wallenberg och försvunna svenska fartyg i Östersjön tillika chefen för Andra europeiska avdelningen K.I. Kosatjev övergår till annat arbete, vill vi meddela att sektionschefen vid Andra europeiska avdelningen Vjatjeslav Vladimirovitj Tutjnin utsetts till ordförande för den ryska sidan i dessa grupper.

Med vänlig hälsning

Chefen för Andra europeiska avdelningen

V. Titov

MOSKVA 1998 -08- 20

AVS: V. Titov /MID
ATT: Mikael Dahl
RE: Meddelar att Vjatjeslav V. Tutjnin utsetts till ordförande för den ryska sidan av arbetsgrupperna i Wallenberg-fallet.

МИНИСТЕРСТВО ИНОСТРАННЫХ ДЕЛ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

121200, г. Москва, Г-200,
Смоленская-Сенная площадь, дом 32/34
Телефон 244-16-06

19.08.98 № 6870/2дф-ис

На № _____ от _____

ВРЕМЕННОМУ ПОВЕРЕННОМУ КОРОЛЕВСТВА ШВЕЦИЯ В ДЕЛАХ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

ГОСПОДИНУ МИКАЭЛЮ ДАЛЮ

Г Fax 426 1998-08-31 Kel

INK. AMB. MOSKVA
D. 138 / 25
1998 -08- 20
AVD. R | GR. 19 | MÄL RW

Уважаемый господин Даль,

В связи с переходом сопредседателя российско-шведских рабочих групп по делу Рауля Валленберга и пропавшим на Балтике шведским судам Заместителя Директора Второго Европейского Департамента К.И.Косачева на другую работу информируем, что вместо него в качестве председателя российской части указанных групп назначен Начальник Отдела Второго Европейского департамента МИД России Тучнин Вячеслав Владимирович.

С уважением,

М.У.Н.

ДИРЕКТОР ВТОРОГО
ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО ДЕПАРТАМЕНТА

В.ТИТОВ

250/00 09-07 Skrivelse daterad 98-09-04
Skriftlig version på engelska av Susan Reisens preliminära delrapport daterad 98-09-08 re genomgång i Moskva av dokument i FSB-arkiv

Ex till:
Magnusson, Rise
Hallgren, EC
Olson, EI-ESEK
Gullgren, EC4
Rep: 98-09-07

INTRODUCTION

In the absence of incontrovertible evidence, the key to the resolution of the mystery of Raoul Wallenberg's fate lies in the question of whether the Swedish diplomat died or disappeared in 1947. Arguments for both views arise in every aspect of this work, starting with the debate over the use of the term 'liquidatsia' in the Vishinsky paper to Molotov of May 14, 1947. While there are those who insist that this use of the term was a strong hint to execute the man, a number of former Soviet officials maintain that this language refers rather to the 'resolution of the problem.' While this could mean anything from releasing or exchanging the prisoner to eliminating him, certain experts claim that the most likely procedure would be to round up and silence the witnesses while concealing or 'disappearing' the man.

Our task is not to argue semantics, nor to take sides in conflicting reports from eyewitnesses, whether former prisoners or officials. My objective is rather to provide a fully documented context in which to evaluate this problem. This is being done by reviewing the files of a selected number of prisoners in order to weigh the 'extreme case scenario' against the realities of the norm. These two poles of norm and extreme provide a grid against which all testimonies can be measured and charted, allowing us to evaluate not only the sketchy details of a single sighting but its place in the 'bigger picture.' A growing understanding of the grouping and movements of prisoners, of the apparatus itself, has proven critical to the investigation in process. Also valuable to the investigation are questions raised by analagous cases which may or may not prove tangential in the end.

While we are forced to deal with the problems generated by the absence or destruction of documents directly related to Wallenberg or his associate, Vilmos Langfelder, we rely upon the cross-referencing of pertinent details to reconstruct the missing information or, in more classified cases, to point to those registries and administrative files where such data might be found.

A final report on this material cannot be written, however, without more complete data, including the remaining files and follow-up requests. I am therefore using this opportunity not only to define the direction my work has taken as a result of the materials we have seen to date, but to move ahead with requests (most old, but some new) for information needed to complete our data gathering efforts over the next few months.

TIME FRAME

I have focused this particular phase of the investigation on the time frame between Wallenberg's and Langfelder's arrests in 1945 and the Soviet replies to their respective governments in 1957. For, it was during this period that their fates, one way or another, were sealed. I have attempted as detailed an examination as possible of the information put forth during this time frame, including internal memoranda as well as formal exchanges, in order to lay a solid foundation upon which to conduct any

further research that might become necessary into the medical or labor camp sightings of the later decades.

My Final Report will give these findings up through the Nanna Svartz/Myasnikov controversy of the early Sixties and include the results not only from the Prisoner Files but Medical files -- which is to say Phases One and Two of the recently accepted Medical Proposal.

AREAS OF INVESTIGATION

Other than the facts, including forensics, which will directly enable us to reconstruct Wallenberg and Langfelder's paper trails, I have divided my data gathering and analysis into the following sub-investigations:

1. Probable "Danger Points" between 1945 and 1957, starting with but not limited to the official Soviet death date of July 17, 1947 ;

2. Ways of Concealment or of 'Disappearing a Man' as pertains to this case;

3. The role of the witnesses and to what degree and in what way(s) Wallenberg and Langfelder were or were not separated from them, where and when;

4. Details of arrest, investigation and sentencing , including questions of jurisdiction, which could help us understand and track their fates;

5. The question of 'important' versus 'dangerous' and where it leads us (to be developed primarily in my Final Report);

6. Informants before and after the supposed death date and where that leaves us;

7. The question of 'accumulated embarrassment' (a term I have coined to mean the difficulty to divulge the truth about any one case, in whole or in part, because it would reveal information about the fate of another foreign prisoner),

8. Unresolved intelligence links which continue to tie Wallenberg's fate with that of Anglo-American involvement in Hungary (to be left for the Final Report as it requires additional investigative research in Washington),

9. The inability to reveal the truth regarding this case, in whole or in part, because it touches upon Soviet operations or the work of Soviet agents;

10. The collection of pertinent medical data, particularly through the Medical Investigation, which would enable us to bring closure to this case.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PRELIMINARY REPORT

As this is only a Preliminary Report, the gathering of data is at various stages of completion, effecting the analysis and end result. Under no circumstances should this document be construed as conclusive. It is rather an open invitation to the Russian side to respond to my findings, requests and my thinking so that we can cooperate even more closely in the final stages.

I will confine my discussion to the highlights which could help us collectively tackle the basic issues in this case. At the same time, I have defined those documents or files which I think could help answer the questions at hand. Each of these requests relate to specific determinations and offer a means of establishing substantive evidence. It should be remembered that these findings directly reflect the 54 files we have seen to date, and could be altered by the remaining prisoner files as well as the results of our investigative questions or medical research.

Please note that I have limited this report to the first of the above-mentioned Sub-Investigations with certain aspects of the others interwoven in the text. Further reports can be produced upon request, but this covers the most controversial material and is therefore the most significant, to be followed by the section on 'Disappearance.'

Note also that this Report has been translated from my notes in English, so that certain phrases have to be translated back into Russian, without the actual document at hand. Where there is a question, please refer to the actual text as identified in my discussions.

THE RISK

While there is always a risk in presenting partial findings at a premature stage, I do so out of respect and thankfulness to the Russian side whose generous and well thought out cooperation has brought us to this place. In so doing, I welcome corrections in fact and in emphasis that would greatly improve the end result. It is also my hope that by placing my various follow-up requests in a specific context, the Russian side will be able to see that this is indeed a finite search whose every method is geared toward closure within the next several months. Again this depends upon receiving as much requested data as possible during the forthcoming stage.

It should be noted that while, in this report, I have been very forthright regarding the materials I have seen, this is written under the strict terms of confidentiality set down before our research began. Particularly in sensitive area caused by potentially overlapping mysteries, I am being frank about these matters because I do not expect anything set forth here to go beyond the Working Group. The Russian government has already initiated a number of steps to heal the wounds caused by previous regimes. I am only following in their wake when I raise issues which, resolved, will not only bring us much closer to the truth but honor the spirit generated by the present Government's active cooperation.

MY THANKS

I remain thankful to both the Russian and Swedish sides for making this independent investigation possible. Through my on-site work, I can now attest to the invaluable contributions made over the past seven years by members of the Working Group. The documents which have been handed over have indeed provided a foundation for this time-consuming and meticulous effort. I am therefore all the more grateful for the access and insight I have been given. Special thanks go to the archivists who patiently re-created their steps even as they placed far reaching requests for files in order to assure the continuity and completeness of this analysis.

I. MOST PROBABLE DANGER POINTS, 1945-1957.

The Gromyko Memorandum of 1957 establishes Wallenberg's death date as July 17, 1947, based on the attached Smoltsov document. Our investigation would suggest rather three possible danger periods, the first based on the above and current testimonies of former Soviet officials. The latter are prompted by our findings in the Prisoner Files and preliminary analysis of the Vladimir cards copied in 1990 by the independent team.

These three periods are:

- 1947, either as 'execution', the result of too acute measures, or a heart attack, as set forth in the Smoltsov Document,
- 1952, if indeed execution; otherwise 1953-55 for reasons of health,
- 1955-56 for reasons of 'accumulative embarrassment' and/or unresolved intelligence issues related to Anglo-American interests in Hungary and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.

1947 - MOSCOW

1.While recent oral testimony from various KGB officials have suggested other causes of death than the heart attack mentioned in the Smoltsov document, they all adhere to the July 1947 death date. The difficulty here is that there is no legitimate, witnessed document to substantiate this claim. Furthermore, if one views Wallenberg not as a 'super-hero' but as one of a special group of war prisoners charged with being Fascists or of collaborating with the Nazi regime against the Soviet Union and her Allies -- this death date comes too soon. With the exception of the convicted Polish leaders of the Government-in-Exile, tried and sentenced in June 1945 -- the investigation process for those with whom Wallenberg sat between 1945 and 1947 was just warming up. Prisoners who had wall tapping contact with Wallenberg in Lefortovo only began to be sentenced in 1948, while those with whom he had more substantial association most often were sentenced in 1952, with a few

small groups of prisoners closely associated with Wallenberg and Langfelder sentenced in 1950 and 1951.

Furthermore, truly important prisoners like the Polish or Baltic leaders, remained numbered until their sentencing. Wallenberg, according to the file of Kitschmann, Page 99, was known by his own name while under the jurisdiction of Kartashov of the 4th Department of the Third Main Directorate, which continued at least until August 1946. If this situation changed, it did so only in early 1947 where Wallenberg's transfer back to Lubyanka may also mark his coming under the jurisdiction of the Investigative Unit for Especially Important Matters. If Wallenberg suddenly became a significantly important prisoner whose fate hung in the balance as early as 1947, some real ground for this must be established.

Given that Willi Roedl, Wallenberg's long term cellmate, was still under the jurisdiction of the 4th Department of the Third Main Directorate when he died, did Roedl stay under that jurisdiction between February 1947 and October 1947, while being held at Internal Prison?

If Wallenberg's jurisdiction was changed, whose permission would be required and where would these transactions have been recorded?

2.In order to evaluate the question of whether the Soviet authorities were convinced of Wallenberg's guilt, it will be necessary to reconstruct the testimonies against him through increased access to the investigative files, in those cases that might contain something of relevance.

These include questions addressed to the investigative files of Bethlen, Gfrorener, Mayer and Feller who worked with Wallenberg in Budapest.

To pursue this issue, we will need to raise questions to the files of Count Michael Tolstoy-Kutuzow in the archives of Foreign Intelligence. Although we have been apprised by the Russian side that there is no mention of Wallenberg in that file, it is still relevant to understand with some precision Tolstoy-Kutuzow's own activities in Budapest, not only related to his work with the Swedish Red Cross but also his work directly for the Legation related to prisoners of war and as representative appointed by the Swedish Minister to meet the Soviet troops.

3. In order to give weight to the Soviet argument that Wallenberg died in July 1947, it is very important that we be allowed to review the prisoner files and prisoner medical files of those who did die that that year.

For this reason, we are requesting to see the files of Bethlen, Marek and Roedl from our original list, and Esau Oggins whose case had been previously discussed with the Swedish side. It is also important to examine the medical file of Garet van der Waals who died in August 1948. Like Wallenberg and Langfelder, also said to have died in 1948, van der Waals was in his prime while Bethlen, Marek and Roedl were much older. It is also relevant that van der Waals -- like Schandl, Clement and Wallenberg -- was directly under Abakumov's watch.

4. In this context, we would like to inquire as to the fate of British Warrant Officer, Reginald H. Barratt, also known as Stanley Godden, who worked with van der Waals, Clement and Schandl in Budapest, had connections with the Swedish Legation and -- like Wallenberg -- had been advised to seek the protection of the Soviet authorities when he approached them and disappeared. The British Government has established that Barratt also was taken into the Soviet Gulag. It should be noted that the Soviet Government denied detention/possession of Wallenberg, van der Waals and Barratt -- all three.

If correlations could be shown between such denials and death, this would lend weight not only to the death claim but give a clearer context to the role of Vishinsky, inasmuch as he issued the denial at least to the Swedish government. If the Russian side could offer examples of others whose presence in the Soviet Union was officially denied by Vishinsky or others, with information as to whether they died or disappeared (fates unknown), this would give us more information from which to draw our conclusions.

5. The Moscow Conference of October 1943 established the Tripartite Allies' commitment to 'unconditional surrender,' the scheme for the Allied offensive, including deception plans against Germany involving Scandinavia and the Balkans. At this Conference, Molotov reported to the American side that Stalin was 'violently opposed'[1] to all forms of Eastern European federation, confederacy or any form of economic union -- including what was called the 'Scandinavian/Danubian conspiracy.' Along these lines, Stalin kept a sharp eye out for separate peace deals and/or any secret business negotiations between the Germans and the Western Allies that could effect Soviet success on the Eastern Front or their plans for establishing 'spheres of influence.' These business negotiations included the ransoming of Jews or others in exchange for strategic materials, to be used by the Germans exclusively on the Eastern Front. This 'violent opposition' may account for possible reprisals against Raoul Wallenberg in 1947.

The question of Eastern European confederacy, resistance and its links to both Scandinavia and the Anglo-American Allies can only be addressed by reviewing the investigative files of Bethlen, Jankowski, Chatlosh, Hatz, Marek, van der Waals, Field, Rado, Mayer and Feller, Beckerle, Roedl, Volkov and Gfrorener from our original list and other arrested because of their resistance or intelligence work in Hungary. The latter include Victor BONDOR, Zoltan MIKO and Elemer BENCZES (also known as GEIGER) whose father claimed to have helped shape Wallenberg's mission in Stockholm. In most of the cases noted, there is increasing proof of a direct connection with Wallenberg.

6. Nikonov, Gordievsky and Kondrashev (among others) have all indicated that Wallenberg did not die of a heart attack but was shot. Had this occurred

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[1] This term 'violently opposed' is quoted in English in the files of American Ambassador W.A. Harriman. We do not know the actual terms used by Molotov in Russian.

before May 26, 1947, it might have proven more probable and easier to trace. However, rasstrel was canceled on that date and not reintroduced until January 12, 1950. If there are exceptions, we do not know of them.

If the Russian side could name instances of foreign prisoners shot during the period that rasstrel was no longer in effect, and would allow us to review some of these files, this would support such an argument. However, in such a case, we would need to know by whose order, for what reasons and how an execution which ran contrary to law was documented and put into effect. Who really did the 'dirty work' and where were these executions carried out?

7. Mr. Kondrashev has identified the documents that were being reviewed in the interrogation of late March/early April 1947 in which he served as translator as those found in Wallenberg's possession upon his arrest. In subsequent conversations he has stated that, if the documents proved Wallenberg had a direct connection with American intelligence, this would be reason enough to execute him. I have on several occasions brought up to Mr. Vinogradov the importance of these documents to the Americans, as confirmed in recently declassified CIA documents. For example, a September 1945 top secret cable from Dean Acheson to Washington reports that it was known that Wallenberg had been taken to Moscow and that his papers had been seized by the Soviets when he was placed under arrest. DELETION Wallenberg's Nansen Plan for the reconstruction of the Jewish community in Budapest, which was among those papers, would hardly seem grounds for execution.

In response to this I have now initiated, in my capacity as Director of the ARK Project, a concentrated effort to determine the nature of these documents through declassification of related American documents which could shed light of their value. I am asking that a concentrated effort be made by the Russian side to retrieve the documents themselves, as a way of establishing a possible motive for the execution of Wallenberg and/or isolating the man, for information purposes or for an eventual exchange.

8. Related to this, we noted in the file of Jan Spishiak, the Slovak diplomat arrested and interrogated by Smersch in Budapest at the same time as Wallenberg, that Spishiak's documents stayed with him for a time and would seem to have been finally removed in Internal Prison in December 1946. (Alternatively, they had already been removed and were being brought forth in anticipation of his return to Czechlosovakia). These are unidentified papers in foreign languages, a notepad with notes, and various photographs. All items were placed in one parcel with 'seal Number 14.' Received by the Officer on Duty, MBG, 18 December 1946. The backside of this document reads:'handed over to the Department. Registered in book for various departments. Received, Major Weindorf, Room 671. 18 XII 46' (See Spishiak, Page 28.) According to the archivist, when Spishiak was repatriated to stand trial in Czechlosovakia, these documents were forwarded under separate cover as evidence.

Please identify the registry or distribution journal for December 1946 where the documents for Spishiak that were sealed by Number 14 were listed. Are the documents of Raoul Wallenberg contained among those for storage or distribution? .

Is this sealing process exclusive for documents going to trial?

Whose authority is represented by seal Number 14 and what does it mean (to be sealed by that particular seal)?

Is there another procedure for storing the documents of diplomats still under investigation or who have died, where the papers have judicial or operational value? How are these papers processed?

Were there any cases where an exchanged diplomat got his documents back before departure? For example, when Mayer and Feller were repatriated, did their documents go with them? If not, where did they go?

In addition to Wallenberg's papers, the ***fate*** *of the documents of the following (diplomats) would be especially relevant:* Beckerle, *Feller, Chatlosh, Roedl, Bethlen, Hatz, Marek, Gerstenberg, Okulicki, Jankowski, Munters, Merkis, Urbshish as well as any other number prisoners who were diplomats.*

Is it possible that Wallenberg's documents were intended for use as potential evidence for Nurnberg or for eventual show trials in Eastern Europe? Is there any indication of this from other sources? What would be the most likely use of these documents in the Spring of 1947?

> 9. Because Wallenberg's cellmates were Fascists, and because the charge against Wallenberg, at least initially, was collaboration with the Nazis against the Soviet Union and its Allies -- investigation to date has focused on the German Department. Given that being a British or American spy may, in itself, constitute an 'especially grave matter' that could result in death or disappearance, this may reflect an important omission in our investigation. As the issue of Wallenberg being an 'American spy' has been cited as the probable cause of his extreme fate, whether death by execution or long term detention, more attention should be paid to the investigative efforts of the American Departments of the various directorates.

Under what unit, department and directorates were the American department(s) and who constituted its heads? Who were its most expert interrogators? In general, what were its strategic goals? What were its concerns in terms of Sweden, Hungary and the 'Jewish Question.'

In this context, kindly provide us with a fuller understanding of the identity and/or nature of the case against Vladimir Prisoner Number One, whose card describes him as a Hungarian accused of being an 'American spy.'

Thirdly, would the transfer of Wallenberg from the 4th Department of the 3rd Main Directorate to the Investigative Unit of Especially Important/Grave Matters have been coincidental with investigating questions related to his having been an Anglo-American spy?

> 11.. The only file of those on our original list where we can be certain of an American connection is that of Noel Field, formerly of the U.S. State Department, OSS and the Unitarian Service Committee which provided helpful intelligence information to the War Refugee Board in its early stages. Field defected to the Soviet side and was later the subject of a show trial in Budapest where he was accused of pro-Zionist, pro-Titoist leanings and of being an American spy because of his close association with Allen Dulles.

My research in the West would suggest that Field's case is analagous to Wallenberg's not only in their mutual interest in rescuing people, but through possible overlapping contacts in Budapest during the War, DELETE including Rajk. CHANGE There exist also indications that not only Field and Bethlen but Wallenberg may have had connection with Allen Dulles, through his associates, related to the future of Hungary.

For this and other reasons, we repeat our request to review Field's personal file and the opportunity to address questions to the investigative file. This is particularly vital in order to better understand the American Budapest connection, how it functioned and in what specific ways it threatened Soviet security concerns.

> 10. Questions have arisen around the Smoltsov Document -- lately through the files of Okulicki and those turned over to us from Vladimir. Smoltsov's distinctive signature is easy to read. It appears in the cases of Pataridze, DELETE Shulgin) Jankowski and Okulicki only for the most routine form of processing. In the Doctor's Report introduced as a forensic sample of Smoltsov's signature, Okulicki is being evaluated in June of 1945 for his fitness to work in a labor camp. When it comes to critical medical concerns like the hunger striking which precipitated Okulicki's death -- it is not Smoltsov who is called in to observe or oversee the emergency operation but Dr. Tsitronblat from the Central Polyclinic of the Medical Department of the MGB.

Tsitronbat's personal and professional records and medical reports should be examined as well as those of his unit not only to determine what might have transpired in the case of Wallenberg, but the chain of command for reporting in general. Who reported to whom in the case of Okulicki?

Smoltsov's relationship to Abakumov should be compared to that of the Medical Department of the MGB. Smoltsov's correspondence from 1945 through 1951 should be studied to determine the nature and content of his reporting and to whom. How often did he report to Abakumov? How often did he deal with a special or critical situation? Does he figure in the death of any other important prisoners?

As it is known that there appears to be a page number on the upper right side of the Smoltsov document, from what or whose file was this document obtained?

12. In terms of the text of the Smoltsov document itself, we ask the Russian side to define through parallel cases or use of language the following terms: *'Because of your instruction personally to watch Walenberg....'* We further need to understand why such a 'watch' would be necessary unless he was already ill, in which case he should not have been in his cell but in Butyrka (See below.)

Is the implication here that Wallenberg was expected to become ill and that he was kept in his cell so there would be no witnesses to his sudden death?

Please comment also on the phrase 'presumably as a result of infarct of the myocardium.' As 'presumably' does not do justice to the meticulous reporting in the final stage illness histories or autopsy reports we have seen, is this a hint as to how to write out a pseudo-medical conclusion, as in the case of Oggins?

Along those lines, how and where was Oggins actually executed and how was the 'doctor's report' written? Was it properly witnessed?

12. The prisoner files would show that the majority of medical situations, from exhaustion caused by malnutrition to tuberculosis, were referred to Butyrka Medical Service rather than being treated on location.

Given the active role of the Butyrka Medical Service, the function of the Sanitorium Service of any Moscow prison, but particularly Lubyanka, should be clearly defined.

Butyrka Medical registries should be examined for Wallenberg as an incoming patient (or for an autopsy). This is also important because of the text of Supplement Number 3 to the Written Report by Molotov and Serov of April 28, 1956 which states that Wallenberg died in the prison hospital.

To facilitate this, it is very important to identify Wallenberg's registration number at Internal Prison since we have observed that the sick retain their identification number from the prison where they are officially being detained -- to distinguish them from those sent directly as prisoners of Butyrka.

Wallenberg and Langfelder's registration numbers can be determined from the Internal Prison registry for January- February 1945. We have also observed that such numbers do not change even after a substantial absence so once these numbers have been determined, the Butyrka Medical Service registries could be scanned for several years -- not only the 1947 time period.

14. Autopsy reports for the prisoners we have considered were consistently performed by the team of Moscow Medical Forensic specialist, Semenovsky and Lt. Colonel of Butyrka Medical Service, Finayev, with a third doctor sometimes as an added witness. This can be seen in the cases of Van der

Waals, Okulicki, Marek and Roedl whose autopsies and death certificates we have been able to review.

As Dr. Semenovsky is well versed in 'signing off on' extremely sensitive deaths -- DELETION --- why was a Smoltsov document even necessary?

Again, we must inquire as to the legal consequences of the absence of three witnesses on a death certificate or autopsy, as in the case of the Smoltsov document and on the failure to report a death, as in the case of Jankowski and Prisoner Number Eleven, listed in the 1952.54 Section of this Report. Are these omissions intended to keep the death from becoming 'public knowledge'? Does the failure to officially report a death create a situation where, from a legal perspective, the death remains ambiguous? Is it possible, in the absence of such binding documentation, that the death did not happen in the manner in which it is claimed that it happened?

15. In the deaths of the individuals who died while under the jurisdiction of Moscow's Internal Prison, responsiblity for ordering an autopsy and cremation at Lubyanka rested with Mironov as its Head. Mironov's jursidiction reached so far that he oversaw the resolution of all matters attending the death of Roedl who died on a transport to Camp 27, Krasnogorsk. Both Mironov and Ionov of Lefortovo were very thorough in their responsibilities. Therefore, the responsibility which Smoltsov implied he could take in the case of the death of the 'prisoner Walenberg' to perform an autopsy and to send the body for cremation does not fit with the procedures in comparable cases.

If, however, there exist other instances where Smoltsov undertook such steps, we would re-consider this reading of the situation.

16. Okulicki, Page 128A. Handwritten pencil note: 'Corpse of prisoner Okulicki could be cremated in the crematorium on general grounds as usual. Agreed with Comrade Likhachov. Short note says that first page is missing, signed Ivan Nikolayevich. Telephone 296-1405.

Please define the procedures involved in 'on general grounds as usual.'

What are the other options or concerns in weighing this decision? If not here, where else would the body be sent? Was there a place where controversial cases could or should be buried?

Where are the actual documents ordering and witnessing this cremation? Do records exist to show where and when the cremation took place and where the ashes were placed, as has been described in comparable cases such as that of Istavan Bethlen?

Assuming 'Comrade Likhachov' to be the same who interrogated Okulicki on December 4, 1946 after the Polish Commander of the Home Army began his final hunger strike on December 2, why was he consulted on the process of disposing of the body? What was agreed?

How accountable would Likhachov be for the death of Okulicki and why? (I raise this point particularly because 'interrogations' have also been described by the prisoners as 'negotiations.' In this instance where obviously no accord could be reached, self-induced death was a certainty. Okulicki had made this clear.)

Are there any documents related to these 'negotiations' and/or the disposal of Okulicki's body still in the personal archives of Mironov, Leonov, Likashov and Ivan Nikolyevich?

Taking the case of Okulicki as a possible parallel, if Wallenberg's death was the result of extreme measures during interrogation or his refusal to be turned, who would be the most likely persons to consult regarding the disposition of his body? Can one infer that whoever was consulted may have had a direct hand in acute measures leading to this tragic event?

17. Related to the Vishinsky request of May 14, 1947 to resolve the controversy generated by Wallenberg's detention, we refer to Schandl, Pages 8-15, dated October 1948 to December 1949, as a possible parallel. Chief of Lefortovo, Ionov, notifies Major Borashnikov, as Chief of Section A; Leonov as Chief of the Investigative Unit for Espeically Important Prisoners; and Pitovranov as Chief of the Second Main Directorate that Schandl is still being held without interrogation for years. Ionov requests explanation and to take all measures to 'move the question ahead.'

While the language is not identical, it should be procedurally compared with the steps involved in Vishinsky's complaint to Molotov, *'Insofar as the Wallenberg case remains unresolved until the present moment,'* i.e. without moving, no one cares to resolve it, *'I ask you to order Abakumov to present information on the subject of this affair and suggestion about its liquidatsia.'*

In evaluating the implied tendency to extreme measures of the parties in question, it should be noted that Schandl was not liquidated. Rather a reply came from Deputy Chief of Section A, instructing Ionov 'not to give a report (spravka) for the arrest of the arrested prisoners....Schandl and Clement.'

To whom should Ionov not report?

Why did the answer come from Section A? Why only from there? Was it the appointed liaison with the prison authorities?

Are there any other examples from this period and group of prisoners where there are instructions not to report on the 'arrest of the arrested?'

On February 10, 1950 and on June 13, 1950 Pitovranov made the decision that Schandl was guilty of being an agent of British intelligence and should be placed in a special prison under strict isolation. Schandl was sent to Vladimir as Prisoner Number 26 without ever having gone through the normal procedures of investigation and sentencing. This is indicated by the fact that,

later, when Schandl applied to Voroshilov for a pardon, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet noted that Schandl's request could not be considered because the decision of the sentencing body was not in the personal file.

Is it possible that Wallenberg's case was 'moved ahead' in a similar fashion to that of Schandl's -- that is, quick sentencing without going through the full steps of an investigation process and sending him away as a numbered prisoner? If not, why not?

If we look at the term 'liquidatsia' through the prism of the Stalinist principle, 'eliminate the problem by eliminating the man', do there exist similar requests to 'move the matter forward'? For example, in the case of Oggins, were there comparable requests from the head of his place of detention or from the Foreign Ministry or both, which would enable us to study the possible parallels more closely? What was the language in these cases?

As General Pitovranov is still alive, perhaps he could comment directly on more exceptional cases such as these, specifically if the prisoners were arrested in Hungary. Why were Wallenberg, van der Waals, Schandl and Clement kept 'under the wing' of Abakumov? Who else comprised this group?

18. While the ADD fact and form of Wallenberg's death in 1947 is grounds for debate, there seems to be no question among the Russian authorities that Wallenberg refused to be recruited. This leaves the question of who was attempting to recruit him, for what CHANGE purpose and when? (Not only Stolyarov, but Pitovranov have testified that Utekhin of Komitet Informatsia knew a lot about Wallenberg due to an active interest in his potential usefulness as an 'agent of influence.')

Sinitsyn has stated in his memoires that he took part in an effort to recruit Wallenberg. The name of Sinitsyn has also appeared as an interrogator for Walter Schlitter/Schlutter, an informant who sat with a number of Wallenberg/Langfelder witnesses. This interrogation took place on May 10, 1945 from 22:40 until 0:20. Wallenberg was still in Internal Prison at that time, but had been transferred from Cells 121-123 which he shared for six weeks with Schlitter in February-March 1945.

Assuming this to be the same Sinitsyn whose name, like that of Abakumov, appears rarely as an interrogator, it is important to clarify under whose jurisdiction and with what goal his interrogations were being conducted.

What was the content of Sinitsyn's interrogation of Schlitter? Who read or 'signed off' on this material?

Given Sinitsyn's admitted role in Stockholm and Helsinki during the last years of the War, his familiarity with the Wallenberg family and their international ties: an effort

should be made to itemize the interrogations conducted by Sinitsyn to determine if they all address approximately the same areas of concern.

19. July 17, 1947 is given as the official date for Raoul Wallenberg's death, according to the Gromyko Memorandum. Subsequent research by the Russian side has uncovered the existence of a July 17, 1947 memorandum, 3044A, from Abakumov to Molotov which is assumed to carry the answer to the fate of Wallenberg. Abakumov's memoranda on Oggins 2773A of May 21, 1947 has been offered as proof that 3044A refers to the execution of the prisoner in question. This invites further analysis.

A number of issues should be raised in connection to these two memorandum. First Oggins was an American prisoner whose presence in the Soviet GULAG was certain. He had been interviewed by representatives of his Embassy in June of 1943 and they had stated their willingness to repatriate him. Oggins had also been sentenced and served his full term: he should have already been released. This made an immediate decision necessary.

Secondly, Abakumov's recommendation for the fate of Oggins is addressed to Stalin and Molotov. Memorandum 3044A regarding Wallenberg is addressed only to Molotov. Abakumov's 'solution' in the case of Oggins -- to execute him and make a false medical history and predate his death certificate so that it would appear he had died of aggravated tuberculosis of the spine a few weeks before his end of term --presumably required Stalin's consent. It is hard to believe that two months later, the execution of a man as internationally valuable as Raoul Wallenberg required only the consent of Molotov, or no consent at all.

It should be remembered that, at that time, it was not known that Wallenberg was held captive in the Soviet Union. Therefore, the denial set forth in the Vishinsky Memorandum of August 18, 1947 may have been a sufficient 'solution' to the problem. From this perspective, the rounding up of the witnesses on July 22, 1947 would appear a sensible step to establish how much was known about the presence of prisoners Wallenberg and Langfelder, prior to preparing the Memorandum.

Kindly provide comparable memoranda to the Council of Ministers regarding the fates of Okulicki, Yasukovitch (1946) and Bethlen and Marek (1947). To whom were they addressed -- Stalin, Molotov, others, a combination of the above? If there were no reports via the Council of Ministers, how were these deaths reported to Stalin and by whom?

Please examine other cases from that time, even from those not on our list, to help us analyze how deeply these officials were involved in such matters, and to define what prisoners were of concern to whom and why.

IF SEGMENT ON OGGINS IS HERE, IT SHOULD BE REMOVED. .

20. While emphasis had been placed on the July 22, 1947 interrogations in the past, certain key pieces of information emerged from our research which could be helpful in better understanding Wallenberg's fate. The first is that neither Loyda, who sat with both Wallenberg and Langfelder, or Hille who sat with Langfelder were interrogated in Moscow at that time. Secondly, Schlitter -- Raoul's first cellmate with Richter -- was interrogated by Kartashov, at the end with Ernst Huber who later became his long term cellmate. Thirdly, the emphasis on the July 22nd interrogations may have obscurred the fact that Gustav Richter was interrogated on July 17 for six hours and fifteen minutes. As this is suppposedly Wallenberg's death date, this is an important coincidence.

We would like a complete list of all those interrogated in Moscow prisons on July 22, 1947 to determine who else may have been included in the inquiries conducted by Kartashov in Internal Prison and Kuzmishin in Lefortovo. For example, were comparable interrogations taking place in Butyrka and, if so, with whom? Who conducted these interrogations?

It is further necessary to determine who was placed in isolation immediately after such interrogations and who not. For example, was Schlitter isolated or was he placed in a cell with another significant player, such as Roedl or Langfelder who was brought to Internal Prison the next day? (Regarding the overlapping interrogations of Schlitter and Huber by Kartashov on July 22, 1947: as Schlitter was known to have sat with Wallenberg and Huber to have had a good rapport with Langfelder, could this indicate some form of preparation for the informant Schlitter to sit with Langfelder?)

Fuller attention should be paid to the July 17, 1947 interrogation registry and the days before and after. If Richter was interrogated extensively at that time, there are good reasons to expect that Roedl would also have undergone an interrogation.

MGB transport registries should be examined between May 14, 1947 and October 14th when Roedl was sent to Krasnogorsk to determine if Wallenberg was sent to another Moscow prison or out of Moscow during that time. Once again, it is critical to have Wallenberg's registration number for Internal Prison.

20. As the Lubyanka Emergency Registry for July and August 1947, provided by the Russian side, has already shown: there is no report of any emergency heart attack in a cell, only of a suicide attempt by Gudenko, S.N., a female prisoner, on July 18, 1947 at 1:40 AM, who was under the jurisdiction of the Director of Transport for the Ministry of State Security at that time. 'Comrade Bojarsky was informed.'

This extreme situation involved the Internal Prison, the Transport Directorate and the Prison Department (Bojarsky). What would be their respective responsibilities or competence in a case such as this?

Does it follow from the fact that Gudenko was under the jurisdiction of the Transport Directorate that the emergency situation occured en route -- as happened to Roedl in October 1947? Please examine the corresponding registries of extreme situations for the month of October to determine if and how Roedl's death was recorded therein.

We would also like to examine the registries for the Transport Department of MGB for July 1947 through March 1948 to determine when Langfelder left Internal Prison after his interrogation on July 23, 1947 and when he returned -- as his alleged death on March 2nd is said to have taken place in Lubyanka. If this research shows that Langfelder was held in Butyrka Medical Service during that period, as one eyewitness and former cellmate has declared, why was he then returned to Lubyanka to die?

NOTE: In a separate report on 'Disappearance' I will be including an itemized request to review archives of certain Convoy Troops at specific times to verify (OMIT certain) eyewitness sightings. In the interim, however is is necessary to complete our Vladimir Prison transport research for the years 1947 - 1957. Because of a specific eyewitness report that Shulgin and Wallenberg came to Vladimir around the same time, I have been trying to reconstruct the appropriate registry from the kartotecha with the permission of the Vladimir Prison Authorities. This work needs to be completed. In the meantime, I have asked for the Vladimir prisoner registration number of P.A. KUTEPOV, who arrived on July 25, 1947 with V. V. Shulgin and Constantin Volkov. As these three Russian nationals traveled together, I have asked if there were -- on that day -- another enforced convoy for prisoners from Lubyanka or a prisoner who traveled on the same transport but isolated from the rest.

OMIT THIS PARAGRAPH: It would be of great assistance if the transport records from Internal Prison to Vladimir Prison .....

22. A further problem is generated by the fact that there are a number of eyewitness sightings in Moscow prisons, particularly Lefortovo, which come after the alleged July 17, 1947 death date.

We renew our request for the files of Maximillan ANGELIS, Friedrich BAYER, Zoltan RIVO [2], Helmut SCHNEIDER [3] Andre SHIMKEVITCH (alternatively, SIENKEVICH) -- all from our original list.

We also need to request the files of the following additional witnesses: Rudiger ADELMAN, Josef BÖHM, Helmut WIEDLUNG, Paul WITTERN, Kurt GERRUM, Hans Oscar GLAUNING, Claudio DI MOHR, Af DE SANDBERG, Erich KAHLER or KOHLER, Ernst KRAFFT, (Hauptmann) KREIDENWEISS[4], Karl KRAEMER, Erich QUADE and Ferdinand Bodo-horst QUADE[5] , Heinz LINGE, Yuri NARBUT, Oscar NIEDERMAYER, Armando ODENIGO, von OESTEREICH, Rudolf PALTZER, Heinz

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[2] The filc shown covers only Rivo's period in exile and does not include his cell occupancy in any of the Moscow prisons.

[3] Lieutenant Tank Commander at Lefortovo whose early camp record we have seen, but this shows no record of his cell occupancy in Moscow

[4] Rank only is given. First name is unknown.

[5] Uncle and nephew where there is indication of possible contacts in Stockholm as well as in prison.

PANNWITZ, Wilhelm RODDE, Karl SUPPRIAN, Joachim VORWERK, Hans Erich VOSS or FOSS, Hubert GENGSTENBERG, Adolph SCHMIDT, Gerhard SCHMIDT, Hans SCHMIDT, Walter SCHMIDT, Elizabeth SCHREIBER, and Albert SCHWEIDER. **SEE VARIOUS FOOTNOTES.**

These files are being requested because of evidence from the Swedish SÄPO files or as follow up to confirm findings in the prisoner files. This constitutes the revised list.

Finally, as has been requested in previous correspondence, we urgently require the opportunity to study the Butyrka Incoming Registry for those prisoners who were transferred from Lefortovo on March 30/31, 1950 -- including but not limited to Richter, Kitschmann, Hille, Loyda, Hoffstetter, Pelkonen, Gfrorener, Gerstenberg, Bentivegni, and Grossheim Krisko (alias Tomsen). As Grossheim Krisko testified to the Sweidsh Government in 1954 that he was 'convinced ' that Wallenberg was among those in this group of 100-110, it would greatly accelerate our research to be able to affirm or deny this. As Schlitter, Huber, Beckerle and a number of the other prisoners on our list arrived within the next week (the first week in April 1950) we would like to review the incoming during this time frame (March 30 through April 10, 1950) to define the full contingent of persons who were passsed to the jurisdiction of Butyrka and the Second Main Directorate for the pre-sentencing phase of their detention process.

1952 - 1954

1. The October 13, 1954 letter from Deputy Foreign Minister, Gromyko, to KGB Chairman, Serov, asks the latter to report 'where and under what circumstances Raoul Wallenberg died.' Serov replies on November 3, 1954: 'The Committee of State Security doesn't have anything to add to the information by the Minister of State Security of the USSR dated March 3, 1952, Number 2816/i about Wallenberg, R.' Ignatiev's letter to Gromyko of that date simply reiterates the position set forth in the Vishinsky Memorandum of August 18, 1947 that Wallenberg was not to be found on the territory of the Soviet Union.

What prompted Gromyko to raise the question of 'when and under what circumstances' at this time? (The issue of Wallenberg's fate was certainly not new to Gromyko who, as U.N. Ambassador, had been approached repeatedly by dignitaries such as Eleanor Roosevelt to clarify the circumstances surrounding his disappearance.)

Why now ask the question this way? Were mounting Swedish inquiries enough to drive him to try to crack through the silence and ambiguity every query met? Or, had rumors actually begun to circulate about Wallenberg's fate that would force him to take command of the situation ADD at that time?

Does Serov's adherence to the Ignatiev reply indicate that, no matter what the real facts, the answer of the Deputy Foreign Minister should only reflect the reply of the August 18, 1947 Vishinsky Memorandum?

2. Most of the prisoners of Wallenberg's importance, including those with whom he had contact in Budapest, were sentenced in 1952, either by OSO (Special Tribunal or Session/MGB) or Military Tribunal. A partial listing of those sentenced at this time include *Franz Rudolph Gfrorener*, alias Dr. Karl Schmidt, an Abwehr military intelligence figure with whom Wallenberg had dealings related to Jewish rescue in Budapest. Gfrorener was a triple agent who had paid connections with American intelligence as of May 1944. Gfrorener was sentenced to death by rasstrel[6] His execution was reported to have taken place in April 1952, although the requisite paperwork is absent from his file. *Alfred Gerstenberg,* German Air Command at Ploesti, who had military and economic connections in Rumania, Poland and Hungary, was given a twenty-five year sentence for espionage. He was warned that had 'rasstrel not been cancelled', it would have been considered in his case. (An inaccuracy because rasstrel had already been re-instated). Gerstenberg's Air Force position and relation to the oil fields of Rumania could easily put him in contact with the Wallenberg family whose cartel interests included SKF and Rumanian oil concerns. *Heinrich Grossheim-Krisko* who worked with Wallenberg at the Swedish Legation in Budapest and *Gustav Richter,* Police Attache in Rumania and one of Wallenberg's first cellmates. Both were accused of having connections with 'an especially important prisoner' and given a 25 years sentence for espionage. They went to Vladimir as part of the special **H** series. *Otto Hatz*, Hungarian Military Attache, who had connections with Wallenberg in Budapest, but who defected to the Soviet side in November 1944. Hatz, though also a triple agent, was given a fifteen year sentence, taking into account certain favors he had rendered the Soviet government, and sent to Ozerny. *Theodor Krummei,* Gestapo Police Attache in Prague, present also in Budapest where he was involved in the Joel Brand affair as well as financial transactions related to the exchange of Jews; *Bela Kovas,* leader of the Smallholders Part of Hungary with whom Wallenberg had a large number of political connections. *Franz Bentivegni,* head of Abwehr intelligence sentenced with Gerstenberg and sent to Vladimir. Bentivegni was a one time cell mate of Otto Hatz from whom he claims to have first heard of Raoul Wallenberg.

We wish to study the protocol summaries for those sentenced by OSO and the Military Tribunal, named as well as numbered, for 1952. These should include those sentenced with the prisoners mentioned above as well as the previously numbered Baltic leaders on our list, sentenced and sent to Vladimir. It should also include anyone with the **H** *designation for Vladimir to complete the series we have already been studying.*

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[6] It should be noted that most, if not all, of the capital punishment sentences we have seen in files or on prisoner cards were commuted to fifteen years of hard labour.

3. The survival of the above prisoners, all of whom were repatriated with the exception of Gfrorener, does not ensure that Wallenberg lived to pass through the same investigative process. However, an important question is raised by the file of Gfrorener in May of 1946 when his investigation was interrupted 'in order to make further arrests.' The decision to interrupt the preliminary investigation was based on the need for testimony without which it would be impossible to conduct or complete 'the investigation in this case' and 'being guided by the special instruction on the current case.' This raises the question of how important Wallenberg was as a witness to another grave matter and, if so, to whom? Gerstenberg's formal arrest, for example, was based on testimonies from Tillessen, Dietl, Spalke, Schoerner and Richter 'given in preliminary investigation.'

Was Wallenberg's case in any way linked to the special instructions on the' current' case of Gfrorener?

4. The inter-relation of testimonies leads not only to the question of whether or not a live witness is needed for future phases of an investigation, but also whether or not a prisoner 'connected with an especially important prisoner' need be further detained if and when the primary prisoner in question has died.

In this context, it is imperative to determine the identity of the 'especially important prisoner' to whom Grossheim-Krisko and Richter were each connected. Are these the same person? As we understand, the investigative files studied by the Swedish side do not reveal this information. Are there any alternative routes to determine the identities in question?

When a connection or association to an 'especially important prisoner' is established, whether in arrest or sentence charges, does this refer to one still alive or may it refer to a prisoner already dead?

When the text says 'connected' to such a prisoner, is this by virtue of having sat together in a cell or does this not rather refer to previous associations in one's work or mission prior to the detention of the prisoner?

Is it possible to be formally under arrest or sentenced to long terms because of a connection to an 'especially important person' who is still at liberty -- i.e., never captured?

5. The above questions are important to evaluating a possible change in Wallenberg's fate during the 1953 time frame. Grossheim Krisko, after never being informed why he was held or shown his sentence, was released on the 26th of May 1953 because his detention was 'no longer necessary.' If this is the result of his case being screened by the newly formed Committee that included Beria, Malenkov and Molotov, surely connections between Grossheim-Krisko and Wallenberg could not have escaped them. Either it was irrelevant to their criteria for freeing him, or Wallenberg's fate was deemed

sufficiently 'resolved' for them to let him go -- or Wallenberg is not the 'especially important prisoner' to whom he is connected.

Serious effort should be made to establish upon what grounds Grossheim-Krisko was released in late 1953. During this period when Abakumov was still alive, how informed would the heads of the Committee or Commission be of the so-called nature of the crimes or connections which caused the prisoners to be detained for so long?

6. Jan Loyda was finally given permission to leave the Soviet Union as of December 1953. Loyda had stated in a personal letter to the head of Vladimir Prison that his detention was connected to the fact that he sat with such especially important prisoners as 'Chatlosh, Roedl and Wallenberg' (in that order). Chatlosh was sent back to Czechlosovakia with Spishiak, the Slovak diplomat arrested with Wallenberg, in January 1947 to stand trial for war crimes. Roedl died in October 1947 en route to Krasnogorsk, while Loyda was already in repatriation camp in Odessa, en route home. If Wallenberg had indeed died in July 1947 and if Loyda's thinking is correct, he should not have been recalled by special order from Deputy Minister Selivonovsky on November 10, 1947 (Document No. 3-78258)

Please examine Loyda's classified materials to determine why and for what purpose he was recalled on the eve of repatriation.

Given that Kartashov's October 15, 1947 request to bring Loyda and Hille from Camp 27 to Moscow is coincidental with the order to send Roedl to Krasnogorsk, please check for all possible connections between this summons and Roedl's transfer. Did the same persons and authorities order both transfers? If so, who and why?

7. A number of prisoners died in 1953, at least at Vladimir where we have had more access to the prisoner cards. A number of them were older than Wallenberg or Langfelder. However, it should be noted that, as of 1949, the majority of the sightings mention Wallenberg's health. Although the places contradict each other, Wallenberg's health is often the central issue. They speak of Wallenberg hungerstriking in Lefortovo to protest his sentence; of Wallenberg in a cell in Butyrka, very frail (1950-51); of Wallenberg being examined by Dr. Menachem Meltzer in Khalmer-Yu; of Wallenberg taken off a transport from Bratsk to Magadan and sent to be treated in the hospital in Khabarovsk (1950), of Wallenberg in the medical corpus of Verchne-Uralsk, undergoing surgery in Magnitorgorsk (1953), of Wallenberg 'very sick' in Vladimir Corpus II (1952-53 and again later).

Unfortunately, a number of the essential files for this period have not been handed over by the Russian side. These include the following from the original list: NOTE CHANGE IN FORMAT. Friedrich Bayer, Boguslav Baj, Franz Bentivegni, Alfred Fries, Antonas Bogdanos, Fritz Hammerschmidt, Harold Hjeld, Rudolph Winter von Schwab, Rafael Saulson Jacobssen, Josef Mayr or Mayer, Abram Kalinski, Gennadi Kupryanov; Anton Merkis and his wife; Munters, both Vilhem and Natalie, Tank Cdr.

Helmut Schneider (in Moscow prisons), Konstantinov Volkov and Isaac Markovitch Wolfin. Some of these require also their medical files.

In addition we will be requesting the medical files of the following prisoners whose personal files we have already seen: Shun Akikusa, Garet van der Waals, Alfred Gerstenberg, Semyon Gogiberidse, Horst Kitschmann, Fumitaka Konoye, Leopold Okulicki, Erno Pelkonen, Emil Brugger, Otto Schoggl, Jan Sanitser, Jan Stanislaw Jankowski, Walter Schlitter/Schauer and Franz Rudolph Gfrorener.

7. Jan Stanislaw Jankowski, former Deputy Premier of the Polish Government in Exile, died in Vladimir Prison on March 13, 1953. Page 477 of his file states that he was buried in the Vladimir City Cemetery with Prisoner Number Eleven. We know nothing about this Prisoner except that he had a twenty-five year sentence for espionage according to Article 58.4. Jankowski's file also states that his death was not reported to OAGS and his prisoner card says quite simply:'He died' without giving the usual detailed cause of death.

We consider it a very high priority that Prisoner Number Eleven be identified as fully as possible -- name, nationality, date of birth and of death, date and place of arrest, date and place of sentencing and the responsible organs and units thereof, arrival date for Vladimir, cell history in Vladimir and his medical file.

Were there any other numbered prisoners who died during this time period? Who were they and were they buried also in Vladimir City Cemetery? Was OAGS/ZAGS notified? If no one was notified regionally, how were these deaths reported to the authorities in Moscow? To whom were such reports addressed? (Please give not only name but unit, department, directatorate.) Which official had direct oversight over such special cases or deaths?

THIS PARAGRAPH HAS BEEN CHANGED INCLUDING SOME DELETIONS. : We would like permission to study the death registries for Vladimir Prison Hospital and Special Hospital 1893 MVD to look for the deaths of Wallenberg, Langfelder and those associated with them. As in the Vladimir Corpus II study being conducted by Dr. Makinen, we will be looking for a person who might be Wallenberg or Langfelder under a number or other name.

We also wish to examine the records of the Ministry of Welfare for Mordov ASSR where Jankowski would have been sent to an Internat per their letter C-769 of 14 May 1954, to determine what other prominent foreign prisoners were forwarded to internats in Mordov rather than being kept in the Vladimir region, as in the case of Shulgin and Pataridze.

1955/56

1. With the repatriation of the main eyewitnessses as a result of the Khruschev-Adenauer Treaty and their subsequent testimonies to the Swedish Government that Raoul Wallenberg had been with them in Moscow prisons,

the claims of the Vishinsky Memorandum of 1947 had to be amended. In phrasing the Gromyko Memorandum ten years later, it should be born in mind that there existed an obligatory regular reporting system throughout all the regions of the USSR for listing Foreign Priosners and Stateless, Forms 5 and 6, as well as a registry for those living in exiled territories. There had also been periodic updating of records between the offices of the various prisons and the Central Operational Information Card Index of "A" Department, MGB which the 3rd Department of the Prison Administration consulted before releasing Loyda. (See Loyda, Page 85). There exist records of the Internal Convoy Troops of the MVD or NKVD/MGB units throughout the USSR. In other words , a 'thorough and competent' search for Wallenberg could indeed have been effected.

Were ADD <u>each of the above-mentioned sources</u> examined in the 1955-56 period to clarify the fate of Raoul Wallenberg?

2. We have no eyewitness information to suggest that Raoul Wallenberg died in 1955-56. The question is raised only by the fate of Prince Fumitaka Konoye, captured at the conclusion of the brief military conflict between the USSR and Japan in the summer of 1945. In 1951, Konoye was sentenced by OSO to 25 years for 'taking part in circles hostile to the USSR' and for 'contacts with militaristic ruling circles of Japan' -- a probable euphemism for the fact that his father, as Prime Minister of Japan, had tried to negotiate a separate peace with the Western Allies at approximately the time that his son was captured. Konoye's father committed suicide. <u>There is a strong analog with the Wallenberg case in that both young men were educated in America and both were of potential value as collateral in a diplomatic or industrial/military game becuase of family ties which only complicated their situation. THERE IS A DELETION HERE. .</u>

The question is whether Konoye's case is analogous, tangential to or overlaps with that of Wallenberg -- with tragic consequences for both.

To anwer this question, we would like to examine the records of any discussion which took place among member sof the Central Committee, Council of Ministers or Presidium regarding the possible release of Prince Fumitaka Konoye -- particularly, but not limited to, the 1955/56 time period when a reply to the Swedish government on the fate of Wallenberg was being constructed. In this case where Konoye is a living prominent figure, whose detention in the Soviet Union was acknowledged, it would be of great vlaue to see how the issues of his repatriation were weighed against security considerations or possible embarrassments caused by his return and reconnection with the West. (See Item 9 below).

3. Like Jankowski, Konoye was considered an 'Especially Dangerous State Criminal,' a designation he appealed to Malenkov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers on the 8th of Aguust 1953 and again on the 7th of April 1954. (Another letter went to the Minister of State Security on the 1st of July 1955, contents unknown.) <u>It is my understanding that, according to a decision</u>

instituted by the MGB, MVD and Military Procurator in 1951, anyone designated as 'Especially Dangerous State Criminals' -- i. spies, national leaders, terrorists and saboteurs -- could be sent into exile or to a special camp rather than being repatriated at the completion of their terms. Jankowski, for example, was to have been sent to an internat to be watched over by MGB organs since 'he had no family on the territory of the Soviet Union.' He died died two weeks before this change would take place.

It is important to clarify exactly which foreign prisoners were effected by this designation -- that is, not repatriated at the completion of their terms. Where were they sent? Could Wallenberg and Langfelder be among them?

It is also important to review the files of the appeal channels to see if Wallenberg (like Gerstenberg, Pelkonen, Schandl to name but a few) was appealing his sentence and/or designation at the same time as the others I have named. By like token, where were appeals addressed to Stalin filed -- as, for example, the letter which Wallenberg is known to have written to him in the Fall of 1946?

Finally, what is meant by an internat where Jankowski is to be 'watched over by the MGB organs?' In cases where this actually took place, how long did such custody last?

4. In Konoye's file there is an undated questionnaire filled out by the Deputy Head of MGB/Irkutsk in preparation for Konoye's transport to Harbin where he was to be turned over to someone, presumably for repatriation. Konoye never reached Harbin. Instead he was detained in or brought back to Irkutsk, then sent to Vladimir in January 1956, arriving with a number of his compatriots. In April of 1956, Konoye was transferred to Ivanovo Camp 48, an area which seemingly functioned as a gathering point for dispersion of the repatriates, although Ivanovo Internal Prison had previously served as a detention place for the numbered Baltic leaders for years prior to their sentencing ADD in 1952.

This raises two questions of a general nature which must be answered in resolving the Wallenberg case: Why was everyone related to this case -- except for Hatz, Schlitter and Gfrorener -- eventually brought to Vladimir? Why were Loyda (1947), Beckerle (1952) and Konoye (1955/56) called back from their respective destinations? Who and what unit or agency initiated the request in each and all cases, and on what basis? It is very important to determine first if there is any correlation between these three actions and then whether it impacts on or reflects in any way Wallenberg's presence, death or disappearance in the GULAG.

Specifically, it is necessary to determine who canceled Konoye's transport to Harbin, by what order and why; who ordered him brought back to Vladimir and why; and who ordered him to be sent to Ivanovo Camp 48 and why. As these requests come well after the death of Stalin, and the executions of Beria and Abakumov, it is necessary to trace these decisions to the highest level.

5. At Ivanovo Camp 48, Konoye died on October 29, 1956 at 5:00 AM of 'hypertension and acute generalized arterior-sclerosis due to a large area of broken blood vessel in the fourth ventricle of the brain...' He was 41 years old, three years younger than Wallenberg would have been. While his death has been documented in detail and his autopsy performed with a Japanese doctor as part of the team, those who did the examination thrity-three hours later made note that the prisoner was not in the hospital when he died.

Where was he when he died? More importantly, what is the significance of this statement in terms of accountability? Does this have a direct bearing on the Smoltsov note which places Wallenberg in his cell when he died of a heart attack, even though the proposed Supplement 3 to the Memorandum of Molotov and Serov that was never turned over to the Swedish side -- until its recent declassification -- states quite clearly that he was in the prison hospitall ? Which is the truth?

6. As Konoye's file later states, there were no diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Japan when this death occurred. Reclamation of the body was only possible after diplomatic relations were resumed. And yet there occurred meticulous reporting as is to be found in the case of all the Polish, Balkan and other diplomats mentioned previously; in the cases of Oggins and van der Waals, in the cases of German and Austrian officials and miilitary personnel, including Rudolph Weisbrot who prosecuted a number of Communists under the Nazi regime. Such reporting shows a clear awareness of the exigencies of international law.

In this context, it is crucial to address the question of why, since there were diplomatic relations with the Swedish government, the Soviets could not or would not produce a legal document attesting to Wallenberg's death as a way of resolving the problem? Are there other comparable cases which would enable us to understand the rationale?

7. In the summer of 1992, the case of Konoye was raised as a parallel to that of Oggins by certain journalists in Russia. Both men were described as prisoners who could not be released because of what they knew or could report about the Soviet system. In the case of Konoye, it was rumored that he died because of those with whom he had come in contact as a prisoner. My impression then was that Konoye had been executed, like Oggins -- that is to say, shot. I was therefore surprised to read in his file that Prince Konoye died of seemingly natural causes.

Given the ramifications of Abakumov's Memorandum 2773A regarding the faked documentation related to the CHANGE death of Oggins DELETION, I must ask the real facts in the case of Konoye. This is particularly necessary since Ambassador Hallqvist's report on Vladimir sightings states that there was one Japanese who sat with Wallenberg -- unnamed. We need a complete prison and cell history for Konoye, with cellmates listed, in order to determine who sat with him and when.

NOTE: Konoye's file shows that he sat with Jan Stanislaw Jankowski, starting July 6, 1947 and with Adolph-Heinz Beckerle, former German Ambassador in Sofia, in Butyrka Prison Cell 254 just prior to their sentencing in late 1951. Beckerle was sent to Verchne-Uralsk, then called back 'urgently' to become Prisoner H4 at Vladimir in April of 1952. Konoye was sent to Alexandrovsk in the Irkutsk Region where he sat in Cell 49. With what other diplomats did Konoye have contact in the Gulag?

8. Walter Schlitter, Wallenberg's first cellmate along with Gustav Richter, emerged from three years of strict isolation at Alexandrovsk to be placed in Cell 49 with Konoye on March 6, 1954. How long they sat together and the operational value of this remains to be seen. What is clear is that Schlitter/Schauer, who was repatriated in 1955, never came forth to testify about Wallenberg, even though he sat with Raoul longer than Gustav Richter. In this regard, Document/Memorandum 157, Application 1 dated May 13, 1956 addressed to Molotov and Serov by the Secretary of the Central Committee should be reconsidered. Translated, the text reads: '*The competent Soviet authorities were asked to analyze and check the documents passed over by the Swedish side...In particular they would like to get more detailed information about Shoyer/Shauer who presumably was in the same cell with Wallenberg, as Gustav Richter mentioned in his testimonies.*' This official response to the Swedish Government's presentation of the eyewitness reports which led to the Gromyko Memornadum is brief. While it requests photographs and other information which seemingly could help the Soviets search for Wallenberg in the GULAG, its primary purpose may well have been to inquire whether or not Schlitter/Schauer had also come forth to testify. In other words, **this one testimony could have made a significant difference in the form and content of the Gromyko Memorandum of 1957.**

Our study of the file of Walter Schlitter has revealed that he sat with the following persons: Chamota (alternatively written Yamota); Richter; Wallenberg; Kitschmann; Foss; Hatz; Huber and Konoye. Wallenberg, Hatz and Konoye are not stated ADD in the file of Schlitter, but calculated from comparison of data from other files. In addition, there is an unconfirmed report that he sat with one Schmidt, first name unclear, but who could also be Gfrorener under his alternative identity as Dr. Karl Schmidt. This, however, does not give us a full accounting of Schlitter's cellmates.

CHANGE AND DELETION: In addition,

10. A calculation of the pagination in Schlitter's file shows traces of two other series of numbers. In spite of the fact that the file was expanded in 1991 to 388 pages, analysis of the three pagination series shows a discrepancy which corresponds to the 1947-48 period when Schlitter made his most frequent jumps from cell to cell.

We need to know with whom Schlitter sat in eah of the following cells of Internal Prison: Cell 7 (from January 8, 1947), Cell 70 (on February 25, 1947); Cell 25 (from February 26, 1947); Cell 70 (from March 1, 1947); Cell 80 (from July 22, 1947); Cell 74 (from 18 August 1947); Cell 112 (from September 21, 1947); Cell 130 (from

September 27, 1947); Cell 107 (from December 16, 1947); Cell IB (from 24 December 1947), Cell 22 (from 13 January 1948) Cell 97 (from 15 January 1948),; Cell 81 (from 13 February 1948); Cell 118 (from 23 February 1948).

CHANGE. Each of the underlined dates correspond to important events in the fate of Wallenberg, Langfelder or related cases. Therefore, it is important to check how far and how deeply these correspondences go. Specifically, I would like to know if Schlitter sat with Akikusa on February 25, with Roedl on February 26, with Wallenberg on March 1st or following , and with Langfelder on July 23, 1947 or following. It would be important to know with whom he sat on August 18, 1947 and wehther or not he sat with either Loyda or Hille when they arrived in January 1948. How often did he sit with Hatz and Kitschmann? How often did he sit with Richter?

We would also like to study the file of Yamota/Chamota, a prisoner unknown to us, to determine if there is any inter-connection with Yamota and the different cellmates in the series.

11. The fact that Schlitter emerges from strict isolation to be placed with Konoye repeats a pattern which underlines the question whether Konoye sat with Wallenberg, a man with whom he could have much in common, or with Langfelder and/or Roedl who was returning from Japan at the time of his arrest. A number of questions emerge from these parallels, particularly since Konoye's appeals to the Council of Ministers coincide with the growing intention on the part of the Central Committee to successfully resolve the Wallenberg case with the Swedes, once and for all.

Independent of the question of whether or not Konoye and Wallenberg sat together, it would be most helpful if the Russian side could analyze the security, diplomatic and policy factors which entered into questions of Konoye's repatriation and compare them with Wallenberg's situation in 1947 and following, should he have survived.

12. In April of 1955, Isaac Markovitch Wolfin, 'Swedish spy' -- a former staffperson of the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm DELETION who was interrogated just prior to the joint Wallenberg/Langfelder interrogation of July 1946 -- was returned from Vladimir to Butyrka Prison. Wolfin had been sentenced in 1948 to fifteen years. While we do not know how many additional years Wolfin was held in Butyrka after 1955, there is indication that his sentence was cut short for his services as informant and provocateur.

In the course of his detention at Vladimir, Wolfin sat in at least fifty two different cells with more than seventy different prisoners, the majority foreign. While he did not sit with the direct Wallenberg/Langfelder witnesses, such as Richter (with the possible exception of Admiral Krafft), Wolfin did sit with a host of witnesses from our original list -- including Gogiberidse three times in 1952 and once in 1953; Otto Schoggl; Josef Mayer; Maximillan Angelis; Adolph Heinz Beckerle; Franz Langer; Gennadi Kupryanov. He also sat with a number of those whose files we are now requesting -- Karl Supprian , for instance.

He also sat with important Baltic leaders -- Urbshis, Munters and Shalna -- and Number Prisoners such as Boris Menshagin, or Prisoner Number 31, unknown. He also may have overlapped with Adam Behn, the Polish leader usually placed with Jankowski as with Hungarian 'American spy', also unknown. He also sat for approximately four months with Kurt Gerrum, Gfrorener's cellmate, around the time of Gfrorener's execution in April 1952. Besides sitting with a number of prisoners with the label 'spy', 'saboteur' or 'terrorist', he also sat with a number of prisoners with the designation 'M' on their cards. Wolfin also had the 'M' designation, as did Konoye although he could not have been with Konoye in Vladimir if the Prince's file is correct in stating that he only arrived there in 1956. Wolfin did however sit with a number of Japanese.

Noting the (1) outstanding number of Wallenberg-related witnesses, numbered prisoners and other special categories with whom Wolfin sat in Vladimir; (2) possible prior connection to this case as a former employee of the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm, and (3) the fact that Wolfin, a translator and Jew, was fluent in Swedish and therefore may have sat with Wallenberg or Langfelder in Moscow as well as in Vladimir: we are requesting access to Wolfin's prison and medical files and the opportunity to address questions to his investigative file, even though he was known to be a Soviet agent. We regard this exception to the rule as necessary to the resolution of this case.

It should be noted that -- while it seems obvious that Wolfin was useful to the competent authorities as an informant --there is some indication that he may have been also a source of the rumor that Raoul Wallenberg was being held in Vladimir Prison. Maximum access to the records on Wolfin would be of great help in determining the basis or motive for this significant behavior.

Also, his family in Russia is under the impression that Wolfin emigrated to the America. If such is the case, would the MVD authorities be so kind as to inform us at what date he turned in his Internal Passport so that we can specify to the American authorities his approximate time of arrival in an effort to find him.

13. **Regarding LANGFELDER:** Van der Waals file, Page 92, is a document dated March 9, 1956 from Butyrka Prison to Deputy Chief of Prison Section of MVD: 'In agreement with your inquiry, the personal file of the prisoner of war Van der Waals...is being sent for further keeping in your archives. Attachment: Personal file in 91 pages.

Was this in response to a request related specifically to Van der Waals or part of an overall procedure to turn over files of the deceased, or repatriated prisoners to the archives? Is so, the Deputy Chief of Prison Section, was presumably working from a list which we would like to request.

Has an effort been made to search for Langfelder's file or listing in the Prison Section of MVD, following the same procedures as for the file of Van der Waals?

12. Related to this, in the directive to Soviet Ambassador in Hungary Uri V. Andropov dated September 17, 1957 regarding the fate of Vilmos Langfelder, it is said: 'There is reason to think that all materials regarding Langfelder as well as materials about Wallenberg were destroyed by the former leadership of State Security of the USSR. But the list of the prisoners in Lubyanka was found and there is the name of Langfelder with a remark: 'Died on March 2, 1948.'

Where is this list? If not available, where is the document to account for its absence or destruction? Who is accountable for its removal?

* * * * * *

SUMMARY REMARKS

In closing, I would like to repeat that I do not regard the findings I have highlighted here as conclusive, but I do think that the facts -- objectively placed side by side -- show clear-cut discrepancies which must be resolved if we are to arrive at a common and recognizable truth.

The questions I have raised are finite in number and therefore can be addressed in the near future. I feel very strongly that they must be considered to give the world satisfactory answers that, until now, have been based in large measure on hints and whispers. Again, I am not only verifying eyewitness sightings but providing a context for dealing with the deeper issues involved in the controversy between the death or disappearance of this great humanitarian.

My work in the files, combined with my review of the documents released by the Russian side in 1991 and following, have convinced me that -- independent of the actual Wallenberg file -- the information fo the type we need does still exist and can be acccessed. For this reason, I am glad that initially I limited my requests to the most basic level of information. From my mind at least, it has proven a fertile field from which to draw both the data and instrumetns to perfect this search.

I also would like to say that -- as a result of my work to date -- I feel confident in the method which I proposed. It is my hope that the Russian side, through this Preliminary Report, can see how this method works and will take the initaitive to improve upon it -- both by criticism and through their own efforts. In any case, through the materials they have shared with my team, the merit of the results are as much theirs as mine.

Again, my deepest thanks to all for the opportunity to carry out this work on behalf of the Russian-Swedish Working Group. I look forward to receiving the remaining files and registries which will enable me to conclude the preliminary data and move on to investigative questions and analysis, leading to the Final Report.

Respectfully submitted,

Susan Ellen Mesinai
Director, ARK Project
Consultant

September 8, 1998

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am sending you, attached to this e-mail my report on Raoul Wallenberg, press advisory, and a press release. The report is to be released, as u see from the press advisory, on Tuesday, September 8th, 11:00 m., central daylight time.

l documents are sent in rich text format. If you have any trouble ading them, let me know and I will send them in some other format.

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Exp. 98-09-08
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Delges inkl press release & press advisory men ej textdelen
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PRESS ADVISORY

A report on the fate and whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg will be released on Tuesday, September 8th at 11:00 a.m. at the Winnipeg Jewish Community Centre Asper Campus, 123 Doncaster, Kroft Boardroom.

Raoul Wallenberg saved up to 100,000 Hungarian Jews from the Holocaust. He was arrested by the advancing Soviet troops in 1945 and never heard from again. He is Canada's only honourary citizen.

The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy on September 5, 1996 announced that the Government would assist in defraying the cost of the research activities of David Matas to be conducted to determine the fate and whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg. The amount granted was $5000.00. David Matas is a lawyer in private practice in Winnipeg, Manitoba active in human rights causes.

For further information contact: David Matas, 602-225 Vaughan Street, Winnipeg, Manitoba, R3C 1T7, Tel: 204-944-1831, Fax: 204-942-1494, e-mail: dmatas@mb.sympatico.ca

PRESS RELEASE SEPTEMBER 8, 1998

Wallenberg Report calls for Release of Documents

A report released today calls on the Russian, Swedish, American and British governments to make available all information in their archives that would help to clarify the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. The report, written by David Matas, and funded by Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Hon. Lloyd Axworthy, concludes that the fate of Raoul Wallenberg is not yet known, but that it is knowable based on documents in existence in archives in various countries.

The report warns that it is premature on the present state of the evidence, in advance of full disclosure of all relevant documents in archives, to come to any conclusion on the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. It is unwarranted to come to the conclusion that Raoul Wallenberg died in 1947. A 1947 death conclusion operates at cross purposes with the need for further research. The currently available evidence that Raoul Wallenberg survived 1947 is at least as compelling as the evidence that he was murdered in 1947.

The author of the report, David Matas, stated: "An investigation into the fate of Raoul Wallenberg is not just a Russian Swedish bilateral matter. Given what Raoul Wallenberg did to combat crimes against humanity, his fate concerns all humanity. Because Raoul Wallenberg is Canada's only honourary citizen, it is fitting that Canada is involved in the investigation into his fate."

The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy on September 5, 1996 had announced that the Government would assist in defraying the cost of the research activities of David Matas to be conducted to determine the fate and whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg. The amount granted was $5000.00. David Matas is a lawyer in private practice in Winnipeg, Manitoba active in human rights causes. The recommendations of the report are attached to this press release. For further information contact: David Matas, 602-225 Vaughan Street, Winnipeg, Manitoba, R3C 1T7, Tel: 204-944-1831, Fax: 204-942-1494, e-mail: dmatas@mb.sympatico.ca

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What Happened to Raoul Wallenberg?

A report by David Matas
8 September 1998

What Happened to Raoul Wallenberg?

by David Matas

I. Introduction

The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Government of Canada on September 5, 1996 announced that the Government would assist in defraying the cost of my research activities to be conducted to determine the fate and whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg. The amount granted was $5000.00. In pursuit of that research, I have travelled to Riga, Latvia; London, England; Stockholm, Sweden; Moscow, Russia; Geneva, Switzerland; and Washington, District of Columbia, United States of America. I was in Riga on November 15, 1996; in Stockholm the week of January 12 to 19, 1997; in London the week February 11 to 17; in Moscow the week of March 3 to 9, 1997; in Geneva the week of March 26 to April 4, 1997; and in Washington, D.C. from May 17 to 21, 1997.

Both the Swedish and Russian governments, in September 1991, appointed working groups to investigate and report on the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. I went to Riga to meet Hans Magnusson, the head of the Swedish working group on Raoul Wallenberg, who is also the Swedish ambassador to Latvia. In Washington, D.C. I met with Susanne Berger, an independent Wallenberg researcher. In Geneva, Switzerland, I met with Guy Von Dardel, Raoul Wallenberg's brother. In both London and Washington, I attempted to get access to archival documents. The details of these efforts, as well as information about my contacts in Stockholm and Moscow are in the body of the report.

Because of the existence of the Swedish and Russian working groups, I originally intended to delay the release of my report till those groups released their reports. The reason for that was twofold. One is that those groups have done a considerable body of work. Their reports contain substantial information to which a reader could usefully refer when considering this report. There was no point in my duplicating the work those groups have done. That was, in any case, beyond my capacity. My own work is an attempt to both complement and supplement the Russian and Swedish working group reports rather than an attempt to replace them.

Second, this report proposes a program of action to complete the work of investigation beyond the Swedish and Russian working group reports. There seemed to be little point in suggesting what comes after the working groups while the work of those

groups was still in progress. Because their work was still in progress while I was writing my report, I made suggestions for further work on Raoul Wallenberg directly to the working groups.

From the time I began my work, the release of the Swedish and Russian working group reports at all times appeared imminent. Release dates, though constantly changing, were never more than a few months away. In the fall of 1997, I was told that the reports of the working groups would be released in December 1997 or January 1998.

Even though I still think that the release of my report would have best followed the release of the reports of the Swedish and Russian working groups, I have always believed that the Raoul Wallenberg case was one of the utmost urgency. It seems to me incompatible with that sense of urgency for me to just sit around waiting. So, I have decided to release my report now. After the two groups release their reports, I will comment on those reports.

My own involvement in the Raoul Wallenberg dossier dates from 1989. Irwin Cotler of the Faculty of Law at the University of McGill chaired an International Commission of Inquiry and a Soviet International Joint Commission both on the fate and whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg. Professor Cotler asked me to assist him with the two commissions. The commissions were entirely non-governmental. The first commission began its work in February 1989 and released its report in May 1990. The second commission began its work in August 1990 and announced findings in September 1990.

My work for those two commissions made me realize that the full story about Raoul Wallenberg had not yet been told, and convinced me that much of the story was available in archives behind closed doors. I approached the Government of Canada to assist in this work because I felt that the backing of the Government was necessary in order for me to get behind those doors.

Although this report is my own and not a report of the Government

of Canada, the Government backing was indeed helpful, not just financially, but as well by giving me access and status with government officials in other countries that I might not otherwise have had. In particular, the meetings I had with Russian government officials when I was in Moscow were arranged by the Canadian embassy in Moscow. I doubt I could have met with those people without the assistance of the Canadian embassy.

3 September 1998

II. Raoul Wallenberg in Hungary

Given his fame, surprisingly little is known about the life of Raoul Wallenberg. Much has written about the six months of Raoul Wallenberg's time in Hungary, from July 1944 to January 1945. Aside from those six months, there is almost nothing that one can say with certainty about him.

This report focuses on the little that is known about the fate of Raoul Wallenberg from the date of his disappearance into the Soviet gulag. It is understandable that little would be known about the fate of a disappeared person. What is surprising is that almost as little is known about the life of Raoul Wallenberg prior to the time he went to Hungary.

Books about Raoul Wallenberg to date have been more hagiographies than biographies. According to those hagiographies, President Roosevelt asked the American Government War Refugee Board to help save the Jews of Hungary from the Holocaust. The War Refugee Board asked its representative in Sweden to find a person for that task. The Swedish representative of the War Refugee Board, Iver Olsen, had his offices in the same building as an import export firm where Raoul Wallenberg worked, the Central European Trading Company Inc. Wallenberg's boss, Kalman Lauer, recommended Wallenberg and off he went to Budapest.

This version jars with other known facts. Before it was ever decided that Raoul Wallenberg would go to Hungary on his heroic mission, he had been given a special passport issued by authority of the Swedish cabinet. The passport stamps show he used the passport extensively to travel throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Why was this passport issued? What was the purpose of these trips?

The date book Raoul Wallenberg kept before the war was stolen after the war from storage. The crime was never solved and the date book never recovered. What was Raoul Wallenberg doing

before he went to Hungary?

Why was he chosen and not someone else? How was he chosen, by what process? What was he asked to do? Was he sent over to save Jews, or sent over to save associates in Hungary of Swedish business interests? Were his efforts to save Jews his own initiative using the techniques he had learned to save others?

The answer to these questions are now as much a mystery as the answer to the question what happened to him. Indeed, part of the answer to the question of his fate in the Soviet gulag may well be wrapped in the answers to these other questions. Swedes both in private and public life, including some members of his own family, did much too little to help rescue him in the first years of his capture, when he was without doubt alive. Was Swedish lethargy a consequence of the fact that Raoul Wallenberg went beyond his original mission and ended up hurting rather than helping Swedish interests?

What is known is that between July 9, 1944 when Raoul Wallenberg arrived in Budapest and January 14, 1945, when he was arrested by the Soviets, in the space of six months, he saved up to 100,000 Hungarian Jews from the Holocaust by using protective Swedish passports and every other means he could. Wallenberg was arrested by the advancing Soviet troops and taken to Moscow on the order of Deputy Defence Minister Nikolai Bulganin. He arrived in Lubianka prison in Moscow on February 6, 1945. He was never heard from again.

Wallenberg has been much honoured for his heroic efforts during those last six months of 1944. There are statues of him, memorials, buildings and parks named after him. He is the great hero of the twentieth century, a person who showed us what one individual could do in the face of evil. He is an honourary citizen of Israel, the United States and Canada. He was made an honourary citizen of Canada in 1985 by Act of Parliament.

Wallenberg was much honoured, but little helped. It is an irony and a tragedy that he who helped so many was so little helped himself; that he who rescued so many was not himself rescued. Now, even if he is still alive, he will have spent over fifty years in Soviet and Russian prisons and hospitals. When he was arrested he was 33. Now, even if alive, he would be 86.

III. Soviet Coverup and Russian Cooperation

i) The Soviets

The Soviets were involved in fabrications, document destruction and obstruction that began with Raoul Wallenberg's arrest and continued to almost the end of the Soviet period. Furthermore, the Russians, to this day, have been less than fully cooperative in uncovering the truth about Raoul Wallenberg.

In March 1945, Kossuth radio, the Moscow based Communist radio station beamed into Hungary a broadcast that "all signs indicate that" Raoul Wallenberg had been murdered by Gestapo agents.[1] This disinformation was broadcast after Raoul Wallenberg had been in Soviet hands for two months.

In February 1947, Peter Fedotov, chief of counterintelligence of the Ministry of Security, the MGB, a predecessor of the KGB, told K. I. Novikov, chief of the Second European Division of the Soviet Foreign Ministry (MID), that Raoul Wallenberg was being held by the MGB. Different documents available today note this conversation.

Fedotov worked for Viktor Abakumov, Minister of Security. Novikov worked for Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky. Between 1945 and 1947, the Swedish government made repeated requests to the Soviets about Raoul Wallenberg. These requests, coupled with the knowledge that the Soviet Foreign Ministry had from the Soviet Ministry of Security that Raoul Wallenberg was in MGB hands, led to a number of communications about Raoul Wallenberg.

Vyshinsky wrote to Vyacheslav Molotov, then Vice Chair of the

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[1]ENDNOTES

. See Elenore Lester "Wallenberg: The Man in the Iron Web" Prentice Hall, 1982, pages 74 and 131; Frederick E. Werbell and Thurston Clarke, "Lost Hero: The Mystery of Raoul Wallenberg", McGraw-Hill, 1982, page 164.

Council of Ministers and Deputy Prime Minister, by memorandum dated May 13, 1947: "We several times in oral and written form channelled our requests in 1945 and 1946 to SMERSH and later to the Ministry of State Security for clarification on the fate and whereabouts of Wallenberg. As a result of this, only in February of this year in his talk with Comrade Novikov did Comrade Fedotov inform us that Wallenberg was now at the disposal of the Ministry of State Security and promise to report to you personally on further undertakings of the Ministry of State Security in this case."[2]

Vychinsky wrote to Abakumov on July 7, 1947: "In order to solve the question of a reply (to the Swedes) and its contents, it would be important to have information about the place where Wallenberg was taken into the protection of the Soviet military forces, his whereabouts at this time, the places to which he was moved and whether any fighting or bombing occurred at these places, whether Wallenberg had freedom of movement or (was) under constant surveillance and whether at this point in time he was in contact with or met members of the Swedish Embassy in Vienna (presumably this should be Budapest) or other foreigners."

In August 1947, one month later, Vyshinsky wrote to Swedish ambassador Rolf Sohlman: Raoul Wallenberg "was not and never had been in the Soviet Union....There remains only the supposition that Wallenberg died during the battle in the city of Budapest (in 1945) or that he was captured by the Arrow Cross (the Nazi puppet fighting force in Hungary)". The contrasting documents, one set of documents internal to the Soviet system, and another document external, to a Swedish government representative shows graphically something that crops up again and again in the Wallenberg history: unequivocal and blatant attempts by senior members of the Soviet government to lie about Raoul Wallenberg,

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2. "Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness - A Soviet Spymaster" Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatoli Sudoplatov, with Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schecter, Little Brown and Company, 1994, page 272.

to state publicly what Soviet officials knew for a fact not to be true. About Raoul Wallenberg there was lying as a government policy, and a policy established at the highest levels.

Of course, lies in 1945 and 1947 were lies of many years ago. But lying has occurred more recently. In February 1957, then Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko released a memorandum which said that after a page by page search of the archival documents from all wards in certain prisons there was a document found which there was good reason to consider as referring to Raoul Wallenberg. The document was a 1947 report from A.L. Smoltsov, health service director of Lubianka Prison to Abakumov. The note said that "Walenberg" died suddenly the previous night, probably as a result of a heart attack. The note was dated July 17, 1947. Smoltsov asked Abakumov for permission to do an autopsy. A further note was added saying: "It has been ordered that the body be cremated without an autopsy." Nikita Khrushchev in 1957 announced that Raoul Wallenberg had been arrested by Abakumov and that Abakumov had been executed for committing this crime, amongst others.

Abakumov had indeed been executed, but not for the arrest of Raoul Wallenberg. The indictment of Abakumov has now been published and the arrest of Raoul Wallenberg is nowhere mentioned amongst the charges. Moreover, the person responsible for the transfer of Raoul Wallenberg to Moscow from Budapest, far from having been executed, was honoured and promoted. He was, as I wrote earlier, Bulganin, who at the time of the release of the Gromyko memorandum, was Nikita Khrushchev's Prime Minister[3].

The 1957 Gromyko memorandum went through several drafts. A draft of April 1956 attached as an appendix to a memorandum from Vyacheslav Molotov, then Vice Chair of the Council of Ministers

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[3]. "Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness - A Soviet Spymaster" Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatoli Sudoplatov, with Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schecter, Little Brown and Company, 1994, page 275

and Deputy Prime Minister and Ivan Serov, head of the KGB, to the Central Committee stated that Raoul Wallenberg had been held in Lefortovo prison, that he died in the Lefortovo prison hospital in July 1947 and that his body was cremated.

Soviet Foreign Minister Sjepilov, in October 1956, sent a memorandum to the Central Committee, enclosing a later draft of what became the Gromyko memorandum. This draft maintained that Raoul Wallenberg was held in Lefortovo and Butyrka prisons and that he suddenly died on July 17, 1947, and the body cremated.

These earlier drafts are noteworthy in that it they present more or less the same explanation as the Smoltsov note, even though the Smoltsov note had not surfaced at that time. In other words, the appearance of the Smoltsov note in 1957 could not have led the Soviet leadership to report that Raoul Wallenberg died suddenly in 1947 and his body cremated, since even before the Soviet leadership had the Smoltsov note in hand, there were drafts floating around internally stating Wallenberg died suddenly in 1947 and his body cremated.

It is also worth noting that these 1956 drafts had Raoul Wallenberg dying at an entirely different prison from the one he is alleged to have died in according to the Smoltsov note. The 1956 drafts have Raoul Wallenberg dying in either Lefortovo or Butyrka prison. The Gromyko memorandum as finally released has Raoul Wallenberg dying in Lubianka prison.

The April 1956 draft gave as the source of its information the records of Abakumov, the former commander for counter espionage. The October 1956 draft said that its information came from several persons. The Gromyko memorandum as released in February 1957, however, said that its sole source of information was the Smoltsov note, and that "no data were found containing information on Wallenberg's stay in the Soviet Union" aside from the Smoltsov note.

According to the Gromyko memorandum, a thorough search was made in the archives relating to prisoners and the investigation files of the prisons of Lefortovo, Lubianka and Vladimir prisons for information about Raoul Wallenberg. Yet, a visit by researchers to Vladimir prison in September 1990 established that no such search was ever made.[4] Prison archives had not been previously examined; prison officials had not been previously interviewed; witnesses had not been previously questioned.

The Gromyko memorandum talks of the Smoltsov note having been found in the medical service archive at Lubianka prison. Yet, according to Konstantin Vinogradov, the present deputy head of archives of the FSB, the Federal Security Service, the successor organization to the KGB, no such archive exists or ever existed. Furthermore, a KGB official whom the Swedish working group interviewed told the working group that he was given the job of searching Lubianka prison records in 1956 for evidence that Raoul Wallenberg suffered from some illness, but did not find the Smoltsov report.

It should be obvious that the Gromyko memorandum was not generated as a result of discovery of the Smoltsov note. Indeed, there is much to suggest that the Smoltsov note was itself a fabrication. But why did the Soviets in 1957 produce a new lie, that Wallenberg died of a heart attack in 1947, rather than just stick with their old lie that he died in 1945?

Indeed, there were Soviet adherents to the position that the old lie should be maintained. Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko wrote to the KGB chief Serov in 1954 asking for a report on the date and circumstance of the death of Raoul Wallenberg. Serov answered that it was not suitable to deviate from the reply used

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4. Soviet International Joint Commission on the Fate and Whereabout of Raoul Wallenberg, September 5, 1990, Principal Findings one and two.

since 1947.

However, by 1957 the Soviets had released a number of German prisoners of war, and their evidence showed unequivocally that Raoul Wallenberg was alive and in Lubianka and Lefortovo prisons at least between 1945 and 1947. This German prisoner of war evidence led to renewed Swedish government pressure on the Soviets to explain Raoul Wallenberg's fate. The Soviets decided to respond to this pressure by producing something that fit with the evidence of the released prisoners.

It was not unusual for the Soviets to fabricate death stories about prisoners. Maksim Litvinov, Soviet ambassador to the United States, on authorization from Vyacheslav Molotov, chair of the council of People's Commissars, told Americans in February 1943 who had been inquiring about Soviet prisoners Henryk Ehrlich and Victor Alter that on December 23, 1941, the prisoners had been executed for treason. In fact, Ehrlich committed suicide on May 14, 1942. Alter was not executed till February 17, 1943.[5]

The Vyshinsky note and the Gromyko memorandum were not each one off lies, one in 1947 and one in 1957. They became the basis for continuing and repeated lies by the whole Soviet apparatus until the arrival of Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin on the scene in 1991. For instance, the Soviet Ambassador to Stockholm, Rodionov, by report of August 5, 1953, stated that earlier information in the case was confirmed and that all suggestions that Raoul Wallenberg had ever been in the Soviet Union were "baseless".[6] There were many such statements by Soviet officials between 1947 and 1957, standing behind the Vyshinsky note, and from 1957 to 1991, endorsing the Gromyko memorandum.

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[5]. "Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness - A Soviet Spymaster" Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatoli Sudoplatov, with Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schecter, Little Brown and Company, 1994, page 290.

[6]. Swedish Government 1966 White Paper on Raoul Wallenberg, page 11, English translation.

In Soviet drafting that preceded both the Vyshinsky note and the Gromyko memorandum, there is no attempt to set out the truth. Both the Vyshinsky note and the Gromyko memorandum are exercises in fabrication, attempts to spin stories with three objectives: The invented stories had to conform as closely as possible to what the Swedes at that time knew; Raoul Wallenberg had no longer to be alive; and the Soviets, at least those then living, had to be entirely blameless.

Aside from the invented stories of 1947 and 1957, there are the history of removal from sight of traces of Raoul Wallenberg's stay in prison and the intimidation of witnesses. References in prison interrogation or transfer records and KGB entries in a registration ledger have been thickly inked out. The ink was manufactured after 1948. It is possible with the use of modern techniques to read what is written underneath the ink. Personal files have disappeared.

Raoul Wallenberg's cell mates from 1945 were interrogated in late July 1947 They were asked for the names of people to whom they had spoken about Wallenberg. They were subsequently jailed in isolation or together with each other.

The Soviets in October 1989 handed over to the Wallenberg family Raoul Wallenberg's personal effects, his diplomatic passport, prison register card, foreign currency and date book. The explanation at the time was that they were discovered in the basement of the KGB headquarters in Lubianka prison shortly before, during a refurbishment of the KGB records, replacing wooden filing cabinets with metal ones. The articles were contained in a parcel that fell down from the top shelves when the shelves were being cleared up.

It is difficult to accept this story of discovery. It is hard to believe that information about Raoul Wallenberg, one of the most

important prisoner the gulag ever had, and about whom so many inquiries had been made over the years, would have been stored in such an off hand way, that archivists would not have know about its whereabouts at all times. This form of storage was contrary to rules and regulations of the Soviet system. It was also contrary to the practice of storage and filing the Soviets systematically followed.

The Soviets kept separate files for a prisoner's passport, registration card, money and personal belongings.[7] Raoul Wallenberg's diplomatic passport, prison register card, foreign currency and date book that were returned to his family in 1989 would have most likely have come not from one file that tumbled off a top shelf, but from four separate files that had been shelved according to category.

Yet, if the explanation of discovery cannot be accepted, it pushes forward the active dissimulation by decades. Those who presented the personal effects of Raoul Wallenberg in 1989 are, many of them, the people that remain in charge of the Russian Raoul Wallenberg dossier to this day. It is hard to give credence to Russians saying today that they have done all they can to uncover the truth about Raoul Wallenberg when they maintain that just stumbled across Raoul Wallenberg's personal effects in 1989.

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7. Soviet International Joint Commission on the Fate and Whereabout of Raoul Wallenberg, September 5, 1990, Principal Findings eight and nine.

ii) The Russians

I visited Russia in pursuit of the Wallenberg project from March 3 to March 9, 1997. During that time, I met Russian government officials, Russian non-government researchers, and foreign researchers.

The Russian officials I met were Konstantin Kosatchev, head of the Finnish and Swedish section, and Andrew Zikeyev, attaché, second European Department, both of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in one meeting, and Teimouraz Ramishvili, Head of the Department of International Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights of the Foreign Ministry, in another meeting. The non-government Russian researchers I met were the historian Dr. Lev Besymenski, Vyacheslav Nikinov, who at one time worked for Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin on Wallenberg, Yuri and Ljuba Savienko of the Independent Psychiatric Association of Moscow, and Elena Kudriakova, an independent researcher on migration issues. As well, I had telephone meetings with Alexi Kartsev, a Russian journalist who had written on Wallenberg, and Nikita Petrov, a member of Memorial and a former member of the presidential commission on Soviet archives headed by the late Dmitri Volkogonov. The non-Russians researchers I contacted were Swedish Ambassador Martin Hallqvist, with whom I met, and Guy von Dardel, Marvin Makinen and Susan Mesinai, to whom I spoke by phone while they were at Vladimir.

Mr. Kosatchev informed me that the former Russian head of the working group, Viktor Tatarintsev, had been posted as Russian ambassador to Sweden and had ceased to be head of the working group. No one had been appointed to replace him. He, Mr. Kosatchev, was coordinating matters until a replacement was named.

The Russian working group consisted of four people, the person who would replace Mr. Tatarintsev, and three others who held their positions on the working group because of their functions. These were Mr. Vinogradov of the Archives of the Federal Security

Agency (FSB), Mr. Nikishkin of the Ministry of Interior Archives, and Mr. Filipov of the Ministry of Defence Archives. Mr. Kosatchev did not believe that I should meet with these other people and in fact I was not able to meet them, though the Canadian embassy in Moscow tried to arrange meetings for me with them. Mr. Kosatchev viewed my meeting with them as inappropriate because, he said, they were in possession in confidential information which it would be inappropriate for them to disclose to me.

Mr. Kosatchev further stated that he viewed the Wallenberg investigation as essentially a bilateral matter between Sweden and Russia. He contrasted the time of Bakatin, who was Minister of the Interior between the aborted coup against Gorbachev in August 1991 and the break up of the Soviet Union in December 1991, when documents flowed freely from the Soviet archives, to the present time. To Mr. Kosatchev the reason for the difference was that the 1991 period was a period of lawlessness. The present time was a legal period. In particular, there were laws now about privacy and security which meant that legally documents could not flow as freely as they once had.

Mr. Ramishvili monologued me at length on why present Wallenberg research efforts were a wild goose chase. He enthused that the few tentative opinions I expressed were not serious and unprofessional. His attitude was that the whole Wallenberg search was a make work project fabricated by researchers with nothing better to do with their time. Furthermore, he soliloquyed that this effort that he considered so pointless had nonetheless been allowed to go ahead because of his good graces, his indulgence, which, all the same, had its limits.

All of the non-governmental Russian researchers with whom I spoke gave me the same message. They had got no cooperation from Russian archival officials, and I could expect none.

Elena Kudriakova suggested to me that it was simply impossible for an independent researcher to walk into the FSB archives and expect access to anything. Staff would not give independent researchers even the time of day. There are some researchers working with FSB archives, but they all had approved programs of work authorized by established Russian institutes. Even these researchers did not have access to the archives. The archives were kept in closed stacks. Instead, researchers told the FSB archivists what they wanted, and the archivists might produce the materials requested.

Elena Kudriakova is not a Wallenberg researcher, but Lev Besymenski is. The roadblocks the Russian FSB archivists put in the way of independent researchers he personally experienced. He suggested that there might be some FSB cooperation in an archival search for Wallenberg materials if the Government of Canada made a formal request. When and if the request was approved, Canada could then designate who its researchers would be.

For every foreign prisoner held at Vladimir prison, the Soviets kept three parallel files: a personal file, an operative file and an investigative file. Researchers who went to Vladimir prison in September 1990 found that by then all these foreign prisoner files had been transferred to the KGB archives in Moscow.[8] So getting access to these archives is crucial for Wallenberg research.

Vyacheslav Nikinov who produced so much about Wallenberg and others at the time of Bakatin explained to me the techniques he and Bakatin used to get information they wanted. A story he told me that illustrates their manner of operation is that of Alexander Solzhenitsyn about whom Bakatin also wanted to release information. The chief KGB archivist at the time said that the

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[8]. Soviet International Joint Commission on the Fate and Whereabout of Raoul Wallenberg, September 5, 1990, Principal Findings six and seven.

KGB had nothing about Solzhenitsyn in their files. So Bakatin fired the archivist. The second in command said the same thing. So he too was fired. It was only after these two dismissals that Bakatin got information from the third in the chain of authority that there was indeed information in the archives about Solzhenitsyn.

What was distinctive about those days was that Nikinov and Bakatin were not just researchers, but people in authority, and they used that authority to seek out material aggressively rather than to hide it or just do nothing. It was clear to Nikinov that there was no comparable situation today, and he had two explanations for the shift.

One was the deconsolidation of power. Ambassador Hallqvist had pointed out to me that President Boris Yeltsin himself had promised Russian cooperation in the search for Wallenberg. I reminded Nikinov of that promise. Nikinov observed that Yeltsin says all sorts of things that just disappear into thin air, not because of hypocrisy on his part, but because the institutional mechanisms to translate the will of the President into action have disintegrated. Each bureaucracy has become a power into itself, doing what it wants, rather than what the President wants.

The second was the backlash against Bakatin. Within the FSB, Bakatin is now widely seen as a traitor. Recent published KGB memoirs all denounce Bakatin. The main sticking point was not the revelations about Wallenberg, but rather the disclosure of the bugging of the American embassy, something spy officials believe should never have been disclosed. The backlash means that the aggressive search for information in security files and their disclosure which Bakatin led are actively discouraged.

Research into psychiatric institutions was left to private researchers who ran into a Russian brick wall. Yet, that

research may well bear fruit. For instance, the Swedish doctor Nana Swartz understood the Soviet cardiologist Alexander Miasnikov to have told her that Raoul Wallenberg was in a mental hospital in Moscow. There was information from other witnesses to the same effect.

Yuri and Ljuba Savienko of the Independent Psychiatric Association of Moscow informed me that their association had formed a committee to look for Raoul Wallenberg. This search was at the request of Guy Von Dardel, and financed by a grant from Tetra Pak, a Swedish firm.

The Psychiatric Association committee had visited a number of psychiatric institutions which had housed political prisoners in the days of the Soviet Union. The committee had gone through the records of these institutions looking for an indication that Raoul Wallenberg might have been there. However, access was barred to the records of Kazan mental hospital in Tartarstan, the psychiatric hospital with the largest number of political prisoner, the hospital which was most likely to have housed Wallenberg. They had received permission to access the records from the Chief Psychiatrist of the Ministry of Health, but for the head of the Kazan mental institute, that authority was not sufficient. He wanted authority from someone higher up in the chain before he would allow access.

The Savienkos traced the decline from the days of Bakatin in cooperation of Russian officials with the search for Wallenberg to the war in Chechnya. The violations of human rights committed by the Russian government during the war in Chechnya were roundly condemned by human rights organizations both inside and outside Russia. The result was a breakdown in relations between the Russian government and human rights organizations. Since the war, the Russian government has been less willing to cooperate with human rights organizations across the board, including in archival research on Wallenberg.

Alexander Kartsev said that figuring out what is in FSB archives is difficult. There are no published indexes. When archivists do not wish to disclose something, they do not say that they have it and will not disclose it, but rather that they do not have it. One can surmise that certain documents must exist, but there have been periods of document destruction and it becomes difficult to be sure which documents that must have existed at one time survived these various destruction binges. The document destructions are themselves not properly documented. Kartsev surmised that at the very least there would be undisclosed records in FSB archives from the period when Wallenberg was in Hungary, since the KGB would have had agents in Hungary at the time reporting to them. These documents would not likely have been destroyed. Yet they have not been disclosed.

The dissimulating behaviour of archivists was confirmed by Anatoly Prokopienko, former Director, Special Archives of Moscow in an article in Izvestia of September 25, 1997. Prokopienko wrote in Isvestia that some of the files that the Swedish Working Group had asked for and been told by Russian archivists could not be found he personally had seen. One example he gave was the file of Count Tolstoy-Kutusov.

Count Tolstoy-Kutusov worked at the Swedish legation at Budapest when Raoul Wallenberg was there. The Count was later identified as a Soviet agent. Before publication of the Prokopienko article, the Swedish Working Group on Raoul Wallenberg had asked Russian archivists for their file on the Count and were told it could not be found. After the publication of the Prokopienko article, the Swedish Working Group again asked for the file of Count Tolstoy-Kutusov. This time it was made available.

Nikita Petrov told me that the presidential commission on Soviet archives headed by the late Dmitri Volkogonov of which he was part had in 1992 made a tentative recommendation that the KGB

archives and the Presidential archives be transferred to the state archives where they would be organized and accessible to researchers. However, after lobbying from FSB officials, the recommendation was dropped. The issue of what to do with the Presidential and KGB archives was left unresolved. His practical experience as a member of Memorial seeking access to the archives for work about Wallenberg was that officials gave him absolutely no cooperation.

From the foreign researchers in Moscow, Ambassador Hallqvist, Guy von Dardel, Marvin Makinen and Susan Mesinai, I heard about the Vladimir saga. Vladimir is a place Raoul Wallenberg is likely to have been detained if he survived 1947 because Vladimir was the prison in the Soviet gulag where foreign political prisoners were kept. Furthermore, if Wallenberg was in Vladimir from 1947, he would have been detained in a cell without another prisoner, a single cell, and not under his own name. Marvin Makinen had proposed going through all the records of Vladimir from 1947 to 1972 to identify those cells where there were was only one prisoner. Prison officials had agreed in writing in September 1996 to allow this to happen.

However, when the group arrived in Vladimir, access was denied. Apparently, there had been a change in personnel somewhere up the chain of command since the original permission had been granted, and prison officials wanted a new written permission before they would grant access. As a result of representations Ambassador Hallqvist made to the Foreign Ministry, prison officials relented, to an extent. Access would be allowed, but photocopying of prison cards, for which there had also previously been permission, would be forbidden. Photocopying was necessary because the research team wished to enter the data from the cards into a computer for the purpose of analyzing the data. The number of relevant cards was in the order of 100,000. It was impossible, within the time the research team had available in Vladimir to enter all that information on computers. Photocopies

of the cards were necessary so that the data could be entered into computers over time.

The reason Russian officials gave to forbid photocopying was privacy concerns, that the permission of all those named in the cards, or their relatives, if dead, had to be sought before photocopying could be permitted. In protest against the refusal to allow photocopying, the foreign research group and their Russian Memorial colleagues left Vladimir with the work undone, on Sunday March 9.

In advance of the March 1997 trip to Vladimir, Marvin Makinen and Susan Mesinai had requested the files of 83 gulag prisoners who had given testimony about Raoul Wallenberg, to assist in verifying their testimony. Of the 83 files requested, only 15 were handed over in March 1997, and some and some of those 15 had been previously handed over already in September 1996.

In January 1998, the Russians relented, allowing photocopying of records and giving access to some 100 files. The analysis of the photocopied records and the investigation of the accessed files is now under way.

These incidents illustrate that the cooperation of the Russians with even the Swedish working group has been less than fulsome. When it comes to independent researchers operating outside of the umbrella of the Swedish working group, there has been systematic stonewalling. Dr. Lev Besymenski, Yuri and Ljuba Savienko of the Independent Psychiatric Association of Moscow, Arseni Roginsky of Memorial, journalist Nikita Petrov, and Vadim Birstein, to name a few, have had their work on the fate of Raoul Wallenberg totally frustrated by Russian officials.

Marvin Makinen, although he was obviously not pleased with these developments, had an explanation for them. It was not that long ago that officials could be executed for revealing the

information that his working group had sought. Even today, officials can be fired for indiscretions. Especially at the lower levels, many of the officials who were saying no to everyone at the time of the Soviet Union remain in place. The Soviet tradition was secrecy, not openness. It takes a good deal of procedural legwork to overcome, if it can be overcome at all, the inclination to coverup learned over decades.

Ambassador Hallqvist had his own explanation for the change from the days of Bakatin, the shift in Russian politics. This was also the explanation the late Lars-Åke Nilsson, then Swedish ambassador to London, gave me when I saw him there. Wallenberg research is seen by the Russians as basically a facet of diplomatic relations with the West. Disclosure of Wallenberg documents flourished at a time when Russian relations with the West were warm. The eagerness to cooperate on Wallenberg research waned as Russian relations with the West cooled. Now, politically, in Russia it is not considered astute, not in Russia's best interests, to be too friendly with the West. This cooling of relations has impacted every corner of Western Russian relations, including Wallenberg research.

Since the days of Bakatin, there has not been any independent effort or initiative of the Russians to find out what happened to Wallenberg. Russian officials today are far from being the driving force in Wallenberg research. The recent Russian official effort has been one of going along, less than wholeheartedly, with the Swedish effort. And that is all.

The Russian working group appeared willing to cooperate with the Swedish working group only and no one else. As I wrote, I could not even meet with any of its members. The chair had resigned and the others were inaccessible.

If the Russian working group was not totally passive, its activity paled in comparison with the activity of the Swedish

working group. The Vladimir incident was telling. The Vladimir research taking place the week I was there brought together three of the five members of the Swedish working group, as well as a number of independent researchers associated with that group. Though the research was on Russian soil, none of the members of the Russian working group was participating in it.

Russian official cooperation will be satisfactory only when every qualified researcher who is doing work on Wallenberg whether associated with the Swedish working group or not, is satisfied. For now, that is far from being the case.

In one sense, it may not matter with whom Russian officials cooperate, as long as they cooperate with someone. The truth about Wallenberg, even if told to only one person, can, through that one person, be spread round the world.

In another sense, it matters very much who it is Russian officials decide to help. Despite all the time and effort the Swedish working group spent on the Wallenberg file, which is substantial, they do not have the final answers. More work, other work, has to be done. Russian cooperation with the Swedish working group has not necessarily meant cooperation with this other work.

Furthermore, any research benefits from a variety of approaches. The truth in any area of research is best found by different researchers trying different techniques to get at the truth. Russian officials, by providing cooperation with only those researchers working through the Swedish working group, closed off this variety of approaches.

As well, any research to be convincing must be verifiable. That means not only producing the documents on which the Swedish working group relied, but also replicating the access that it has had.

IV. Swedish Diligence

The Swedish government has failed to do all that it could do to help Raoul Wallenberg. There was the continued insistence of the Swedish ambassador to Moscow in 1945 and 1946, Staffan Söderblom, when dealing with the Soviet authorises about Raoul Wallenberg, that Raoul Wallenberg died of an auto accident in 1945, even though Söderblom had received information to the contrary from the very start.

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Dekanozov sent a message to the Swedish embassy in Moscow on January 16, 1945 that Raoul Wallenberg had been found and was in the care of the Russian troops in Budapest. Ambassador Söderblom seemed aware of the detention of Raoul Wallenberg in February 1945 since he sent a telegram on February 14 to the Swedish Foreign office, suggesting that Raoul Wallenberg and other members of the legation be instructed to take up contact with the new (Communist) Hungarian government. He wrote "some information of this kind seems even more suitable (for Wallenberg) since Wallenberg probably has not gotten the least sign of life from home."

The Swedish Foreign Office rejected the suggestion, stating by return telegram of February 17, 1945: "If you can get connection with Wallenberg...transmit our thanks and best wishes from the family and the information that instructions will be given when Danielsson has been found." Carl Ivan Danielsson had been the Swedish minister to Hungary.

Alexandra Kollontay, the Soviet ambassador Sweden, told Ingrid Günther, the wife of Swedish foreign minister Christian Günther, shortly after Raoul Wallenberg's arrest that Raoul was safe in Moscow and would be back. She added that it were best if no fuss were made about the matter.[9]

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[9]. See Elenore Lester "Wallenberg: The Man in the Iron Web" Prentice Hall, 1982, page 13.

Despite all this information, Ambassador Söderblom reported to Stockholm on April 19, 1945 that "the Russians will be unable to discover what happened to Raoul Wallenberg, that it was possible, "in the event of his having been involved in a fatal car accident or murdered...that Raoul Wallenberg has disappeared without a trace." In response, the Foreign Ministry in Stockholm instructed Ambassador Söderblom to call on Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Dekanozov to ask the Soviets to take urgent action to find Raoul Wallenberg. Ambassador Söderblom did so, on April 24, 1945, but in handing over the letter of request to Dekanozov, Söderblom stated that he presumed that Raoul Wallenberg died in a car accident.

An American telegram sent September 20, 1945 to the embassy in Moscow from Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of State in Washington states that the Swedish Foreign Office "has obtained from reliable Hungarian source information Raoul Wallenberg still alive." The telegram says further, in a portion that has a line through it, that the Swedish Foreign Office "feels that even if the info is true the Soviets will never produce Wallenberg alive."

Ambassador Söderblom met Josef Stalin about Raoul Wallenberg on June 13, 1946. Despite what the Swedish Foreign Office told the Americans they thought they knew, at the meeting between Söderblom and Stalin, Söderblom expressed his personal conviction that Raoul Wallenberg had fallen victim to an accident or had been kidnapped. He said that he accepted that the Soviet authorities had no information on Raoul Wallenberg's fate.

The Swedish legation in Moscow in 1945 actively discouraged the American legation in Moscow from helping to find out what happened to Raoul Wallenberg. The then American ambassador to Moscow, Averell Harriman, sent a telegram to the Secretary of State in Washington D.C. on April 12, 1945 stating "The Swedes

say that they have no reason to think that the Russians are not doing what they can (about Raoul Wallenberg) and they do not feel that an approach to the Soviet Foreign Office on our part would be desirable."

Ulf Barck-Holst, who as chargé d'affaires in the Swedish embassy in Moscow after Söderblom left, found that whenever he raised the question of Raoul Wallenberg with Soviet officials, the Soviets continually raised the names of those they wanted from Sweden. The Swiss[10], the Italians and the Danes had all got back diplomats simply by giving Russians in exchange. The Swedes had Russian spies in their control and did return them eventually to the Soviets, but asked for nothing in return.

Östen Undén was then Swedish Foreign Minister. When Per Anger, one of Raoul Wallenberg's colleagues at the Swedish legation in Budapest, asked Undé_ why Sweden did not ask for Wallenberg in return for the Russian spies the Swedes gave to the Soviets, Undé_ replied only that "The Swedish government does not do such things."[11]

Bernhard Rensinghoff, one of the German prisoners of war imprisoned with Raoul Wallenberg in Lubianka, on his release testified that Raoul Wallenberg discussed with Rensinghoff, Wallenberg's interrogations. At one interrogation session in Lefortovo prison just before Wallenberg was moved back to Lubianka, the interrogating commissar said to Wallenberg that the best proof of his guilt was the fact that neither the Swedish embassy in Moscow nor the Swedish government had done anything on his behalf. If the Swedish government had been at all interested, they would have been in contact a long time ago.

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[10]. For the Swiss, see Goerg Barany *The Current Stage of Research on Raoul Wallenberg* in "The Holocaust in Hungary: Fifty Years Later" edited by Randolph Braham and Attila Pók, 1997, Columbia University Press, New York, at page 580

[11]. See Elenore Lester "Wallenberg: The Man in the Iron Web" Prentice Hall, 1982, pages 134 and 135

While this statement of the interrogating commissar is no proof of what the Swedes did or did not do, it illustrates the use to which Swedish inactivity was put, and the value that Swedish activity would have had in that period in freeing Wallenberg.

The Soviet embassy counsellor in Ankara, Turkey, Pavel Erzine, attempted, in the summer of 1955, to arrange discussions between the Soviet leadership and the Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander about the possibility that "they (the Soviets) will repatriate him (Raoul Wallenberg) if he is still alive". Erzine used the Finnish diplomat Åke Frey, also stationed in Ankara, as an intermediary. When Frey returned to Helsinki, Finland, in November 1956, the Soviet contacts continued through Viktor Vladimirov, a second secretary at the Soviet embassy in Helsinki. Sverker Aström for the Swedish Foreign Office refused to have the Swedish government enter into the informal discussions.[12]

The Soviets suggested in 1964 a prisoner exchange of Raoul Wallenberg for Soviet spy detained by Sweden, Swedish Air Force Colonel Stig Wennerström. The Swedish government rejected the idea of an exchange. The capture of Wennerström was an opportunity thrown away. Nothing was requested from the Soviets. There were no negotiations. There was total inactivity; complete disinterest in using this opportunity to pursue the fate of Raoul Wallenberg.

Susanne Berger, a German independent researcher on the Raoul Wallenberg case who lives in Washington D.C, in an article published in a Swedish newspaper in the fall of 1997, wrote, in a translation she has provided me: "Sweden also essentially ignored many of the witness testimonies which indicate that Raoul Wallenberg might have survived beyond 1947. In many cases testimonies sat on official's desks for years without actions

12. Pentti Peltoniemi, "Suomi sai salaviestin Wallenbergistä" ("Finland got a secret message about Wallenberg)", Helsinki Sanomat, March 23, 1997 (translation by the author).

being taken until the witness died. The examples are too numerous to cite here in detail..."[13]

I was in Riga on November 15, 1996 to meet Hans Magnusson, the head of the Swedish working group on Raoul Wallenberg, who is also the Swedish ambassador to Latvia. I was in Stockholm the week of January 12 to 19th, 1997 and met with the colleagues of Hans Magnusson in the Swedish working group, Martin Hallqvist, Lage Olsen and Guy von Dardel. Martin Hallqvist is an Ambassador in the Division for Central and Eastern Europe of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the Government of Sweden. Lage Olson is a Counsellor for Strategic Export Control also in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Guy Von Dardel is Raoul Wallenberg's brother. He lives in Geneva, but was in Stockholm the same week. I also saw in Stockholm that week Susanne Berger; Per Anger, one of Raoul Wallenberg's colleagues at the Swedish legation in Budapest; Sonja Sonnenfeld of the Raoul Wallenberg Institute and Daniel Backman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives; and Pentti Peltoniemi, a Finnish journalist doing research on the Finnish connection through diplomat Frey to the Wallenberg case.

Every member of the Swedish working group I found to be personally open and accessible. The same cannot be said for Swedish archives. While many Swedish archival documents about Raoul Wallenberg are available, not all are. The Swedish government has major collections of Raoul Wallenberg material in its Foreign Office (UD) archives and in its Security Police (SÄPO) archives. The Foreign Office archives have been mostly, but not completely disclosed. The Security Police archives were off limits to researchers till September 1997. A study of those archives in September 1997 shows them to be incomplete, with several crucial omissions. The omitted material is presumably

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13. "Alla dokument maste fram i ljuset" May 11, 1997, Dagens Nyheter

14. Susanne Berger "Raoul Wallenberg File, SÄPO: Preliminary Report", October 8, 1997

elsewhere in files not disclosed to researchers.[14]

Swedish Cabinet level documents, as a rule, are disclosed after forty years. However, some documents are considered so sensitive that they are not disclosed even after the forty year period has passed. For instance, Swedish government cabinet documents refusing the 1964 proposed Wallenberg/Wennerström exchange are up to now undisclosed.

The Swedish working group fell victim to inordinate delay caused by exaggerated deference to Russian non-disclosures or lags in disclosure. Other than conducting interviews, the group neither engaged in research nor contracted research. In particular, the group members did not themselves conduct archival research nor arrange for it to be done by anyone else.

At the end of the day, the work of the Swedish working group has to be judged both on content and on process. In terms of process, while their personal openness was commendable, archival restrictions were not. As well, seven years is far too long to complete their work. The work has not been given the urgency nor the priority Raoul Wallenberg deserved.

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14. Susanne Berger "Raoul Wallenberg File, SÄPO: Preliminary Report", October 8, 1997

V. Archival Research

There is need for further archival disclosure not only in Sweden and Russia, but also in the United Kingdom, the United States, Hungary, Germany, Israel and the United Nations in New York. Generally, security service information in all countries about Raoul Wallenberg in all countries has been accessible with difficulty, if at all. All of the security services suffer from an institutional bias to secrecy that hinders research into the fate of Raoul Wallenberg.

i) The United States

For the United States, there is an outstanding Freedom of Information Act request made for blacked out sections of Central Intelligence Agency documents released in December 1993. Answers to US Freedom of Information act requests have been known to take up to six years.

The Central Intelligence Agency has, as well, information yet to be disclosed about the American War Refugee Board, about Iver Olsen, the Swedish representative of the War Refugee Board, and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Hungary. Olsen was an agent of the OSS in Hungary attached to the US embassy.

The U.S. government has refused a Freedom of Information Act request made by Susanne Berger for documents about Greville Wynne. Greville Wynne was a British spy sentenced by the Soviets in 1963 to eight years in prison, but then exchanged a year later for a Soviet spy, Konon Molody. John Bierman recounts[15] that Wynne recalled in 1980 (presumably to Bierman) an exchange in Lubianka prison in 1963 with a prisoner who identified himself as Swedish. Once Wynne returned from the USSR in 1964, he would have been debriefed by the British government and that debriefing information presumably would have been passed on to the United

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15. John Bierman "Righteous Gentile" Viking: New York, 1981, at page 173

States government. That debriefing may contain more detailed information about the Wynne/Swedish prisoner conversations. Susanne Berger has appealed the Freedom of Information Act refusal.

ii) United Kingdom

I wrote to the United Kingdom Office of the Public Service in December 1996 under the U.K. Code of Practice on Access to Government Information. I asked for information in their records about Raoul Wallenberg; the impact of the activities of the Wallenberg companies during World War II on the mission of Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest, Hungary; any link between Raoul Wallenberg and the Wallenberg companies on behalf of the Allies; British discretionary oversight related to the activities of the Wallenberg companies during World War II; World War II Ministry of Economic Warfare files related to Sweden; World War II Ministry of Economic Warfare files related to Hungary; files about either Hungary or Sweden under the classification "Safe Haven: Neutral Trade Department"; debriefings of Greville Wynne; records of conversations and memoranda between Winston Churchill and Franklin Delano Roosevelt that relate to Raoul Wallenberg or to the mission of Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest; the C Bureau Allied Swedish network during World War II involving Lieutenant William Denham; an Allied mission to Hungary involving a separate peace with the Allies that mention either Raoul Wallenberg or Per Anger; and a "liquidatsia" request for Raoul Wallenberg in files relating to KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky.

The reason why some of the information was requested is self evident. Other requests may need explanation.

There was a request about Wallenberg in 1947 for what was called a "liquidatsia". Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky wrote to Vyacheslav Molotov, then Vice Chair of the Council of Ministers and Deputy Prime Minister, by memorandum dated May 13, 1947 to prevail upon Viktor Abakumov, chief of the Smersh

military counter espionage, to report on the substance of the case and propose its settlement. The Russian word used for "settlement" was "liquidatsia".

This request has been interpreted variously as a request to liquidate Wallenberg, a request to obliterate all traces of Wallenberg in the Soviet records, or a request to clear up the case of Raoul Wallenberg by answering Swedish government requests about him. Information the British obtained from KGB defector Gordievsky may include details of this "liquidatsia".

There is, of course, no end of theories about Wallenberg, what happened to him and why. The only answer to all of the theories is hard facts. Because some of the theories revolve around what Wallenberg was doing and for whom before he was captured, the facts that must be ascertained include those about his activities before he was captured.

Some of the information requested was directed to ascertaining these sorts of facts. Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance and what I consider to be the half hearted efforts of the West to have him released are a downward trajectory which can only be explained by his upward trajectory before his capture.

The US News and World Report published an article on May 13, 1996 suggesting that Raoul Wallenberg was operating as an American spy in Budapest under Swedish consulate cover. In one sense, whether Wallenberg was a spy or not may not matter, since the paranoic Stalinist system of the Soviet Union after the War would have thought of him as a spy, even if he was not.

In another sense, it may matter a good deal. If he was indeed a spy, the West may not have put every effort it could have done into releasing Wallenberg because exerting that effort would have resulted in acknowledging the extent of Wallenberg's complicity in the West's intelligence activities.

Lieutenant William Denham was part of an Allied Swedish intelligence network during World War II. Denham, himself, left Sweden before Raoul Wallenberg went to Budapest. Nonetheless, if Wallenberg was doing intelligence work for the Allies, his name and his work would presumably show up in the network files.

The Wallenberg family companies were involved in supplying the Nazi war effort.[16] An obvious line of inquiry is the connection between Raoul Wallenberg's involvement with the Allies and the involvement of other family members with the Axis. Was Raoul's involvement with the Allies some form of quid pro quo from the family?

After the War broke out Marcus Wallenberg, cousin to Raoul, became head of the Swedish trade mission to Great Britain. Jacob Wallenberg, brother of Marcus, became head of the Swedish trade mission to Nazi Germany. Was Raoul's involvement in Hungary part of a Wallenberg family effort to maintain overall neutrality by helping all sides at once?

The Swedish government in general and the Wallenberg cousins in particular had economic interests in Hungary which the mission of Raoul Wallenberg, by attempting to save Swedish associates in Hungary, initially supported. However, Raoul Wallenberg went far beyond protecting Swedish business associates in Hungary. By, from the Swedish and cousins' perspective, going overboard, did Raoul Wallenberg hurt rather than help the Swedish and the cousins' business interests? Was it potential harm to business interests that made the cousins and the government of Sweden so unassertive in attempting to determine Raoul Wallenberg's fate and whereabouts? Several of the records requested try to get at information that would answer these questions.

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16. See Elinore Lester titled "Wallenberg: The Man in the Iron Web", Chapter Four.

British intelligence in Europe during the War was sophisticated and detailed. Although the position of Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest was financed by the War Refugee Board, an American entity set up by executive order of President Roosevelt to save potential victims of Nazi persecution, the functioning of Wallenberg in Budapest must have inevitably appeared in British war time records. Those records needs to be made public if we are to explain fully the fate and whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg.

Kate Crowe, Open Government Enquiry Unit, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom, by letter dated February 1997 wrote to tell me that security and intelligence agencies had searched their records in response to previous requests for information about Raoul Wallenberg and the records contain nothing that is not already known about his fate. The implication of the letter from Ms. Crowe is that the records do contain information about Raoul Wallenberg, but in the judgment of the security and intelligence agencies, that information is already known. The statement prompts three responses.

This first is to ask what possible objection there could be from the security and intelligence agencies to the release of information in their possession if that information is already known? Presumably, the reason why security and intelligence agencies refuse to disclose information is so that secrets can be kept. However, if there is no secret to be kept, there is no justification for the refusal to disclose.

The second is to request the opportunity to allow independent Wallenberg researchers to make their own judgment whether or not the information about Raoul Wallenberg in the possession of British security and intelligence agencies is already known. Two different documents containing superficially the same information may have slight variations which to a trained researcher would be fraught with significance. It is unreasonable to ask the public

simply to accept an official judgment that information behind closed doors is already known, and not allow independent researchers to make that judgment themselves.

The third is to point out the difficult nature of Wallenberg research. The activities of Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest during World War II, and his fate immediately after the War are generally of greater interest now than they were at the time. In retrospect one can say that Raoul Wallenberg was one of the great heroes of the twentieth century, the paradigmatic human rights activist, and his disappearance one of the great crimes of this century.

However, at the time, his feats were not public. Even the Holocaust itself, while it was being perpetrated, was little known, covered up or wilfully ignored throughout the globe. An awareness of the heroics of Wallenberg at the time he was accomplishing them would have meant a full awareness of the Holocaust at the time it was happening. Given the blind eye the world turned to the Holocaust while it was being inflicted, the efforts of Wallenberg to save people from the Holocaust made no contemporaneous general impression.

Refusal to confront the horrors of the Holocaust did not end with the end of the War. It was years before the full scope of the tragedy sunk into public consciousness. Indeed, one can say that even today we have not fully grasped the enormity of the evil of the Holocaust and are still attempting to do so. Confronting the Holocaust has been a gargantuan effort, a work of years, even decades.

Furthermore, the anti-Semitism that led to the Holocaust, while it manifested itself in its most virulent form in Nazi Germany, was part of the then global popular culture. That global anti-Semitism did not end with the defeat of Nazi Germany. It continued in mitigated form and only slowly dissipated as older

people with fixed anti-Semitic biasses were replaced by a new generation, and as the awful, lethal consequences of anti-Semitism became fully known. Post war anti-Semitism and the Holocaust were in a tug of war, the anti-Semitism generating resistance to facing the Holocaust or minimizing its significance while knowledge of the Holocaust was generating opposition to anti-Semitism and racism and promoting respect for human rights values. From today's perspective one can say that it is knowledge of the Holocaust that won this tug of war. However, in the early years after the War, it was polite, vestigial anti-Semitism that had the upper hand.

It was in Nazi Germany that eliminationist anti-Semitism, the notion that Jews must be killed, was the most prevalent. But elsewhere, including amongst the Allies, social anti-Semitism, the notion that the Jews were different from the rest of us, that their fate was not as important to us as the fate of others, was pervasive.

What that meant for Raoul Wallenberg was that not only his feats during the War at the time he accomplished them passed with little notice. After the war, his disappearance seemed to the public at large in general and Allied officials in particular of little consequence. The enormity of the crime against him, the enormity of the crime against humanity by his enforced disappearance, only became apparent years after the War when the full shock and horror of the Holocaust registered.

In consequence, it is unreasonable to expect to find in British security and intelligence archives a Raoul Wallenberg file that would set out what he was doing during the War and what may have happened to him during the War. As surprising as it may seem from today's perspective, the efforts of Wallenberg during the War and his fate after the War, to all appearances, did not seem important enough to British security and intelligence at the time to justify separate tracking of his activities and fate.

The result is that there is, in all probability, no separate Raoul Wallenberg file that one can pull off the shelves of British security and intelligence services. What information there would be in security and intelligence files about Raoul Wallenberg would likely to buried in other files, files about British Russian relations, British Hungarian relations, trading with the enemy files, Swedish undercover operative files and so on. Doing a thorough and proper search of British security and intelligence files for information about Raoul Wallenberg would be a time consuming task requiring the attention and knowledge of experts in the field.

I have no reason to believe that mammoth task has ever been undertaken. My impression is that British security and intelligence archivists have cast a cursory glance at the most obvious sources of information, found little or nothing, and left it at that.

What needs to be done is more than garner the bland assurances of professional security and intelligence archivists. Expert Wallenberg researchers need access to security and intelligence files to comb through them for relevant information. This to my mind can be done in one of two ways.

One is for the British government to commission research in its security and intelligence files on the activities and fate of Raoul Wallenberg. The commissioned researchers would have access to all security and intelligence files without restriction, with authority to release all Wallenberg information publicly.

The other is to allow unrestricted, open stack access of security and intelligence files to any qualified Wallenberg private researcher, subject only to a confidentiality undertaking. The undertaking would be not to disclose any information obtained through this research that was irrelevant to the Wallenberg case.

This was all communicated to the United Kingdom government. The government simply stated in a letter of reply dated May 6, 1997 that it is the long standing policy of the government not to grant access of this sort to their records.

Though responsibility for the disappearance of Raoul Wallenberg must rest squarely on the shoulders of the Soviet Union, responsibility for discovering what happened to him rests on the whole global community. The governments of other countries are ill placed to press the Russian government to disclose information in Russian files about Raoul Wallenberg if these other countries do not disclose information in their files about Raoul Wallenberg.

The Russian excuses for non-disclosure based on security or private concerns can hardly be countered as long as other governments refuse to disclose what they have in their files about Raoul Wallenberg, based on security or privacy concerns. Other governments' full disclosure of information in their files about Raoul Wallenberg is necessary not only to shed full light on the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. It is necessary also in order to maintain credibility when pressing the Russians to disclose all.

VI. The 1947 Death Hypothesis

Given the incomplete access to information that now exists, it is impossible to come to any firm conclusion about what happened to Raoul Wallenberg. There are two hypotheses. One is that he died in 1947. The other is that he survived 1947 and lived in the Soviet gulag for many years after. There is no conclusive evidence to support either hypothesis.

The 1947 death theory is in fact three theories. One theory is that Raoul Wallenberg was shot and buried. Another theory is that he was poisoned and cremated. A third theory is that he died of a heart attack during interrogation.

All these theories cannot be true. The fact that all three theories have currency raises questions whether any one of them is true. The shooting theory, the poisoning theory and the heart attack theory rather than reinforcing each other, cancel each other out. The shooting theory puts in doubt the poisoning theory and the heart attack theory; the poisoning theory puts in doubt the shooting theory and heart attack theory; and the heart attack theory puts in doubt the poisoning theory and the shooting theory.

The shooting theory is that Raoul Wallenberg was shot at Kommunarka near Moscow and buried in the woods there. There is the evidence of Sasovsky, the commander of a prison camp near Moscow, who, when drunk in 1950 or 51, boasted of taking part in the shooting of a Jewish swine from Sweden. However, this sort of evidence, from a drunk who does not mention Raoul Wallenberg specifically, is of no better quality, and, indeed of far worse quality, than the evidence that Raoul Wallenberg survived 1947.

There was a conversation Alexander Jakovlev had in 1989 with Kruytchkov after a Politbureau meeting. According to Jakovlev, Kruytchkov told Jakovlev Raoul Wallenberg was shot. However, this conversation, forty two years after Raoul Wallenberg's

alleged shooting, is not evidence of anything, but is rather mere rumour mongering.

Indeed, virtually all of the evidence about the death of Raoul Wallenberg is of this nature. It does not come from anyone who has direct knowledge of the case from personal experience. It is guesses and speculations passed on from one person to another which, through enough repetition, acquire the status of fact. Former KGB official Kondrashov in the spring of 1947 interpreted at the interrogation of a prisoner dressed in a suit. The lead interrogator was Kuzmishin. Some months after the interrogation, Kondrashov asked a colleague what had happened to the person interrogated and was told that he had been shot. Kondrashov did not understand at the time that the person in question was Raoul Wallenberg, but found it out later the same year.

However, this story raises more questions than it answers. How did Kondrashov find out that the person concerned was Raoul Wallenberg? When? From whom? Who told Kondrashov that the person concerned was shot? How did the teller come to know that information?

In support of the poisoning theory is the evidence of a former intelligence officer who alleges he saw a file on Raoul Wallenberg that was created at the time of his death. Death was from a heart attack induced by mental torture and medical experiments. The source speculated that Pavel Sudoplatov's unit, the Administration for Special Tasks, was involved, including the laboratory run by Grigori Moiseyvich Mayranovsky, which undertook toxicological research and also executed important victims by poison.

Where is this file the source saw? What was the archive in which the file was kept? What has happened to the documents in that archive?

Sudoplatov himself maintained that Raoul Wallenberg may have been killed in Mayranovsky's laboratory and suggested where documents could be found that would establish this murder.[17] These documents have not been located.

One could argue that the interrogation of Raoul Wallenberg's cell mates in late July 1947 and their subsequent isolation support a conclusion that Raoul Wallenberg died in July 1947. However, this treatment of Raoul Wallenberg's cell mates is equally consistent with a Soviet decision that, in future, the identity of Raoul Wallenberg would be disguised within the prison system, that he would become a numbered rather than named prisoner, and that he would be kept in isolation.

Alternatively, the interrogations may not have signalled any decision about Raoul Wallenberg at all. The Vyshinsky note of 1947 stated that Raoul Wallenberg is "not known to have been on Soviet territory". The interrogations may have served only the purpose of ensuring that this bald faced lie could be told without fear of immediate contradiction.

Soviet archival record show there to have been a letter dated July 17, 1947, from Viktor Abakumov, chief of the Smersh military counter espionage, to Vyacheslav Molotov, then Vice Chair of the Council of Ministers and Deputy Prime Minister about Raoul Wallenberg. The letter itself is missing. July 17, 1947 was also the date of the Smoltsov note which said that Raoul Wallenberg had died of a heart attack the previous night.

Obviously what is in a missing letter can be only a matter of speculation. It is an indication of the flimsiness of the evidence in support of the 1947 death conclusion that this mere

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17. See "Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness - A Soviet Spymaster" Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatoli Sudoplatov, with Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schecter, Little Brown and Company, 1994, pages 265 to 276

coincidence of dates, in the absence of the Abakumov letter, is used to argue that Raoul Wallenberg was murdered in 1947.

As mentioned earlier in this report, Vyshinsky wrote to Abakumov on July 7, 1947 asking Abakumov give him the information already known to foreigners about the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. That information was to be used to prepare a reply to the Swedish government which had been pressing the Foreign Ministry about Raoul Wallenberg.

The most obvious possibility is that in the July 17 letter Abakumov was only responding to that request. The reply from Abakumov went to Molotov rather than Vyshinsky because Vyshinsky was operating under Molotov and on Molotov's behalf. It most likely contained exactly what Vyshinsky asked it to contain and nothing else.

As long as there are unanswered questions about the fate of Raoul Wallenberg, as long as there is research to be done, archives to be searched, files to be disclosed, a 1947 death conclusion operates at cross purposes with this research. A 1947 death conclusion takes the wind out of the sails of the effort to answer unanswered questions. As well, the unanswered questions make the 1947 death conclusion implausible.

VII. 1947 Survival Hypothesis

The evidence that Raoul Wallenberg survived July, 1947 is compelling. It is as persuasive as the evidence that he died in July, 1947. It is a mistake, based on the present state of evidence, to prefer the hypothesis that Wallenberg died in 1947 over the hypothesis that he survived 1947.

Witness testimony supporting the survival of Raoul Wallenberg beyond 1947 has been rejected on the grounds that Raoul Wallenberg was known and discussed among foreign prisoners during the 1950s, giving rise to second hand, distorted reports; that Raoul Wallenberg may have been confused with others of Swedish nationality; that there were other prisoners called Wallenberg in the gulag system; and that there have been false sightings of other celebrated gulag prisoners. In my view, the testimony of each Raoul Wallenberg witness must be examined and assessed separately. Rejecting witness testimony in the generalized fashion the majority does supports a conclusion already formed, that Wallenberg died in 1947, but cannot itself justify the conclusion.

Although no card was found in Vladimir prison relating to Raoul Wallenberg, the testimony of several of those who claimed to have seen or heard or heard about Raoul Wallenberg's being in Vladimir, mainly from the 1950s, is largely correct with regard to details about their cells and dates of their imprisonment. The information Vladimir witnesses from the early 1950s gave about their fellow witnesses was also on the whole correct.

It has been suggested that the Vladimir prisoners may have been mistaken because Raoul Wallenberg was a well known person in prison; that several Vladimir prisoners had met Raoul Wallenberg in Moscow prisons between 1945 and 1947; and that Vladimir prisoner Henry Thomsen, alias Grossheim-Krisko, was a possible source of error. Henry Thomsen had been an employee at the Swedish Legation in Budapest. He communicated with other

prisoners at Vladimir by knocking and, in so doing, had described himself as a secretary at the Swedish legation. However, the suggested confusion and mistakes of the Vladimir prisoners about Raoul Wallenberg have to be contrasted with their error free testimony about all other matters not related to Raoul Wallenberg.

There are evidentiary statements by witnesses that cannot be discounted. Among these are the testimony of Theodor von Dufving, Zigurds Kruminsh, the Polish prisoners, Varvara Ivanovna Larina, and Alexander Timofeevich Kukin.

Theodor von Dufving recounted how he had encountered in a transit camp in February 1949 on the route to Vorkuta a prisoner dressed in civilian clothes and with his own special accompanying guard. The prisoner was stated to be a Swedish diplomat. The Swede stated: "I have become prisoner due to a great mistake."[18]

Zigurds Kruminsh in 1962 told Marvin Makinen in Cell 2-31 in Vladimir prison in 1962 that Kruminsh had met in the prison a Swedish prisoner who was allegedly arrested "for some kind of intelligence work" and who was "certain" that he would "be well rewarded for his work upon his return home." This statement must be considered in conjunction with that made later to Makinen in a labour camp that "Kruminsh sat (in Vladimir) with "the Swedish prisoner van den Berg."

A number of Polish prisoners, Boguslaw Baj, Jozef Kowalski, Jerzy Cichocki and Josef Markujewski, all held in the Soviet gulag have identified Raoul Wallenberg as a fellow prisoner in the early 50s.[19] All made statements separately and independently of each

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18. Lage Olsen, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Trade Department, Strategic Export Control Division, Government of Sweden, "From Antonas Bogdanas to Isaac Wolfin: A Summary of 16 Witnesses' Relations with Raoul Wallenberg" 1996-03-11, page 2

19. U.S. News and World Report, May 13, 1996

other. The testimony of these prisoners about their detention and camp conditions is supported by their personal files.

Evidence that Raoul Wallenberg had been sentenced, with a sentence to expire after 1947, would have been some evidence that he survived 1947. Two of the Polish witnesses testified that Wallenberg was sentenced. Boguslaw Baj testified that Raoul Wallenberg was given 25 years for espionage. Jerzy Cichocki, another Polish prisoner, testified he, Cichocki, had asked to have Raoul Wallenberg moved to Cichocki's work brigade. Bratsk camp commanders refused the request because Raoul Wallenberg had "a special sentence."

It has been argued that keeping Raoul Wallenberg in a camp would be extremely illogical because of the risk of his coming into contact with other prisoners. However, the Polish witnesses state that they were held in a strict regime, which meant that prisoners could only associate with each other in groups of three or less, that the only topic for discussion was to have been work, and that they were to address each other by the number listed on a patch sewed on to their clothes. If Raoul Wallenberg was indeed in camp with these prisoners, it would not have just been any camp, but a very restricted place.

A person who was a cleaner at the prison hospital recently identified Raoul Wallenberg as a prisoner in an isolation cell in the 1950s.[20] The name of the cleaner is Varvara Ivanova Larina. Her testimony is that a foreign non-German prisoner had been held for a lengthy period in solitary confinement. Although Larina did not know the name of the prisoner, she described his physical features. The person she described has features similar to those of Raoul Wallenberg. She, as well, identified Raoul Wallenberg by selected a photograph of him that had never been in the

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[20]. U.S. News and World Report, May 13, 1996

international press. In any case, at the time she was first interviewed, in 1992, by Marvin Makinen and Nikita Petrov in the office of the chief doctor of Vladimir Prison hospital, Dr. Polinina, Larina knew nothing of the case of Raoul Wallenberg. She remembered the prisoner primarily because of his complaining attitude to prison authorities.

Alexander Timofeevich Kukin, a retired former head guard at Vladimir, as well admitted that a foreign non-German prisoner had ben held in Vladimir for a lengthy period in solitary confinement, in appearance like a photo of Raoul Wallenberg.

The testimony of Abraham Kalinski, a Polish Jew who had spent a number of years in Soviet prisons and camps, including Vladimir prison, was that Raoul Wallenberg was imprisoned in the Soviet Union until 1975. Kalinski claimed to have seen Raoul Wallenberg for the last time in 1959. Kalinski further passed on testimony of Soviet Jewish prisoner Jan Kaplan, prison medical officer Butova and Soviet General Gennadij Kuprianov.

Some of the testimony of Kalinski is undoubtedly false, for instance, that Kuprianov died in prison of torture at the hands of the KGB. Kuprianov in fact died a natural death twenty three years after his release from prison. However, other parts of Kalinski's testimony are correct, in terms of places and dates. The Kalinski testimony is not reliable enough to justify on its own a conclusion of any sort, but it does deserve investigation.

If Wallenberg survived July 19 1947, it is highly likely that his identity would have been disguised within the Soviet system. He would have been given a false name or a number to hide his identity from the prison staff. Numbered prisoners existed to a limited extent especially in the Moscow prisons and Vladimir prison. Stalin's son Vasily was one such prisoner. Another example is the prisoner Boris Menshagin.

An important decision may have been taken in July 1947 about Raoul Wallenberg. The decision may have been to kill him. However, the decision may equally have been to move him from Lubianka, where he was an identified prisoner, to another prison where he would be a numbered and otherwise unidentified prisoner.

A number of witnesses place Raoul Wallenberg in Lefortovo prison in late 1947 and 1948. Finnish citizen Richard Dahm in 1955 told the then Swedish ambassador to Helsinki that in 1948 he was a Soviet prisoner in Vladimir held in a cell with Germans Joachim Vorwerk and Heinz-Helmuth von Hinckeldey. Vorwerk and Hinckeldey told Dahm that they had met Raoul Wallenberg in Lefortovo in September 1947.[21]

Roland Gottlieb, consul at the German embassy in Sofia during the War, was captured by the Soviets in 1944 and held in Lefortovo. At the end of 1947, a co-prisoner advised Gottlieb that Raoul Wallenberg was in Lefortovo.[22] There is substantial additional testimony from other prisoners to the same effect.

A defecting Jewish AVO official (AVO was the acronym for the Hungarian security service) stated in 1984 that he had been given a special assignment in January 1983 as an analyst of some investigative material prior to a planned anti-Zionist trial. A Soviet adviser told him that Raoul Wallenberg was to be used as an important witness.

Igor Prelin, a former KGB press officer, stated that he reviewed materials which indicated that Raoul Wallenberg was to have been used as a Soviet witness in the Nuernberg war crimes trials. He further explained that there existed an agreement between the

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[21]. "Vladimir in Wallenberg Files" page 6

[22]. Irwin Cotler "Summary of Report of International Commission of Inquiry re Fate and Whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg 1947-1990 (May)" Appendix D

former Allies: Russians at Nuernberg were not going to reveal American and British support for Nazi Germany; in turn, the British and Americans would not reveal details of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact or the Katyn massacre. Raoul Wallenberg and others served as guarantees that the deal would be kept.

In 1956, when the Soviets were in the process of concocting what became the Gromyko memorandum, there were active discussions about what the Swedes knew in order to tailor the memorandum to that knowledge. In discussing what the Swedes knew, they considered what Mäntynen knew. Mäntynen was a Finn imprisoned in the Soviet Union between 1948 and 1955. One Soviet Foreign Ministry memorandum dated April 5, 1956 states "According to information from the USSR Minister of the Interior and the KGB, Mäntynen did not meet Raoul Wallenberg while imprisoned in the USSR between 1948 and 1955 and was therefore unable to provide Swedish representatives with any material deserving any attention at all about Raoul Wallenberg." Why would the Soviets be concerned about whether Mäntynen had met or had not met Raoul Wallenberg between 1948 and 1955 if Raoul Wallenberg was already dead in 1947?

I mentioned earlier, in the section on Swedish diligence, the Soviet proposal in 1964 for an exchange of Raoul Wallenberg for a Soviet spy detained by the Swedes, Swedish Air Force Colonel Stig Wennerström. Soviet contact was made through a KGB resident at the Soviet embassy in East Berlin to Carl-Gustaf Swingel, a Swedish businessman living in Berlin at the time.

A 1960 Swedish report put out by two judges of the Swedish Supreme Court concluded that it was probable that Wallenberg was alive and held in Vladimir prison at least in the early 1950's. The judges were Ragner Gyllensward and Per Santessen.[23]

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[23]. See Elenore Lester "Wallenberg: The Man in the Iron Web" Prentice Hall, 1982, page 137

After a conversation in German between the Swedish psychiatrist Nana Swartz and the Soviet cardiologist Alexander Miasnikov in 1961, Nana Swartz understood Alexander Miasnikov to have told her that Raoul Wallenberg was in a mental hospital in Moscow. The then Prime Minister Erlander wrote to Communist Party chair Nikita Khrushchev about the conversation and asked for the return of Raoul Wallenberg. Rolf Sohlman, the then Swedish ambassador to the Soviet Union, at a meeting on February 25, 1961, handed over the letter to Khrushchev, who responded with a verbal harangue. Dr. Miasnikov subsequently wrote to Dr. Swartz insisting that Dr. Swartz had misunderstood him. The two met again on July 10, 1965 and each maintained his/her own version. Dr. Swartz remained "unwaveringly convinced" of the correctness of her version.

Dr. Miasnikov had an interest in changing his story, if Dr. Swartz's version is correct, since Dr. Miasnikov's original admission contradicted official Soviet policy, the policy of his masters. Dr. Miasnikov was not just an ordinary Soviet doctor, but one with close ties to the police and the KGB. If Raoul Wallenberg were alive, there is every chance that Dr. Miasnikov would have met him, and every reason for him to parade the official Soviet line about Raoul Wallenberg when told to do so.

Dr. Swartz, on the other hand, had nothing to gain from her version of the story being correct. As well, a 1986 letter from the daughter of Nana Swartz to Swedish researcher Kenne Fant recounts that she met Dr. Miasnikov when she was a child and she remember him as speaking good German.

If Wallenberg was kept alive, why was he kept alive? Answering this sort of question is difficult, not so much intellectually as morally. The very suggestion that the killing of anyone might somehow make sense is repulsive, reprehensible. It is difficult to try to imagine how people who were murderers and liars would

have behaved towards Raoul Wallenberg. We are ill placed to put ourselves in the shoes of murderers and liars.

Despite that limitation, it is possible to say that there are several good reasons why the Soviets would have kept Raoul Wallenberg alive. One is that evil has its limits. The killing of Raoul Wallenberg would have been such a dastardly act that it must have given even the most bloodthirsty killers pause.

Second, Raoul Wallenberg alive remained a valuable asset to the Soviets. He was always someone who could potentially be exchanged for a person the Soviets wanted abroad.

Third, Raoul Wallenberg could have potentially given testimony in various trials relating to World War II. Indeed, some of the evidence about his survival after 1947 revolves around potential exchanges and potential testimony.

A fourth reason why the Soviets would have kept Raoul Wallenberg alive was the nature of the gulag. Admittedly, in the Soviet Union, people were killed senselessly. As well, they were arrested and kept in prison, simply to keep the gulag going. The gulag and the whole state security apparatus of the Soviet Union depended on the arrest and detention of spies, traitors, and saboteurs to justify its existence. If there were no spies, traitors and saboteurs, they had to be invented. Raoul Wallenberg could have been kept alive in the gulag for no other reason than that the gulag needed people like him, or like the Soviets pretended he was, on order to give the gulag its raison d'être.

This report does not conclude that logically Raoul Wallenberg must have been kept alive or that the present evidence leads to the unequivocal conclusion that Raoul Wallenberg survived 1947, but rather that logic leads us nowhere and that the present evidence is equivocal. The present evidence that Raoul

Wallenberg survived 1947 is substantial and cannot be dismissed.

VIII. The Law

A. Burden of Proof

There are two possibilities. Either Raoul Wallenberg is alive. Or he is dead. There are two propositions at play. One is the proposition that he is alive. The other is the proposition that he is dead. It is my view that the burden of proof should be on the proposition that he is dead. The burden of proof should not be on the proposition that he is alive.

If we assume that Wallenberg is alive, when in fact he is dead, then all we have lost is our own time and effort in attempting to locate him when he is nowhere to be found. If, on the other hand, we assume that he is dead, when in fact he is alive, then we will be perpetrating a cruel injustice on Raoul Wallenberg himself. In view of all that he has done for others, our own assumptions should be structured to do as much as possible for him.

B. Standard of Proof

For standard of proof, our choices are prima facie proof, reasonable possibility, balanced of probabilities, clear and convincing evidence, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Prima facie proof is proof that is established after examining only the evidence in favour of a proposition , without examining any of the contrary evidence. Proof on a reasonable possibility is proof that establishes a proposition is more than a mere or hypothetical possibility, but goes no further. In terms of percentages, proof that establishes a proposition has one in ten chances to be true is considered to be proof on a reasonable possibility.

Proof on a balance of probabilities means proving that a proposition is more likely than not to be true. In terms of percentages, proof on a balance of probabilities must establish that a proposition has more than a 50% chance of being true.

Clear and convincing evidence of truth is a standard that is higher than a mere balance of probabilities. It approaches the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, with quite reaching it. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest standard of proof. Demanding proof beyond this standard becomes unreasonable.

In addition to the burden of proof being on the proposition that Raoul Wallenberg is dead, the standard of proof should be proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A burden of proof on the proposition that Raoul Wallenberg is dead, with a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is most likely to spur further inquiries and to answer all unanswered questions. Any other burden or standard is likely to leave matters hanging.

C. The Law of Disappearances

The United Nations Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance[24] applies to the case of Raoul Wallenberg and it has been violated. The Declaration was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 18, 1992 and Raoul Wallenberg disappeared long before that. Nonetheless, he remains a disappeared person to this day, and the Declaration applies to his case today.

The United Nations Commission on Human Rights Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances began its work in 1980, before the adoption of the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. When it began its work it took within its mandate persons who had disappeared prior to the creation of the Working Group and indeed, persons who had disappeared and been found dead prior to the creation of the Working Group. The Working Group did not feel constrained to deal with only those cases of persons who had disappeared after the Working Group had been created.[25]

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[24]. General Assembly Resolution 47/133 of 18 December 1992

[25]. Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, Commission on Human

If one examines the Declaration, virtually every provision, except for those about children and asylum applies to the case of Raoul Wallenberg. Furthermore, Russia is in violation of every one of those duties under the Declaration to which the Raoul Wallenberg case is relevant.

To say that Russia is in violation of the Declaration does not necessarily mean that Russian officials are now actively hiding Raoul Wallenberg in their prison or hospital system. Inadequate investigation, a failure to release relevant documents, denying to the Wallenberg case the priority and attention it deserves can all amount to violations of the Declaration.

The Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance imposes duties on all states to investigate the fate of a disappeared person, not just on the state in whose territory the disappearance occurred. The Declaration imposes duties on Sweden and Canada as well as on Russia to account for the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. It provides that an investigation into the fate of a disappeared person should be able to be conducted for as long as the fate of the victim of the enforced disappearance remains unclarified.[26] Cutting off investigation into the fate of Raoul Wallenberg prematurely would violate this provision.

D. Privacy

Russian officials denied photocopying of Vladimir prison records by citing privacy concerns, by stating that the permission of all those named in the cards, or their relatives, if dead, had to be sought before photocopying could be permitted. Denying access to records on this basis is a violation of international law.

Rights, Economic and Social Council, 26 January 1981, United Nations document E/CN/4/1435

[26]. Article 13(6)

The Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance states that an official up to date register of all persons deprived of their liberty shall be maintained in every place of detention. Additionally, each state shall take steps to maintain similar centralized registers. The information contained in these registers shall be made available to family members, their counsel or to any other persons having a legitimate interest in the information, unless a wish to the contrary has been manifested by the persons concerned. Further, the information contained in the registers shall be made available to any judicial or other competent and independent national authority and to any other competent authority entitled under the law of the state concerned or any international legal instrument to which the state concerned is a party, seeking to trace the whereabouts of a detained person.[27]

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[27]. Article 10

IX. Follow Up Process

There needs to be a follow up process to this report and the reports of the Swedish and Russian working groups. The follow up process should not just be a watered down version of the present process. It needs to be international in nature and not just bilateral as the Swedish Russian process is. It needs to have an even higher status and authority than the present process if it is to answer questions the present process can not answer.

It is difficult to disentangle the search for the truth about Wallenberg from the general opacity of the old Soviet system. The search for Wallenberg is a conundrum precisely because the Russians have done so little to clarify the Soviet past. Wallenberg research tells us of the difficulty of explaining the fate of any disappeared person victim of a system whose abuses have not been fully and thoroughly confronted.

The Wallenberg case was a coverup within a coverup. The Soviet gulag was the antithesis of an open accessible system. Even within the more general secrecy of Soviet repression, the Wallenberg case was a separate more tightly held secret. Documents in Soviet archives that would otherwise have been classified as top secret, were, in the case of Wallenberg, relocated to central archives, obliterated or destroyed. Witnesses who would otherwise have been sworn to secrecy were, in the case of Wallenberg, terrorized into saying absolutely nothing about him. Finding out what happened to Wallenberg becomes a matter of not just pulling the Wallenberg file from the shelves, but rather going through many records to piece together from what remains the information about what happened to him.

The Russians, in their wisdom, have decided neither to prosecute those who committed human rights violations during the Soviet regime, nor even to have a truth commission to bring those violations to light. Wallenberg investigations have to throw light throughout the gulag from 1945 till its end. It is a light

thrown on a history that is otherwise pretty much in darkness.

This mammoth task can only be accomplished with the full throated cooperation we saw at the time of Bakatin and have not seen since. Because so much Russian archival material is behind closed doors, Wallenberg research must be led by those on the other side of those doors.

What could the Russian authorities be doing to produce more in the way of documentation about Wallenberg than they have done? There are five possibilities. Three of these possibilities are general in nature. Two are specific to the case of Raoul Wallenberg.

The three general possibilities are various ways of exploring all the wrongs of the old Soviet system. If the full truth about the gulag becomes known, then we will know all there is to know about Wallenberg. There are many reasons why the full truth about the history of Soviet oppression should be known, going far beyond the Wallenberg case. But surely shedding light on the fate of Raoul Wallenberg is one reason, amongst many.

Because these possibilities are general, the reasons why they should be done, and the obstacles to their not being done are also general. It would take me far beyond the intended scope of any focused Wallenberg investigation to argue for these general possibilities and attempt to deal with the obstacles to their realization. I would only say that all of these general possibilities are meritorious, and the fact that none of them has yet been realized is regrettable.

The first general possibility is systematic prosecution of all those involved in the human rights violations associated with the years of Soviet repression. While prosecution of human rights violators is not at bottom a documentation effort, one beneficial effect of such prosecutions is a public accounting of the crimes

being prosecuted. If indeed any of the perpetrators of the enforced disappearance of Raoul Wallenberg were still alive and were now prosecuted for that enforced disappearance, that prosecution would produce evidence about Wallenberg that would form part of the public record about him.

The second general possibility is a truth commission. In many countries that have moved from a violator regime to a democratic regime, truth commissions have taken the place of systematic prosecutions, because prosecutions would be destabilizing. As well, prosecutions are nowhere near as systematic as truth commissions in their exposure of violations. Truth commissions may be limited in identifying perpetrators, but they are effective in providing information about victimization. A Russian truth commission whose mandate would be tell the truth of human rights violations in the Soviet era would inevitably have the Wallenberg saga front and centre on its agenda.

The third general possibility is transfer of the KGB archives and the Presidential archives of the Soviet era to the state archives where they would be indexed and accessible to researchers on the same basis as all other state archives. That, as I had written earlier, was proposed, tentatively by the presidential commission on Soviet archives headed by the late Dmitri Volkogonov in 1992, but the proposal was dropped after lobbying from FSB officials. The proposal, in my own view, remains a viable one.

These three possible solutions go much beyond the Wallenberg dossier. However, it is difficult to disentangle the search for the truth about Wallenberg from the general opacity of the old Soviet system. The search for Wallenberg is a conundrum precisely because the Russians have done so little to clarify the Soviet past. How can we know the truth about Wallenberg without knowing the truth about the whole gulag, all political prisoners, all abuses of psychiatry? Wallenberg was sighted, or claimed to have been sighted, in many different places in the Soviet prison

and psychiatric system. Furthermore, if he was kept alive after 1947, it would have been as a prisoner whose identity was disguised even within the system. To be fully confident that we have traced down every Wallenberg lead, we would have to know who was in every cell, in every psychiatric hospital bed throughout all the years of Soviet oppression from 1947 to its end. Wallenberg research tells us of the difficulty of explaining the fate of any disappeared person victim of a system whose abuses have not been fully and thoroughly confronted.

The two possibilities particular to the case of Raoul Wallenberg are a presidential commission on his fate, and access of authorized researchers to previously closed archives subject to a confidentiality undertaking. The advantage of a presidential commission on the fate of Raoul Wallenberg is that it would have the authority and especially the drive that the present Russian working group, at least in my estimation, seems not to have.

If the reports of both the Swedish and Russian working groups conclude that the question of what happened to Raoul Wallenberg remains unanswered, then the appropriate response would be to escalate the level of investigation. It would be inappropriate to respond to a conclusion of both the Swedish and Russian working groups that the question of what happened to Raoul Wallenberg remains unanswered with a follow up that has less intensity and less authority than the groups had which produced inconclusive reports. If at first you do not succeed, then try harder. It is a recipe for failure to decide to try less hard if your first effort does not meet with success.

All archives, Russian, Swedish, German, Hungarian, United Nations, British, American, should allow unrestricted, open stack access to qualified Wallenberg researchers, subject only to a confidentiality undertaking. The undertaking would be not to disclose any information obtained through this research that was irrelevant to the Wallenberg case. That sort of access would

leave research in the hands of those interested in the fate of Wallenberg, rather than in the hands of professional archivists whose time, energy and commitment to getting to the bottom of the Wallenberg case are not as great.

Since the creation of the Swedish and Russian working groups, over six years have passed. From the time I began working on my report, in September 1996, I heard virtually every month that the Swedish working group report would be coming out in the next month or two, to be released jointly with the Russian working group report. The release of the two reports became a mirage, moving a step further away with each step towards it. The delay in the release of the reports of these two working groups is appallingly long.

The blame for the delay in release falls on both sides. The Russian counterparts claim to have their report ready and waiting for the Swedish release. Nonetheless, the Swedish delays and the Russian readiness were explained by the greater thoroughness and seriousness with which the Swedish working group approached its task. The Swedish working group was never quite ready to release its report, because the Russian side was so lethargic in answering requests for information. The Russian lethargy was met with Swedish politeness. Swedish officials have done little to press Russian officials who did not provide information that was requested of them, who denied direct access to archives or who provided the information only after lengthy delays.

It now looks like at least seven years will pass from the creation of the Russian and Swedish working groups to the release of their reports. It took Raoul Wallenberg only six months to save up to 100,000 lives from the Nazi death maw. A seven year process makes a mockery of the urgency that Raoul Wallenberg and his family deserve.

It may seem idle to talk about what should follow the release of

the Swedish and Russian working group reports, when the release of those reports is not in sight. This current Swedish/Russian process should be completed urgently.

Those involved in the Swedish and Russian working groups must face up to the limitations of the process in which they are mired. Instead of remaining stuck indefinitely in inquiries without answer, they must end their work and recommend a process that will give the answers.

X. The Canadian Connection

Raoul Wallenberg is Canada's only honourary citizen. Roland de Corneille, then a Liberal Member of Parliament for Eglinton-Lawrence, and Mr. Ricard, then a Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament for Laval, in 1985 presented a private member's bill proclaiming Raoul Wallenberg to be an honourary citizen of Canada. The bill passed unanimously the House of Commons on December 9, 1985 and the Senate on December 10, 1985.

William Bauer, Head of the Canadian Delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in September 1988 made a statement to the Conference calling for the case of Raoul Wallenberg to be resolved. He urged the Soviet Union to provide full information on his situation, and charged that this has never been done. He said: "few people will be satisfied until the evasions, the ambiguities and obfuscations surrounding his case are removed, once and for all."

A telex from the Canadian embassy in Stockholm to External Affairs in Ottawa dated October 25, 1989 stated: "on the basis of the compelling case built by the Raoul Wallenberg Association over the years, one can say with some certainty that Raoul Wallenberg did not die in Lubianka in 1947 as the Soviets claim. Hence the case is unresolved. The Soviets know that Raoul Wallenberg is an honourary Canadian citizen. They also know that Canada frequently champions humanitarian causes relating to the USSR. Thus to ignore the Raoul Wallenberg case now that it has been reopened could give inappropriate signals to the Soviets." (I have converted the text from telex to discursive style.) The telex suggested that Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, who was about to visit the Soviet Union, and the senior officials travelling with him raise the Raoul Wallenberg case with their counterparts in the Soviet Union.

This suggestion was taken up. A later telex from the Canadian embassy in Stockholm dated March 1, 1991 said "When Prime

Minister Mulroney passed through Stockholm in November 1989 and met Prime Minister Carlsson, Mr. Mulroney raised the Wallenberg issue, underlining his honourary Canadian citizenship and said he would do what he could to help the related investigation in the USSR. The matter was raised with the then Foreign Minister Shevardnatze by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in Moscow the following week."

A House of Commons Briefing note dated May 30, 1990 from A.P. McLaine, Director-General, USSR and Eastern Europe Bureau, Department of External Affairs and International Trade states: "The Government of Canada has in the past made repeated representations to the Soviet authorities, citing dissatisfaction with the unsupported Soviet assertions concerning Wallenberg's fate."

Most recently, there has been the Government of Canada support for this research. When the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Government of Canada announced that the Government would assist in defraying the cost of my research activities to be conducted to determine the fate of Raoul Wallenberg, the Minister said: "Canadians attach real importance to the extraordinary heroism of Mr. Wallenberg and the inspiration that it offers to champions of human rights who might despair over the huge obstacles they face."

There is at least one person in Canada who asserts that he met Raoul Wallenberg in the Soviet gulag after 1947. Josyp Terelya writes in his 1991 autobiography about coming across Raoul Wallenberg in 1970 at Vladimir prison.[28]

The Government of Canada should participate actively in ongoing efforts to determine the fate of Raoul Wallenberg, including the

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[28]. Josyp Terelya "Witness to Apparitions and Persecution in the USSR", Faith Publishing Company, Milford, Ohio, 1991, pages 133, 134

follow up to the release of the Swedish and Russian working group reports. In particular, the Government of Canada should call on all governments which may have information in their archives about Raoul Wallenberg that has not been disclosed to disclose the information.

An active Canadian government role in Wallenberg research would be consistent with Canada's own history of support for Raoul Wallenberg and those concerned about his fate. It would demonstrate that the investigation is not just a Swedish Russian bilateral matter, that the fate of Raoul Wallenberg is of concern to all humanity. It would show that the questions about the Raoul Wallenberg will not go away until they are answered.

XI. Conclusions

At some time, which is surely not now, we will have to draw a line, say that we know all that reasonably can be known, and draw conclusions based on that knowledge. However, when that happens, conclusions must be drawn based on all the knowledge that is available both inside and outside Russia, and not just some of it.

The basic conclusion of this report is that the fate of Raoul Wallenberg is not yet known, but that it is knowable. There are, I believe, documents in existence in archives in various countries, which, if disclosed, would allow us to know the fate of Raoul Wallenberg.

There is both a legal and moral duty to determine the fate of Raoul Wallenberg, to get at the truth about what happened to him, to follow every evidentiary lead to its conclusion, wherever that lead might take us. That duty rests not just on Russia, but on the whole global community.

The Holocaust showed us the abyss of the human soul, the depths to which humanity could sink. The efforts of Raoul Wallenberg showed what one person could do in the face of tyranny. He demonstrated the heights that humanity could reach. The Holocaust has become the symbol of evil for this century. Raoul Wallenberg has become the symbol for good. What Raoul Wallenberg did he did for humanity. All of humanity owes its gratitude to him.

Many, in the face of the Nazi killing machine, did nothing, asked, what could we have done? The answer to that is: look at what Raoul Wallenberg did.

Nazis viewed World War II as a war against the Jews. It was a one sided war which only the Nazis were fighting. The Jews did not know until it was too late that they were under attack; they

were isolated from the rest of humanity, which, for the most part, offered no help. But Raoul Wallenberg helped. He singlehandedly fought the Nazi death machine. And he won.

Edmund Burke has written that all that is necessary for evil to triumph is for the good to do nothing. Raoul Wallenberg showed us the opposite. He showed that all that was necessary for evil to be defeated is for the good to be active.

The activity he showed must be an inspiration to us whenever evil is present, whenever governments attempt to crush humanity. But his work must first of all be an inspiration to us in fighting for him, in finding out, finally, what really happened to him.

The Wallenberg file must not be just a matter of passive curiosity. It must be a matter of active concern. We must show that the investigation into his fate matters to us. The investigation into his fate must not only be done properly, be done thoroughly. It must be given the highest priority.

Raoul Wallenberg research is a matter of urgency because there remains the possibility, however remote, that Raoul Wallenberg is alive today. Whatever else can be concluded or hypothesized about him, this much is certain. His age puts him within the biological life span. Raoul Wallenberg was born on August 4, 1912. If alive today, he would be 85.

I have no doubt that, at some point, all files now in secret archives that shed light on the fate of Raoul Wallenberg will be disclosed. But if that disclosure is fifty or one hundred years from now, there would not remain even the most remote speck of a possibility that he would still be alive. We must expend every effort to determine his fate while the age of Raoul Wallenberg, if alive, remains within the biological life span.

There may be some readers who are satisfied that Raoul Wallenberg

is dead, even though the questions how, where and when he died remain unanswered. These readers may wonder, why bother spending effort on finding out when where and how he died? There is of course still a mystery to be solved. But, why should the solving of that puzzle be a matter of priority for the international community? Should not the answering of that mystery be left to the measured pursuits of academic researchers?

There are two answers to that. One is that even if Raoul Wallenberg is dead, those responsible for his death and the coverup for his death remain, some of them, very much alive. Those responsible for the death as well as those responsible for the coverup should be held to account. Indeed, it is very likely that the fear of this being held to account is a reason why full disclosure of his fate is so difficult.

The murder of Raoul Wallenberg and the coverup of that murder, if he was murdered, is one of the great crimes of the twentieth century. Ideally, the perpetrators should be brought to justice. At the very least what they did should be exposed, while they are still alive, before they have had a chance to get away with this crime.

The second answer is that putting aside solving the mystery of the murder of Raoul Wallenberg is killing him twice over. Saying that his murder does not matter is a way of saying that he does not matter. Ignoring the murder of Raoul Wallenberg means murdering his memory. In that murder we would all be complicit. If we are truly to honour and remember Raoul Wallenberg, we must not only remember his life. We must remember his death. However, we cannot remember what we do not know. Only by unlocking the mystery of his death can we truly honour his life.

It would be far too late now to compensate Raoul Wallenberg for what has been done to him, even if he were still alive. But we owe it to ourselves, to the glimpse he gave us of what we all

could be, to do what we can even now to find out what happened to him.

XII. Summary of Recommendations

A. There should be full archival disclosure of all information about Raoul Wallenberg wherever that information may be located, whether it is in private or government files; not only in Sweden and Russia, but also in the United Kingdom, the United States, Hungary, Germany, Israel and the United Nations in New York. Neither privacy concerns nor security concerns can justify a refusal to grant full disclosure of relevant information. In particular:

1. Russian archivists should cooperate fully in providing
   a. information about detainees in Kazan mental hospital,
   b. the files transferred to KGB/FSB archives in Moscow of numbered prisoners in Vladimir.

2. Swedish archivists should provide cabinet level documents and security service documents about Raoul Wallenberg, including evidence of the proposed prisoner exchange of Raoul Wallenberg for Stig Wennerström.

3. The United States government should act on Freedom of Information Act requests about Raoul Wallenberg with urgency. The blacked out information in disclosures previously made should be provided.

4. The United Kingdom government should not use a security exception to its Code of Practice on Access to Government Information to justify non-disclosure of information about Raoul Wallenberg. Nor should the reasoning that information in government files is already publicly available in some other form be a justification for withholding that information.

B. All archivists should cooperate fully with independent non-governmental researchers. Research should not just be a

governmental matter. Non-governmental researchers should be given direct access to relevant archives.

C. An investigation into the fate of Raoul Wallenberg is not just a Russian Swedish bilateral matter. Given what Raoul Wallenberg did to combat crimes against humanity, his fate concerns all humanity. In particular, countries that have given Raoul Wallenberg honourary citizenship, the United States, Israel and Canada, are entitled to be and have a duty to be involved in the investigation into his fate.

D. The Government of Canada should participate actively in ongoing efforts to determine the fate of Raoul Wallenberg, including the follow up to the release of the Swedish and Russian working group reports. In particular, the Government of Canada should call on all governments that may have information in their archives about Raoul Wallenberg that has not been disclosed to disclose that information.

E. The Swedish and Russian working groups should complete their work and release their reports as a matter of urgency. These reports should recommend a follow up process to their reports that will give the answers that they have been unable to get.

F. There needs to be a follow up process to the Swedish/Russian working group process. In Russia, the follow up process should include the establishment of a Presidential Commission to report on the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. The follow up process should be intergovernmental, involving all interested governments.

G. It is premature on the present state of the evidence, in advance of full disclosure of all relevant documents in archives, to come to any conclusion on the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. In particular, it is premature and unwarranted to come to the

conclusion that Raoul Wallenberg died in 1947. A 1947 death conclusion operates at cross purposes with the need for further research. The currently available evidence that Raoul Wallenberg survived 1947 is at least as compelling as the evidence that he was murdered in 1947.

H. A burden of proof on the proposition that Raoul Wallenberg is dead, with a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is most likely to spur further inquiries and to answer all unanswered questions. Any argument that Raoul Wallenberg died, whether in 1947 or at any other time, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Author: INTERNET:asoderqu@pen.k12.va.us/ at INTERNET
Date: 1998-09-07 13.13
Priority: Normal
TO: Lage (UD) Olson at (Pk)UD-3
Subject: message from Susanne Berger

250/0021 07
1998 -09- 08
AV: P 2 Eu 1

Dear Mr. Olson,

I have two brief questions.

1. Would it be possible for you to request from the Norwegian authorities their material on the following two individuals:

a. Erik Kristoffer Bjertnaes b 19.5.1916 (for obvious reasons)
b. Tove Filse (former Attache at the Norwegian representation in Stockholm during the war and Iver Olsen's contact. I believe this is a woman.
For both individuals the Norwegian Police/Intelligence should have a file.

Kopia till amb. OSLO exp. 98-09-09

2. Could we get an official confirmation from the Swedish Red Cross - and the International Red Cross - whether or not their organizations employed a delegate by the name of Wollberg or Wallberg anywhere in Eastern Europe during and immediately after World War II? If such a person existed he could well have been a source of confusion with RW in the Gulag. If it is confirmed that such a person was not employed, it could strengthen our case for follow up in certain instances.

Brev till Svenska Röda Korset exp. 98-09-09

In this connection I ask again for the list of Swedish nationals in Soviet captivity from 1945 onwards. Susan has asked for it repeatedly and it should be obvious why such a list is an essential tool. Also, it should not be that complicated to provide. A big chunk of it should be made up by the missing Swedish sailors, for instance, for whose release special efforts were undertaken.

Memo till Daniel Bachman A-ARK exp. 98-09-09

Thanks a lot,

Susanne

a.a.

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
OTTAWA

T E L E F A X Sid 1 (3)

U Lindell

1998-09-09

Delges:
Kobes
von Dardel
Carl Persson
Magnusson, Riga
Hellquist, EC
Olson, EI-ESEK
Gullgren EC4
Amb Moskva
Amb Kiev
Raoul Wallenberg-fonden

Utrikesdepartementet, dnr 142

Till: Lage Olson, EI/ESEK

Re: Raoul Wallenberg

(1 bilaga)

Winnipegadvokaten David Matas har som bekant nyligen sökt publicitet för sin rapport om Raoul Wallenberg-fallet. Den engelskspråkiga Montreal Gazette hade sålunda en artikel idag (bifogas för kännedom).

Denna lästes av bl a en Oskar Kantorsky, som därefter hörde av sig till vårt honorärkonsulat i Montreal för att berätta om ett minne som väckts av tidnings-artikeln. Minnet var ett samtal någonstans i Ukraina 1996 i vilket en ovanlig fånge i ett koncentrations-läger/fängelse någonstans i Sovjetunionen 1952 nämndes.

Gunnel Yates på konsulatet, som tog emot samtalet, har gjort bifogade uppteckning.

Kantorsky lämnade sitt telefonnummer och kan kontaktas för uppföljning. Bör ambassaden ringa honom? Är det i så fall några särskilda frågor som bör ställas?

Ståhl

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SVENSKA KONSULATET
MONTRÉAL

1998-09-09

Ambassaden

OTTAWA

Wallenberg

Med anledning av dagens artikel i Gazetten ringde en man som heter Oskar Kantorsky tel: (514)364-6230 och berättade ungefär följande:

1996 var han på semester i Ukraina och träffade några vänner eller släktingar, de satt vid ett bord och pratade minnen. Där fanns en man med ett namn som börjar med Nik.... någonting som hade varit på ett koncentrationsläger 1952. I detta koncentrationsläger fanns det en man som pratade mycket bruten ryska, han hölls i en separat cell, vilket betraktades som en stor lyx inom fägelsevärlden. Fångarna där var huvudsakligen författare och artister som motsatte sig den kommunistiska regimen, och någon hade hört den här mannen (som pratade bruten ryska) nämna Stockholm.

En gång hade fyra bilar kommit för att förflytta den här mannen. Männen som körde bilarna hade inte uniformer på sig utan var civilklädda, vilket också ansågs vara anmärkningsvärt. Det antogs att männen var från KGB, enligt den mannen jag pratade med idag.

Gunnel Yates

Gunnel Yates

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NATION



SSINOT, CP
an Ro-
lund to

Canadian blasts wall of silence on Wallenberg

MARK ABLEY
The Gazette

A Canadian report into the mysterious fate of wartime hero Raoul Wallenberg is heavily critical not only of Russia, where the Swedish diplomat was imprisoned and presumably died, but also of Western governments that never came clean about what they know.

In a 71-page report made public yesterday in Winnipeg, human-rights lawyer David Matas asserted that Wallenberg's fate "is not yet known, but it is knowable. There are, I believe, documents in existence in archives in various countries which, if disclosed, would allow us to know the fate of Raoul Wallenberg."

Wallenberg was a young businessman from Sweden's wealthiest family when he was sent to his country's embassy in Hungary (a German ally) in 1944. His secret mission, carried out in conjunction with the U.S. government, was to protect Hungary's Jews from Nazi genocide. He succeeded in rescuing many thousands of Jews; but early in 1945, he was detained by advancing Soviet troops. He was never heard from again.

The official Soviet line was always that Wallenberg died in captivity in 1947. But there is credible, indeed compelling evidence that he remained alive inside the terrible prison-camp system of the Soviet Union until well into the 1950s and perhaps much later. In 1985, after a unanimous motion of the House of Commons, he became Canada's only honorary citizen.

Raoul Wallenberg, undated photo.

MATAS BEGAN PARALLEL PROBE

In 1991, the governments of Sweden and Russia set up a joint working group to determine the truth about Wallenberg's fate. It was partly in frustration at the working group's behaviour that Matas (past president of the Canadian Council for Refugees and senior counsel for B'nai Brith Canada) began his own research in 1996. He received $5,000 from the Department of Foreign Affairs to help pay his expenses; but his report is independent of the Canadian government.

Though Matas spent a week in Russia last year, he was not allowed to meet with most members of the Russian working group. Indeed, he was told by Teimouraz Ramishvili (head of the Department of International Humanitarian Co-operation and Human Rights in the Russian foreign ministry) "that the whole Wallenberg search was a makework project fabricated by researchers with nothing better to do with their time."

One of those researchers, presumably, was Vyacheslav Nikinov, a former Soviet official who worked on the Wallenberg dossier in 1991 – the only year that saw high-level government sponsorship of the search for Wallenberg. Nikinov explained to Matas why President Boris Yeltsin's promises of Russian co-operation have not been fulfilled:

"Yeltsin says all sorts of things that just disappear into thin air, not because of hypocrisy on his part, but because the institutional mechanisms to translate the will of the president into action have disintegrated. Each bureaucracy has become a power unto itself, doing what it wants rather than what the president wants."

Today in Russia, Matas charges, independent researchers into the Wallenberg case continue to meet "systematic stonewalling." The files of the KGB (the Soviet Union's notorious spy agency) remain closed; so do the files of the Kazan psychiatric hospital, where Wallenberg may have been kept.

Matas's frustration with the Russians is hardly surprising. More noteworthy are his criticisms of Swedish officials, and also of Western nations such as Britain and the United States.

On a personal level, Matas stresses, the members of Sweden's working group have been open and accessible. Yet he suggests they "fell victim to inordinate delay caused by exaggerated deference" to the Russians, and he charges that they neither conducted any archival research nor arranged for it to be done by anyone else.

Moreover, a good deal of material in Sweden's own archives remains off-limits. Many cabinet papers relating to Wallenberg are still secret, and the documents belonging to the foreign office and the security police contain some crucial omissions.

Similar restrictions prevail in other countries, too. Wallenberg's activities during World War II have never been fully explained; it seems likely, however, that while he was based in Budapest, he was providing useful information to U.S. intelligence. This may well explain why the Soviet Union imprisoned him in the first place.

Details about his wartime work, and about postwar efforts to free him, may well lie in British and American archives. Yet the U.S. has refused to make public various documents requested under the Freedom of Information Act, while Britain takes the bland position "that it is the long-standing policy of the government not to grant access of this sort to their records."

Matas counters that although "responsibility for the disappearance of Raoul Wallenberg must rest squarely on the shoulders of the Soviet Union, responsibility for discovering what happened to him rests on the whole global community.

"The governments of other countries are ill-placed to press the Russian government to disclose information in Russian files ... if these other countries do not disclose information in their files."

In a preliminary reply to the report, Fredrik Wetterqvist, cultural attaché at the Swedish Embassy in Ottawa, emphasized that the Wallenberg case "is still an open file. And part of the reason for the delay is that it's hard to get information out of Moscow."

Matas's report received a warm welcome from Montreal human-rights activist Irwin Cotler, who was in Moscow only last week for the opening of Russia's first Holocaust Memorial Museum.

COTLER GETS BRUSHOFF

While there, Cotler brought up the Wallenberg case in a meeting with Russia's current foreign minister, Yevgeny Primakov: "I said to him, 'The world is still owed an accounting.' His response was: 'Well, we've opened up all the archives. Why should we have anything to hide?'

"I found this rather dissembling."

Yesterday, Cotler expressed regret "that an issue with such a sense of urgency should have languished for so long. I'm hoping that this report, at the very least, will prod the Swedes and Russians into releasing their own."

Both Matas and Cotler emphasize that unless the Swedish-Russian report – whenever it finally appears – provides unexpectedly firm answers, it should not be the end of the search.

"The appropriate response," Matas suggests, "would be to escalate the level of investigation. ... Questions about Raoul Wallenberg will not go away until they are answered."

Author: Lage (UD) Olson at (Pk)UD-3
Date: 1998-09-08 16.15
Priority: Urgent
Receipt Requested
TO: Jan (UD) Ståhl at (Pk)Ottawa-amb, Ulf (UD) Lindell at (Pk)Ottawa-amb
Subject: rw-ärendet

Broder,

I anslutning till tidigare e-mail i dag om David Matas rapport bifogar jag en bakgrundspromemoria i ärendet.

Hälsningar

Lage

Avg. 251/601
98-09-08

P 2 Eu

Exp. 98-09-08

REGERINGSKANSLIET
Utrikesdepartementet

Promemoria

1998-09-08

EI/ESEK
Lage Olson
Telefon 08 - 405 3280

Bakgrundspapper med anledning av presentation av en rapport om RW-ärendet den 8 september 1998 i Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada

Advokaten **David Matas från Winnipeg**, Manitoba, Canada presenterar den 8 september kl. 11.00 lokal tid i sin hemstad en rapport (på 73 sidor) om Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet. Matas är en välkänd **MR-advokat** som sedan flera år ägnat stort intresse åt RW-ärendet och som erhållit stöd från Canadas regering att skriva en forskningsrapport rörande ärendet. En förklaring till det officiella stödet och engagemanget från kanadensisk sida står att finna i det faktum att RW är den ende kanadensiske hedersmedborgaren. RW är även hedersmedborgare i USA och Israel.

Matas är känd för RW-arbetsgruppen och han besökt bl.a. Stockholm och Moskva under förberedelserna av rapporten. **Matas har dock ej deltagit i arbetsgruppens arbete.**

I sin rapport ställer Matas **långtgående krav på öppenhet beträffande frisläppande av dokument om RW inte bara i Sverige och Ryssland också i ett flertal andra länder. Matas vill även he en ökad internationell medverkan** i efterforskningarna kring RW och menar bl.a. att den bilaterala svensk-ryska arbetsgruppen borde ha haft en internationell sammansättning. **Arbetsgrupppen har dock redan knutit till sig experter från andra länder och kan därför sägas vara internationell till sin karaktär.**

Matas ställer även långtgående krav beträffande uppföljning av ärendet, bl.a. vill han att man i Ryssland tillsätter en presidentkommission i ärendet. Ryssarna har ju, efter president Jeltsins besök i Sverige i december 1997, visat särskilt stort tillmötesgående och arbetet flyter väl. Det är inte säkert att en presidentkomission är den rätta eller erforderliga arbetsformen.

Matas ambition att nå full klarhet i RW-ärendet är utan tvivel hedervärd. Däremot skulle sannolikt flera av hans förslag till åtgärder bli svåra att genomföra i praktiken.

Från svensk sida kan noteras att arbetet i den svensk-ryska arbetsgruppen rörande RW, som inledde sitt arbete i september 1991, befinner sig i en avslutningsfas. Arbetsgruppen har under de senaste sju åren gått igenom ett mycket omfattande utredningsmaterial, samt genomfört ett större antal intervjuer med nyckelpersoner som antagits kunna lämna upplysningar om Raoul Wallenbergs öde. Fortfarande återstår dock några delprojekt innan arbetsgruppen kan avge sin slutredovisning i form av en vitbok (tidigare vitböcker har publicerats 1957 och 1965). Undersökningsarbetet inom dessa projekt pågår f.n. i Moskva och kommer förhoppningsvis att kunna avslutas under nästa år.

Beträffande öppenheten från svensk sida kan noteras att UD i juni 1997 frisläppte samtliga dokument från det speciella RW-arkivet på CD-ROM-skivor för perioden 1945 - 1970. För tidsperioden därefter fram till i dag planeras en liknande frisläppning med största möjliga öppenhet som ledstjärna. Tidpunkten för denna utgivning är ännu inte bestämd men torde ske så snart tekniska och andra skäl gör detta möjligt.

Vad avser uppföljning på svensk sida av RW-ärendet är det ännu för tidigt att yttra sig om detta. Resultaten från de pågående undersökningarna måste först utvärderas innan man kan ta ställning till vad som bör göras i framtiden. Det är dock klart att uppföljning i någon form (av fortsatt forskning, seminarier m.m.) måste säkerställas. Därvid är tillången till arkiven i framtiden en viktig fråga. Detta har påpekats både av arbetsgruppen och av Matas.

Matas skriver i sin rapport att han ursprungligen avsett att vänta att offentliggöra sin rapport tills den aviserade svenska resp. ryska vitboken

publicerats. Hans tålamod har tydligen inte varit tillräckligt stort för detta. Hans rapport kan därför möjligen ses som ett sätt att försöka påskynda arbetsgruppens arbete och publiceringen av vitböckerna. För säkerhets skull gör han tillägget att han icke tänker avstå från att kommentera innehållet i dessa. Från svensk sida kan det förtjäna påpekas att det av nöden tidsödande arbetet att noggrant gå igenom det omfattande utredningsmaterialet har prioritet framför en snabb publicering av en rapport. **Utredningsarbetet måste til syvende og sidst baseras på yttersta noggranhet för att kunna vinna största möjliga trovärdighet.**

Det är inte tidpunkten för publiceringen av en rapport som är kritisk, vilket Matas tycks mena. Det viktiga och väsentliga i sammanhanget är ju det arbete som utförs.

Lage Olson

Kopia från amb. i Washington
Ankommen till UD 1998-09-07
P2 Ell

Delges:
von Dardel
Carl Persson
Magnusson, Riga
Hallqvist, EC
Olson, EI-ESEK
Amb Moskva
Amb Budapest

Ambassador Per Anger
[redacted]

1998-09-09

Peter Zwack Jr.
4314 Louis Place
Alexandria, Virginia 22304 exp 98-09-09
Telefax: 703-212-8396

August 13th, 1998

Dear Ambassador Anger,

I returned yesterday from the Holocaust Museum in Washington DC with your book, With Wallenberg in Budapest and Elisabeth Skoglund's book about you, A Quiet Courage. Though I knew of you I was not fully aware of your critical role in Budapest during those terrible months between March 1944 and February 1945.

I am a US Army Lieutenant Colonel serving as a planner on the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon. I work in our NATO policy division and have enjoyed seeing the active Swedish involvement in NATO's Partnership for Peace. I also participated in the very positive US and Swedish Joint Staff talks in 1997.

Budapest in 1944-45 has interested me for a long time therefore the discovery of your book very much caught my attention. I am planning to write an article about the May 1944 Weiss train out of Hungary and later will write a military and social history specifically about "The Siege of Budapest." Your first hand insights would be fascinating and valuable.

My family, the Zwacks, was the largest distillers in Hungary during this period. They produced "Unicum" a brand you are probably familiar with. They were well known within Budapest and related to the Weiss, Kornfeld and Chorin families of industrial Csepel Island. Despite their conversion to Catholicism in 1915 they were forced into hiding after the German occupation in March 1944. They (the Zwacks) also were not able to get out on the famous Weiss train which with Nazi assistance traveled through occupied Europe to freedom and life in Portugal.

My grandfather, John Zwack, his wife Vera and my father Peter (then 16 years old) during this time moved into the house of my aunt on #5 Minerva Utca directly across the street from the Swedish Legation. They had been forced out of their home on Uri Utca, on Castle Hill (today's Turkish Embassy). Apparently my grandfather and grandmother knew Lars Berg, as well as you and Raoul Wallenberg. My grandfather who was a very distinguished fellow, apparently played cards several times with some of your staff including Berg and Wallenberg during your rare moments of leisure. Can you recollect any of this?

Lars Berg is a Zwack family "patron saint." During the siege an Arrowcross squad raided our villa and dragged everyone outside "for a walk to the river." My father truly thought this was the end. His cousin was able to talk the Arrowcross into letting him go upstairs to get some shoes -- upon doing so he jumped out the window and ran next door to your Legation. Lars Berg came running out and placed himself between the Arrowcross guns and my family and declared that they were employed by the Swedish Legation and therefore under its protection. The Arrowcross then released them. If they had taken "the walk" I surely would not be existing today! (Your picture of the Arrowcross standing in front of the Legation was very interesting to me -- do you have other photos of the neighborhood, or of Budapest which capture the feel of this difficult time).

Mr. Ambassador, could any photos possibly exist of my family which lived next door to your legation for eight months? Was #5 Minerva Utca used at all by the Swedes as a workplace? Do you know anyone else I could try to contact about this period of time? Would it be possible to locate Mr. Berg? If so, I would really like to speak with him.

An entry exists in a Weiss diary that "the Zwacks received a Swedish Schutzpass." Could there possibly be any surviving documentation of my family in the Swedish Archives? Where could I go to find out if they received a Swedish Schutzpass for example? Would a copy of such a document be on file?

Finally ten years ago while on a trip to Australia I was unexpectedly contacted by a older Hungarian Jewish man who was a young orphan trapped in Budapest during the German occupation and Russian siege. His aggressive attempt to find me in 1987 took me quite by surprise. He claimed that my grandmother Vera Zwack (or Vera Wahl) was involved in the organization, morale and upkeep of an underground Jewish orphanage. She apparently appeared every week, sang to the orphaned children and ensured that they were being well taken care of. He remembers vividly her charm and vitality (she was a beautiful woman - then in her 40s). He claimed that she was directly responsible for helping him survive deportation. Could Vera Zwack, my grandmother, have had any link with the Swedish Legation with this underground activity especially as she was living next door? My grandmother being a discreet women took this story to her grave in 1976 while sadly my grandfather died in 1958. I was never able to ask them the questions I am asking you now. My father, perhaps for his own protection at the time, was never told this story.

I realize that I have asked you a barrage of questions which after 54 years would strain any memory. If you recollect any of what I have mentioned above I would be honored for the opportunity to meet and talk to you. Your book is tantalizing as there is much you must of seen in Budapest which you couldn't write down due to space considerations.

My father having barely survived this frightening period fled to the west in 1948 after the Communist takeover of Hungary. He became a US citizen and after living 40 years between the US and Italy moved back to Hungary in 1988. Since then he gained back the family Unicum business, became the first Ambassador to the United States of newly democratic Hungary in 1990 and an independent minister in Hungarian Parliament in 1994.

In closing I would like to add that I have a wonderful Swedish brother-in-law, Niklas Per Pederstamm, of Göteborg who is an officer in your Merchant Marine.

None of this would have ever occurred were it not for the gallant Swedes in Budapest fifty-four years ago ...

With Warmest Personal Regards,

cc Mrs. Elisabeth Skoglund
Mr. Thomas Veres
Niklas Pederstamm

i Tyskland

Delges:
von Dardel
Carl Persson
Magnusson, Riga
Hallquist EC
Olson, EI-ESEK
Amb. Moskva

1998 -09- 09

To: Lage Olson EIXESEK
UD

From: S. Berger
1 703 237 0946

Date: September 7, 1998

Pages: Cover + 6

Mp. 98-09-09 /Ko

Dear Mr. Olson,

enclosed please find a summary of the current discussions in the Myasnikov/Svartz question. This paper constitutes an attempt to look at some of the old arguments with the intent of finding support for our renewed inquiry into this question. It is not an entirely complete and therefore not wholly objective summary. It serves only to restate the points that are relevant to our current research. I stress this point to avoid possible misunderstandings.
We are all sufficiently aware of the weak spots of the Myasnikov/Svartz problem – it is the strong points which need to be followed up, so they can be either confirmed or dismissed.

As always, I am grateful for any corrections, critique or additional points

Best wishes.

Susanne

252/005

98-09-09

P 2 Eu7

a.a. /Ko

The term "Mentalkrankenhaus" that Svartz attributes to Myasnikov in their conversation has been grounds for much debate. It has been cited as unlikley to have been used by Myasnikov, since the correct term in German would have been "Psychatrische Anstalt" or - in derogatory form - "Irrenhaus". For a speaker of German as a second language, even someone who has attained fluency, the term "Mentalkrankenhaus" is an acceptable term of expression and may have been a conscious effort to avoid using a term like "Irrenhaus"

Svartz's age has sometimes been cited as perhaps having played a role in a possible misunderstanding. She was already over 70 years old in 1961. Svartz however, pursued a full professional schedule at the time and had also presented a lecture at the Medical Congress three days before her meeting with Dr. Myasnikov.

Option c Myasnikov misunderstood Svartz

Myasnikov may have confused the case Dr Svartz described to him with another one of his patients. It would be difficult to imagine, however, how Svartz could be refering to one of Myasnikov's patients, given her status as a foreign physician who did not practice medicine in the Soviet Union. Given this fact, the only option of denial left to Myasnikov was a misunderstanding based on language (which is exactly what he claimed).

Myasnikov's statement to Svartz at a follow-up meeting to their original conversation is interesting. He cites a possible additional level of misunderstanding: He tells Svartz that he was under the impression that he and Svartz were talking on a colleagial/private level. Had he known, he continues, that Nanna Svartz was acting in an official capacity he would of course have taken the necessary steps. If Myasnikov had allowed himself a momentary ~~slip~~ of the guard and had taken up the Wallenberg case with Svartz - perhaps only partially aware of the full ramifications of the RW case, perhaps giving in to a momentary temptation to appear knowledgable and important - he had counted on his colleague's disgression in her role as a physician

Myasnikov's question to Svartz "Wollen Sie ihn sehen?" has been cited as supporting the idea that Myasnikov could not have had RW's case in mind when he said this. If he knew the nature of the case he would have been aware that Soviet authorities would never have permitted a meeting between Svartz and a special prisoner

One should consider that when Myasnikov asked this question, he could not have anticipated Svartz's answer. What would have happened if Svartz's had answered "Yes, I want to see him right now"? Perhaps Myasnikov counted on the likely outcome that a meeting would never take place. But would he really have wanted to take the risk of disappointing a foreign colleague?; of embarassing the Soviet authorities who would refuse Svartz's request? And - provided he understood that this was the case of a SWEDISH prisoner - possibly create an international incident? One needs to consider then both possibilities: a. That Myasnikov just pretended to let Svartz see the patient, knowing it would be an impossibility; and b. that Myasnikov was in some way prepared to let Svartz see the patient in question, somehow thinking that the matter could perhaps be playing out on a medical/private level.

Draft

The Myasnikov/Svartz question

Summary

In the month of January 1961 Swedish physician Dr. Nanna Svartz attended a medical congress in Moscow. On January 17, 1961 during a visit with a Russian colleague, Dr. Alexander Leonidovich Myasnikov at the (USSR) Institute of Therapy, Dr. Svartz inquired whether or not Dr. Myasnikov could provide any information in the case of missing Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg. According to Svartz, Myasnikov not only indicated his familiarity with the case but also stated that he personally had seen Wallenberg a short time before.
Dr. Myasnikov then called in a colleague, Dr. G. Danishevsky, who suggested to Dr. Svartz that she turn with her request directly to the Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Seminovitch Semenov. Dr. Myasnikov later contradicted Dr. Svartz's account of their discussion and the issue was left unresolved

Analysis

From the beginning, analysis of the Svartz/Mysanikov faced difficult obstacles due to the absence of documentation. This has led to the present-day impression that everything that can be said about the matter has been said. Nevertheless, there are some details which should be examined with great care and which form the basis for our decision to request permission to study the currently available material in this question.

Based on the assumption that Nanna Svartz gave an essentially truthful account of her meeting with Dr. Myasnikov [and no one appears to have doubted her veracity], there are then several possible explanations for what followed:

Option a Myasnikov and Svartz misunderstood each other, in language and meaning

This appears to be the least likely scenario. Myasnikov and Svartz knew each other well from numerous previous meetings. There are countless witnesses who confirm that both spoke fluent German and that communication between the two had never been hampered by language difficulties. (Sic!)

Option b Svartz misunderstood Myasnikov in her eagerness to receive news about RW

It has been argued that Svartz was so eager and hopeful to find news about RW that she may have jumped to conclusions. It has further been stated that Myasnikov had the habit of nodding his head quietly, as in affirmation, leading to misinterpretations on the part of his listeners.
If there was, however, a misunderstanding between Svartz and Myasnikov it was more likely to have been Myasnikov who misunderstood. Svartz was very clear in her account about what Myasnikov stated to her. Perhaps Myasnikov thought the dicussion was about a different person (confusion about the name "Wallenberg"), although he never invoked this possibility as a possible source for the misunderstanding. (see option c)

1/6

Option d Myasnikov said what Svartz alleges he said and told the truth

Myasnikov may have made the proverbial "slip of the tongue" and he may have instantly realized that he went too far. He then called in Danishevsky who handled the situation fom then on.

There is also the possibility that Myasnikov had knowledge of the RW case indirectly through contacts with his colleagues in the medical community. He supposedly had good contacts to Andrei Vladmirovich Shneznevski of the Seroski Forensic Psychiatric Research Institute and Vadim Smolenski, Professor of Therapy and head of a Moscow medical college.

Myasnikov appears to have briefed Danishevsky correctly - further weakening the argument of a misunderstanding. In Svartz's account of the meeting she writes "... Jag fragade [Danishevsky] om professor Myasnikov talat om vad saken gaellde och han bekraeftade det. Han fragade mig noga om var Wallenberg tjaenstgjort och bad mig skriva hans namn pa ett papper. ..." From the continuing text it appears that the conversation flowed on from the point where Svartz and Myasnikov had left off
Danishevsky was not present at the subsequent face-to-face meeting of Svartz and Myasnikov in the presence of Swedish and Soviet officials.

The question of who Danishevsky was has been essentially ignored, even though it was he who gave Svartz the advice to contact Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov directly In the evening of the same day of Svartz's discussion with Myasnikov and Danishevsky, Danishevsky took Svartz aside at a banquet to ask her if if she had been successful in her attempt to contact Semenov. [Semenov was away on a business trip to Kairo]

Svartz later remembered that she had met Danishevsky the first time at a medical congress in 1934 and again in Malmoe in 1936. There he appeared to follow her and another colleague, Dr. Dimitri Pletneff, as they were taking a walk.. She pointed her observation out to Pletneff, who told her to simply ignore Danishevsky Pletneff was later imprisoned, apparently in large part due to the denunciation by Danishevsky. [Pletneff was one of Stalin's personal physicians]

Option e Myasnikov lied about having knowledge about the RW case

Myasnikov's vanity would perhaps not allow him to acknowledge that he had no information about the case that Svartz asked him about. He might have felt that some limited detail would suffice to appear knowledgable enough. He might have thought that he had sufficient control over the situation before it would lead any further.

3/6

Documentation

The Svartz/Myasnikov controversy should have generated a number of documents since the issue was brought to the official attention of the highest levels of Soviet government. The available documenation should include official notes [including telephone], memoranda, internal and interdepartmental reports, meeting protocols, etc.

The request centers on papers of individuals as well as general collections, such as the Archives of the Academy of Medical Science, the Foreign Ministry, the Communist Party, the Secretary General of the Communist Party, the Politburo and the Supreme Soviet, among others.

The following is a list of documentation which should be requested [in some cases requested again] from the Russian side:

- Files of the Academy of Medical Sciences/Institute of Therapy collections of personal and professional papers of Myasnikov, Danishevsky, Shnezhnevsky and Smolenski, 1960 - (1965)

- Files for associated Institutes and Medical Facilities, such as Serbsky Forensic Psychiatric Research Institute, Psychiatric Registration Facility Number 2 and others (See official request to the Ministry of Health, Russia), 1960 -

- Official correspondence of the Academy of Science and associated Institutes with the Soviet Government and Communist Party hierarchy such as the Foreign Ministry, Office of the Secretary General of the Communist Party, etc.

- Files of the Foreign Ministry, the Office of the Deputy Foreign Minister, etc. 1960 -

- Records detailing Khrushchev's meeting with Myasnikov in 1961

4/6

TYPED COPY (no photocopying allowed in Archives of the Swedish Security Police)

Excerpt from P.M. of 11.11. 1977 by Harald Wigfors (received by Swedish Police 14 11 1977)

Ang. A.L. Myasnikov (f.1899)

1. Jag hade den 9 november 1977 ett samtal med Ilja Shapiro om Miasnikov, Nanna Svartz sagesman i Wallenberg-fallet. Shapiro aer av rysk-judisk boerd och hoppade av vid en resa till Vaesteuropa foer nagra år sedan. Han aer cancerforskare och nu verksam vid Karolinska Institutet. Hans foeraeldrar aer kvar i Ryssland och hans namn boer behandlas med diskretion.

Shapiro torde vara omkring 45 år och Miasnikov (M) var en av hans laerare. S. var också studiekamrat med M:s son. S. laemnade till mig foeljande upplysningar. Samtalet foerdes på engelska som S. behaerskade vael

2. M roerde sig i de hoegsta kretsar, "he was on the top". I den s.k. laekarkomplotten Jan. 1953, alltsa kort foere Stalins doed, laemnade han uppgifter om V.N. Vinogradov, en av de laekare som beskylldes foer att ha tagit liv av Sjadnov Samme Vinogradov hade sjaelv under haexprocesserna pa 30-talet sladdrat om andra laekare som anklagades foer att laborera med giftmord pa ledande funktionaerer.

3. M var en man som inte tvekade att dra foerdel av sin staellning. "He was a goodlooking man who enjoyed life" Levde glada dagar - "girls and so on." Man kan mahaenda inte helt utesluta att han i samtalet med Nanna S. fallit foer frestelsen att goera sig maerkvaerdig, men det aer obestridligt att han kaende personer som i sin tur kan ha haft direkt kaennedom om Wallenbergs vistelse pa sinnesjukhuset. Tanken att han inte skulle ha helt förstått Nannas tyska aer loejlig. M reste som framgår av hans curriculum ofta till vaest foer att delta i internationella kongresser och omstaendigheterna vid hans samtal med Nanna aer sadana att han omoejligen kan ha missat vare sig Wallenbergs namns eller saettet foer hans internering. Det var som bekant M sjaelv som yttrade det laettbegripliga ordet "Mentalkrankenhaus".

4. M:s karaktaer var sådan att han inte ett ögonblick skule tveka att ta tillbaka och foerneka en tidigare utsaga om detta skulle vara opportunt. Hans politiska oeverordnade kunde lita pa at detta var en man som villigt foeljde deras oenskningar

5. M hade bl. a. följande bekanta inom den hoegsta laekarsocieteten: Snezjnevski Denne aer sedan några år (men tydligen inte så tidigt om 1961) oeverpsykiater pa Sovjets haelsoministerium. "He is a terrible man" Med M hade han livliga relationer, "close relations". [Snezjnevski aer uppenbarligen en av centralpersonerna i Sovjets beryktade politiska psykatri. Han hycklar gaerna humanitaera åsikter och bemoeter utlaendsk kritik som foertal, men det aer vael kaent att han svaenger sig med den politiska psykiatrins vanliga klysjor "foerhoejd sjaelvuppfattning", "paranoida tendenser", besatt av reformatoriskt/reformistiskt nit", o.s.v. Man kan utgå från att han fran sin hoegsta post hjaelper till att hålla igång trafiken med falska diagnoser som grund foer tvångsinternering. (anm. av HW)]

5/6

Vadim Smolensky stod också M naera. Han aer professor* i terapi och foerestår en av de medicinska hoegskolorna i Moskva. * Egendomlig titel. M var emellertid chef foer Ryska vetenskapsakademins terapeutiska institut.
Danichevskij den av M tillkallade "kollegan" i samtalen med Nanna kaenner Shapiro inte, men han tror sig ha hoert namnet.

6. En kvinnlig psykiater som laemnat Rysland aer Marina Feinberg, el. Fajnberg. Hon skulle ha vittnat på senaste internationella psykiatrikongressen på Hawaji, också på "the Sakharav hearing" i koepenhamn nyligen. [Enlight mina informationer har han tidigare varit verksam på ett sovjetiskt mentalsjukhuset (Leningrad) och daer bl.a. vårdat en dissident som han foeraelskade sig i och sedan foeljde i exil. Denne man aer Viktor Feinberg Jag skall ta reda på var paret vistas.] (Anm. av HW) Shapiro foereslar att man tar kontakt med denna kvinna

7 Så långt Shapiros beraettelse om M. ..

(document continues)

signed/Harald Wigfors
11 November 1977

6/6

F 2 Eu'

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1998-09-09

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Ambassaden
WIEN

Exp 980909
LOV

Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet

Ambassaden anmodas att, som ett led i de fortsatta undersökningarna i RW-ärendet, hos vederbörande österrikiska myndigheter efterhöra om information kan erhållas på följande två punkter.

1. Den amerikanska experten Susan Mesinai, 123 Bank Street, New York, N.Y. 10014, och som arbetar för RW-arbetsgruppen, besökte 1992 i Moskva den österrikiska ambassaden tillsammans med professor Guy von Dardel, RW:s halvbror och medlem av arbetsgruppen. Man erfor vid detta tillfälle att Österrike från sovjetiska myndigheter skulle ha erhållit arkivmaterial avseende österrikiska medborgare som hamnat i GULAG. Mesinai skulle i sina fortsatta undersökningar gärna vilja ta del av detta material, om möjligt på Österrikes ambassad i Moskva.

2. Mesinai skulle vidare vilja få tillfälle att studera persondossieren över den österrikiske diplomaten Ferdinad Marek, vars personakt skall ha överlämnats till österrikarna. Marek var minister i Prag en första gång sedan Österrike blivit republik och därefter åter en gång efter nazismens fall. Marek greps av sovjetiska trupper i Prag 1945 och fördes till Moskva, där han avrättades 1947.

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Ambassaden
OSLO

Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet

Ambassaden anmodas att, som ett led i de fortsatta undersökningarna i RW-ärendet, hos vederbörande norska myndigheter efterfråga upplysningar om följande norska medborgare:

1. **Erik Kristoffer Bjertnes**, född den 19 maj 1916. Bjertnes, affärsman (vapenhandlare) bosatt i Schweiz, uppgav i Genève i februari 1983 till den svenske chefsrådmannen Gunnar Linnander att han av en sovjetisk agent, Alexander Pavlov (täcknamn), erfarit att RW skulle ha avlidit en kort tid innan på ett sjukhem utanför Moskva. Linnandet höll inne med sin information i något år, varefter han först vände sig till CIA och därefter (1987) till UD (Corell). Bjertnes intervjuades i Genève den 2 oktober 1987 av Hans-Olle Olsson. Något nytt om RW eller Pavlov framkom dock inte vid detta tillfälle.

Pavlov var under tiden 1939 - 1944 verksam i Stockholm som Tass-korrespondent och samtidigt anställd vid den sovjetiska handels-representationen. Bjertnes hade lärt känna Pavlov i Stockholm under andra världskriget. Pavlov är bl.a. känd för sitt samröre med den svenska äventyrerskan Jane Horny.

2. **Tove Flise**, attaché vid den norska legationen i Stockholm under andra världskriget. Flise hade nära kontakter med den norskättade amerikanske finansattachén(och OSS-mannen) i Stockholm Iver Olsen, som var RW:s kontaktman i förhållande till uppdragsgivaren the War Refugee Board i Washington D.C.

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Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet

Som ett led i de fortsatta undersökningarna i Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet vore jag tacksam erfara huruvida en person med namnet Wallberg eller Wollberg varit anställd vid Svenska Röda Korset alt. Internationella Röda Korset någonstans i östra Europa under eller omedelbart efter andra världskriget.

Med vänlig hälsning

Lage Olson
Ambassadråd

Exp. 98-09-09

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